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Abstract 
 
This document represents the conceptual foundations of the EU-FP7 OPTIC project. As 
such, it seeks to provide a range of theoretical resources with which to develop an informed 
and pragmatic understanding of the complex causal processes involved in contemporary 
transport policy-making at the European level. Specifically, this deliverable aims to further 
methodological advancement with respect to the identification, classification, ex-ante 
prevention and ex-post mitigation of policies‘ unintended effects, and the systematic manner 
in which individual policy measures may be combined so as to improve their effectiveness, 
acceptability and feasibility. Overall, we argue that policy packaging can offer a far greater 
potential for achieving policy targets and objectives than single policy measures deployed in 
isolation. Yet, a careful and relatively well designed process must be undertaken for such 
packages to be effective. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Transport systems in the European Union are complex. It is increasingly evident, however, 
that standard policy measures designed to manage these systems are unable to recognise 
and respond in kind to this complexity and that this has profound implications for the 
effectiveness and efficiency of political interventions. Unless improvements are made to the 
manner in which contemporary transport systems are managed and governed, transport 
policy will be unable to ensure that the daily mobility of people, information and materials 
within the EU can proceed in a sustainable direction, without jeopardising broader social, 
economic and environmental objectives.  
A major barrier to effective and efficient policy-making is the continued presence of isolated 
decision-making. This can result in situations arising where several independently-
formulated and implemented policy measures are in action simultaneously. In certain 
instances this may be favourable, as measures that reduce may positively reinforce one 
another. In other instances, however, two or more measures may contradict one another, 
resulting in limited policy effectiveness and wasted resources. In essence, policy-making 
based upon relatively narrow conceptual considerations has two major implications: first, it 
can lead to the very real problem of unintended effects; and second, it fails to exploit the 
potential benefits of synergetic relationships between complementary measures. 
It is this area of concern that the OPTIC project, as a whole, seeks to address. Broadly, it 
aims: 
 
“to help identify in advance possible adverse effects of transport policy 
measures taken in isolation, and to develop methodologies for the design and 
implementation of optimal combinations of policy measures which reduce 
adverse effects and/or provide positive synergies.” 
 
This first deliverable represents the conceptual cornerstone of the project and thus forms the 
basis for later work packages. As a stand-alone document, it makes two contributions. First, 
we develop a comprehensive typology of unintended effects that are liable to exist as a 
result of (well-intentioned) policy interventions in transport systems. The purpose of this 
typology is not to establish a universally applicable taxonomy for all aspects of intentions and 
effects of transport policies, but rather to create a schema tailored to the principle needs of 
policy-makers and associated actors. As a result, the typology is concerned with establishing 
conceptual clarity, providing a useful categorisation of types of non-intentional policy effects 
and supporting the design of policy packages. The final typology is extremely detailed and 
undertakes to analyse the nature of policy effects with respect to numerous variables. 
Nevertheless, its fundamental contributions are evident; it demonstrates the importance of 
actors‘ situational knowledge, the accuracy and breadth of their causal assumptions and the 
real and perceived range of their jurisdictional influence. Furthermore, and equally as 
important, it brings the issue of non-intentional effects to the fore; by acknowledging their 
existence, and by starting to define their characteristics, this analysis affords accounting for 
them in the early stages of policy design, thus reducing the need to take remedial action at a 
later date. 
The second contribution of the deliverable is a proposed framework for effective and efficient 
policy packaging that has an in-built capacity to prevent and mitigate unintended effects. In 
supporting the efforts of later OPTIC work packages, it actively converges on a set of 
interrelated principles that logically support the project of policy packaging in its broadest 
guise. Following a review of policy packaging developments in previous EU-funded transport 
research, four ‗core elements‘ of a policy package are outlined in accordance with key 
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academic and policy literature: primary measure(s); effectiveness measures, acceptability 
measures and feasibility measures. Attention is then directed to the procedural aspects of 
policy packaging, highlighting the importance of setting clear objectives, explicating causal 
assumptions, robustly evaluating distributional effects, acknowledging the salience of 
jurisdictional constraints and approaching policy design in an iterative manner. As discussed 
in Appendix 7.4, the framework outlined in this deliverable was positively received by a 
group of policy-making experts participating in a dedicated workshop held in Brussels in April 
2010. This was a particularly informative event, and generated highly-constructive feedback 
on the strengths and limitations of the approach. 
Finally, the content of this deliverable directly informs research efforts undertaken in Work 
Packages 3 and 4. WP3 examines to what extent current state-of-the-art modelling and 
forecasting techniques can facilitate the identification, ex-ante, of unintended effects and 
thus contribute to their prevention and mitigation. It also examines ways in which 
unavoidable unintended effects can be identified as early as possible and addressed 
through remedial measures. WP 4 examines various EU transport policy packages with the 
aim of identifying real-world ‗best practice‘ examples of policy packaging techniques.  
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background  
 
A wide variety of policy efforts and interventions are undertaken at different policy levels in 
order to promote efficient, accessible and environmentally sustainable transport systems. 
Meanwhile, it is widely recognised that such transport systems are highly complex and that 
their nature is dependent on multiple factors, not least in the European context. This means 
that the design and implementation of appropriate policy measures involve several 
challenges. One such challenge is to ensure that policies actually lead towards their 
intended objectives. This can be difficult to achieve given the presence of combined effects 
with other measures and unanticipated side-effects on other policy objectives or domains. 
One approach to overcome these obstacles is to adopt integrated policy combinations or 
‗packages‘, based on comprehensive policy assessments. However, although integrated 
transport and the integration of transport with other policy domains has been discussed for 
several years, adoption of parallel individual measures is still the most preferred approach to 
designing an intervention, and often the only approach that seems feasible. Moreover, 
despite efforts to develop comprehensive assessment frameworks, policy analysis often 
remains confined to the study of impacts across a handful of input variables and a limited 
range of outcomes. There is thus a need for methodological advancement to support a move 
towards a more comprehensive and integrated understanding of transport and associated 
policies.  
The overall objective of OPTIC is to help identify in advance possible adverse effects of 
transport policy measures taken in isolation, and to develop methodologies for the design 
and implementation of optimal combinations of policy measures which reduce adverse 
effects and/or provide positive synergies. The aim of the OPTIC project is thus to improve 
our collective ability to analyse the likely effects of transport policies and to develop 
methodologies and implementation strategies for systematic policy packaging.  
 
1.2 Purpose and overview 
 
There are four main roles for this deliverable, as reflected in its structure:  
 to provide an overall perspective on available transport policy (including an inventory 
of measures and their effectiveness) 
 to identify types and examples of ‗unintended, adverse‘ (or counter-intentional) 
effects of policy interventions, and to develop a typology, which can help foresee and 
neutralise such effects in advance 
 to develop a framework for ‗policy packaging‘, that is combinations of policy 
measures into packages, which can consolidate and enhance desired impacts, while 
and at the same time reduce the possibilities for counter-intentional ones 
 to provide a framework for other work packages in the OPTIC project 
 
These topics are addressed in chapters 2, 3, and 4. As shown in Figure 1.1 below, the 
contributions made will directly support tasks undertaken in Work Package 3 and 4. Work 
Package 3, Forecasting of synergies and adverse effects, will draw heavily on chapters 3 
and 4 as it seeks to identify various methods and models with which to aid the ex ante 
analysis of unintended, adverse effects. The typology of unintended effects from chapter 3 
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will be crucially valuable here, as will the procedural framework outlined in chapter 4, with its 
emphasis on distributional effects and causal reasoning. Work Package 4, Best practice in 
package design, will also derive considerable input from the procedural 
framework―extending this through the systematic evaluation of different types of policy 
packages. Also, results from this deliverable will feed into Work Package 5 Barriers for and 
good practises of implementation, which will look in more detail into policy packaging and 
implementation issues, including the analysis of selected case studies. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The structure of the OPTIC project. 
 
1.3 Deliverable structure 
 
Chapter 2 of this report deals with transport policy measures and the context of transport 
policy making, especially in the European setting. Transport policy can have a wide variety 
of aims. It may be to seek to change or preserve various elements of the transport systems, 
transport related behaviours and activities, or transport governing markets, institutions, and 
organisations. The purpose of such changes can again refer to a broad range of economic, 
social and/or environmental objectives. 
To obtain such aims and objectives a large variety of policy instruments and measures can 
be adopted. It is necessary to consider the types of policy measures and their effects in the 
context of the policy aims, and the mechanisms that allow the measures to become adapted 
to fulfil them. It is in the interplay between policy aims, available instruments and real 
implementation processes that the consequences – desired, as well as possibly undesired 
ones – of policy measures occur. 
Chapter 2 therefore starts by providing an overview of European transport policy making 
processes and goals. A range of recent key transport policy documents are reviewed. Also 
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key features of national transport policies in seven EU Member States are briefly described 
and compared. 
A main element in the chapter is an inventory of transport policy measures. It is not intended 
as a complete overview of every policy measure, but provides a rich source of examples of 
different approaches, possible unintended effects and adoption barriers. A full list of the 
considered measures is included in Annex 1 to this deliverable.  
Chapter 3 has its focus on the topic of unintended, or as it will be defined, significant 
counter- and other non-intentional consequences which may or do arise directly or indirectly 
through political interventions in the transport sector. Already in chapter 2 some examples 
are given on such effects in connection with a variety of policy measures. A key element in 
chapter 3 is therefore to establish a more systematic understanding of non-intentional 
effects, by working through a series of concepts and dimensions associated with this 
problem, as reported in scientific literature and transport research. This leads to a series of 
definitions and a set of categorisations of non-intentional effects, that is a typology. The idea 
is that such a typology can be helpful to distinguish between different problems and 
approaches which can be taken with regard to each type of non-intentional effect when a 
policy packaging framework (chapter 4) is applied. 
The main function of the typology in chapter 3 is to provide input to the Framework for Policy 
Packaging that is laid out on chapter 4. The aim of the framework is to establish a systematic 
approach to policy packaging that may serve as a guideline (rather than a prescription) for 
combining policy measures into policy packages. The rationale for policy packaging is 
established and a definition of ‗policy packaging‘ for the purposes of OPTIC is provided.  
Chapter 5 provides an overall summary of the Deliverable. 
 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 each have an accompanying appendix that can be found at the end of 
the deliverable. 
The final appendix, 7.4, provides a detailed discussion of an expert workshop held in April 
2010 designed to test the policy packaging framework outlined in chapter 4. 
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2 European transport policy and policy analysis, tools 
and measures 
 
This chapter is comprised of three distinct sections, and also provides the basis for further 
discussion later in the deliverable of unintended effects of transport policies (Chapter 3) and 
a framework for policy packaging (Chapter 4). 
First, Section 2.1 gives a general description of the process of European policy making, 
including an overview of some main bodies involved in transport policy formulation and the 
most relevant instruments in use. 
 
Second, in Section 2.2, a brief review is made of European transport policy together with a 
comparison of some national transport policy approaches and objectives. Of special interest 
are the stated main problems related to transport, the goals for the EU transport policy and 
approaches to achieve these goals. Since transport is, in general, a derived demand many 
policy areas will have some impact on the transport sector. Therefore we will also examine 
some more overarching EU policy documents. 
 
Third, Section 2.3 provides an overview of the inventory of transport policy measures and it 
shows how the inventory can be used to identify and analyse policy measures representing 
a wide range of different objectives, measure types, modes, geographical scales and 
locations. This section also uses data from the inventory to highlight issues related to 
unintended effects of transport policy measures, barriers to implementation and other 
dimensions of policy making.  
 
2.1 The process of EU policy making and tools available for policy 
making 
 
The institutional procedures shaping EU policy have been subject to considerable change 
since its inception. For instance, the European Parliament (EP) has gone from only having a 
marginal role in the policy process to possessing considerable power as the result of various 
treaties. The institutional design has also been an area of extensive debate by scholars and 
politicians. Democratic deficit and the relative power of the EP are just two examples of 
subjects which have been widely discussed (see, for example, Eriksen and Fossum, 2000; 
Crombez, 2000; König and Pöter, 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). There is no ‗single‘ 
process or pattern of EU policy-making (Wallace, 2005). Indeed, the formal rules of decision-
making depend on the various policy domains. Thus, whether the Council of the European 
Union votes through qualified majority voting or unanimity is connected to the issues 
involved. The European transport policy especially reflects this high need for consensus 
(Heritier et al., 2001).  
There are various tools available for EU policy making. First, regulations, directives and 
decisions are essential in this process. Directives give some flexibility to member states in 
implementation; laws on technological standards especially affect transport policy directly. 
There has also been a long term goal of completion of the common market. A free market 
sector in transport has been regarded as a central element in this process and several 
directives and regulations have been passed in order to promote the competitive conditions 
within the transport sector. Still, compliance with EU laws, at national levels, is far from 
complete―thus hindering the success of the policies implemented. What is called the 
―transposition deficit‖ has risen. The main problems are that transpositions are late, 
incomplete and incorrect (Groenleer et al., 2008). The lack of coordinated development in 
national transport systems has also been one of several obstructions. Further, a combination 
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of international rules produced by international organisations and (protectionist) national 
laws makes it difficult to regulate transport. Thus, the EU characteristic of having both 
intergovernmental and supranational elements makes it challenging to implement a common 
market in the transport sector. Particularly, the principle of subsidiarity constrains the tools 
possible for EU policy-making in transport.  
Second, the EU uses guidelines, research and financing of transport infrastructure projects 
to influence transport policy (Janic and Reggiani, 2001). There might be a connection with 
EU powers in different issues and the use of guidelines. Many of the aspects of transport 
policy come under the national governments. Measures, like urban and land-use planning 
policy, urban transport policy and social and education policy take place at the local and 
national level. The use of guidelines might be preferable in such areas. Especially Article 
155 of the EC treaty established a number of guidelines with regards to trans- European 
network.  
In addition, EU has initiated numerous research programs in the field of transport. Research 
is an important factor in order to have an effective and a high-quality policy. The most 
important tools are the Framework programmes. At present, the 7th Framework programme 
(FP7) for Research and Technical Development covers the period 2001-2013. All inputs 
from the FPs are processed by the relevant Directorate – General (DG) -for example the one 
for Research, and the newly created Directorate – General for Mobility and Transport.  
An important role in drafting legislation is played by the European Parliament, which is the 
only directly elected body of the European Union. The European Parliament is working in 
several committees and one of them is the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN). 
The TRAN Committee is responsible for matters relating to the development of a common 
policy for road, railways, inland waterway, maritime and air transport, postal services and 
tourism. TRAN is particularly active in areas of common rules applicable to transport within 
the EU, establishment and development of trans-European network, the provision of 
transport services, transport safety and relations with international transport bodies and 
organisations. The TRAN Committee is supported in its legislative work by independent 
expert advice. Investments are also a crucial policy tool. The European Investment Bank and 
the Regional Development Fund have been the main institutions for financing infrastructure. 
Railways have traditionally been prioritised, but significant investments have also been put 
into roads, airports and waterways. 
A final point to note here is that EU policy making has both direct and indirect effects on 
European transport policy. There are numerous guidelines and directives which have an 
indirect effect on transport. Both environmental and regional policies serve as examples. 
However, the important point is that the nature of EU policy-making processes strongly 
depends on the nature of overlapping policy domains. 
 
2.2 European transport policy – review of current approach and goals  
The main aim of this section is to provide a background for the rest of Chapter 2 and for the 
OPTIC project in general. Three kinds of policies will be described in the following sections: 
overarching EU-policies; transport specific EU-policies; and national policies. Main focus will, 
however, be on the more general EU transport policies as outlined in the 2001 White Paper, 
the 2006 Mid-term Review and the current discussions on the Future of Transport. Finally 
issues related to transport policies, goals and approaches are discussed with respect to two 
questions: has European transport policy changed during the last decade? And, have the 
policies been effective in achieving the goals? 
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2.2.1 Overarching EU strategies, policies and goals affecting transport 
In this section we will briefly describe some of the most important overarching EU-policies 
that have bearings on the transport sector. The overall goals for the Union are laid down in 
the Treaty on European Union. Several of these have relevance for transport. Obviously, a 
well functioning transport system is crucial for achieving a single market for goods in Europe 
and a European industry that is competitive on global markets. Transport also constitutes 
one of several means necessary for promoting social cohesion and level opportunities for 
people in all parts of the union. And although transport in general is a derived demand, the 
transport industry as such is an important part of the European economy, since it accounts 
for about 7% of GDP and over 5% of total employment in the EU. 
The EU work on a Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) has had a significant impact on 
transport. In 2006 the European Council adopted a new Sustainable development strategy 
that built on the Gothenburg strategy of 2001 (Council of the European Union, 2006). This 
was followed up in 2009 by a further renewed strategy in which it was said that ―The SDS 
constitutes a long term vision and an overarching policy framework providing guidance for all 
EU policies and strategies and including a global dimension, with a time frame of up to 2050‖ 
(Council of the European Union, 2009, p.2). In the 2006 SDS seven key areas are identified 
with regard to challenges and operational objectives and targets. Two of these areas are in 
particular transport related (1) Climate Change and Clean Energy and (2) Sustainable 
Transport. Some relevant objectives and targets mentioned for the former were: 
 EU-15 target of reducing total greenhouse gas emissions by 8% between 1990 and the 
period 2008-2012. 
 By 2010 12% of energy consumption (increasing to 15% by 2015) and 21% of electricity 
consumption should be met by renewable sources.  
 By 2010 5.75 % of transport fuel should consist of biofuels as an indicative target. 
 An overall saving of 9% of final energy consumption should be accomplished by 2017 
compared to 2008. 
 
And for the latter: 
 Decoupling economic growth and the demand for transport. 
 Achieving a balanced shift towards environmentally friendly transport modes to bring 
about a sustainable transport and mobility system. 
 The average new passenger car should achieve CO2 emissions of 120g/km by 2012 (this 
target has since then been relaxed, see below (authors comment)). 
 Halving road transport deaths by 2010 compared to 2000. 
 
In the SDS of 2009, not much is added regarding concrete targets related to transport. 
Instead, reference is made to the forthcoming White paper in 2010. In December 2008, the 
‗climate and energy package‘ was agreed by the European Parliament and Council. It 
included targets to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, to increase share of renewable 
energy to 20% and to improve energy efficiency by 20%, until 2020. The package also 
included new conditions for the EU emission trading system, a framework for carbon capture 
and storage and a long term target for emissions from new cars of 95 g CO2/km by 2020. 
In outlining a future strategy for the EU, the Commission has launched a working document; 
Consultation on the future „EU 2020‟ strategy (CEC, 2009a). It is mentioned that a rethink of 
transport policy is necessary. Key elements that are mentioned are better integration of 
networks, developing alternatives to road transport, promoting clean technologies and 
upgrading infrastructure. 
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2.2.2 Review of EU transport approaches, policies and goals 
European Transport Policy (ETP) has been presented in the White paper: European 
transport policy for 2010: Time to decide (CEC, 2001) and in the Mid-term review of that 
paper (CEC, 2006). At present there is a process going on that should result in a new White 
paper on transport in 2010. One part in this process is the communication from the 
commission, A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology led and 
user friendly system (CEC, 2009b). 
There are basically two kinds of goals for European transport policy. The first kind relates to 
the primary function of transport, i.e. to provide a high level of mobility for both passengers 
and goods which in turn is stated as vital to ―...achieving the free flow of people, goods and 
services, to improving social and economic cohesion, and to ensuring the competitiveness of 
the European industry.‖ (CEC, 2006) 
The second kind relates to the negative (external) effects generated by transport, which 
should be minimised. The negative effects most often focused are climate change, local 
pollution, noise pollution, accidents and energy insecurity (CEC, 2008 b). Congestion is often 
mentioned together with these externalities, but is actually closer related to the functional 
goal of achieving a high mobility. It might be seen as a kind of rebound effect of the 
increasing mobility. 
The transport policy papers often focus on approaches to fulfil these targets. These 
approaches might contain required physical changes to the transport system, like shifting 
transport to rail, as well as general policy strategies such as pricing optimisation. The basis 
of the 2001 White paper is the intended decoupling of economic growth and transport 
growth. Four key approaches were proposed: 
1. Shifting the balance between the modes of transport  
2. Eliminating bottlenecks 
3. Placing users at the heart of transport policy 
4. Managing the globalisation of transport 
 
In the Mid-term Review of 2006 the objectives of EU transport policy are retained from the 
White paper of 2001 and should help provide Europeans with efficient, effective 
transportation systems that: 
 ‗offer a high level of mobility to people and businesses throughout the Union‘ 
 ‗protect the environment, ensure energy security, promote minimum labour standards 
for the sector and protect the passenger and the citizen‘ 
 ‗innovate in support of the first two aims of mobility and protection by increasing the 
efficiency and sustainability of the growing transport sector‘ 
 ‗connect internationally, projecting the Union‘s policies to reinforce sustainability, 
projection and innovation‘ 
 
Although the Mid-term review continues in roughly the same direction as the White paper of 
2001, there is some slight shift of focus. Modal shift seems to be given slightly less 
emphasis, for example. At the same time, efficiency improvements within each mode are 
given more attention. Co-modality is also mentioned specifically in the Mid-term Review. It is 
concluded that the measures suggested in the White paper will not be sufficient on their own 
to achieve the EU transport objectives. The tension between achieving the environmental 
targets and at the same time facilitating mobility is mentioned specifically. Further, a 
comprehensive, holistic approach to transport policy and ‗a broader, more flexible transport 
policy toolbox‘ is called for. The less-than-ideal functioning of intra-EU maritime and rail 
transport is identified as a significant problem.  
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A key challenge for urban transport is identified as ―how to increase mobility while at the 
same time reducing congestion, accidents and pollution‖. Urban planning is mentioned 
briefly along with several other policy areas: ‗transport and energy‘, ‗optimising 
infrastructure‘, ‗intelligent mobility‘ and ‗the global dimension‘. Due to transport becoming a 
high-technology industry the need for research and innovation is stressed. The increased 
budget of the European 7th Framework programme for Research and Development is 
therefore a key component in achieving the economic, social and environmental objectives. 
Furthermore it is mentioned in the Mid-term Review that both new infrastructure and demand 
management is needed. 
The EU policy relating to the Trans-European transport network (TEN-T) has been an 
important tool for improving integration of the transport systems in Europe. The TEN-T 
Guidelines was adopted in 1996 and amended in 2004. They are intended to improve 
coordination in the planning of infrastructure projects by the Member States. Another 
important part of the TEN-T policy is the 30 ‗Priority (Infrastructure) Projects‘ across the 
Union. In 2009 about one third of the projected investments amounting to 400 billion € in 
total had been made. Examples of completed projects are the Öresund link, Malpensa 
airport and the Betuwe rail freight line. 
The communication A Sustainable Future for Transport (CEC, 2009b) constitutes part of the 
process which will lead to a new White paper on transport in the end of 2010. Seven broad 
policy objectives are proposed: 
 Quality transport that is safe and secure 
 A well-maintained and fully integrated network 
 More environmentally sustainable transport 
 Keeping the EU at the forefront of transport services and technologies 
 Protecting and developing the human capital 
 Smart prices as traffic signals 
 Planning with an eye to transport: improving accessibility  
 
The importance of taking the long term perspective in order to avoid lock-ins with regard to 
e.g. transport infrastructure is particularly stressed. It is concluded in the communication that 
many of the set up transport objectives have been achieved, but that the environment is an 
area where further improvements are necessary. This especially holds for emissions of 
greenhouse gases. A significant shift of perspective is evident in this document. While 
increased ―mobility‖ was perceived as the key functional aim of the transport system in both 
the White paper of 2001 and the Mid-term Review, here ―accessibility‖ is introduced. For 
instance it is said that transport is a means to satisfy ―a rising demand for accessibility‖. This 
shift also entails more focus on planning issues and in particular the effect that urban 
structures and the location of services has on the accessibility to services. It is concluded 
that ―[t]he trend towards the concentration of activities has produced a large amount of 
―forced‖ mobility, owing to a worsening of accessibility conditions.‖ This new interest in 
accessibility also implies that a greater focus on IT-solutions is required: ―[t]ransport needs 
can also be reduced by increasing ―virtual‖ accessibility through information technology 
(teleworking, e-government, e-health etc).‖  
To alleviate congestion in the transport system and to promote intermodality, improved 
infrastructure capacity is put forward as a key area in A Sustainable Future for Transport. At 
the same time it is concluded that funding for new infrastructure will be hard to find. 
Therefore making better use of existing infrastructure through, for example, appropriate 
pricing for its use is an important task. Integration of different parts of the transport networks 
as well as interconnections between different modes is also emphasised. 
Regarding quantitative targets one may distinguish between direct targets which refer 
directly to the impact category in question―for example, persons killed in traffic accidents or 
emissions of carbon dioxide―and indirect targets that refer to an impact category which has 
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more of an instrumental character with regard to the ultimate target. A number of direct 
targets are present in European transport policies; for example, that road transport deaths 
should be halved between 2000 and 2010. Indirect targets are more common. One example 
is the binding target for a minimum 10 % share for biofuels in transport by 2020 that has 
been passed (CEC, 2008 a) together with requirements for what kind of biofuels might be 
acceptable. These are set to reduce the use of fossil fuels in transport and, hence, 
corresponding emissions.  
An important and quantitative indirect target is that of Regulation (EC) No 443/2009: setting 
performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community‟s integrated 
approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles (EC, 2009). Actually this 
regulation both comprises a target and a policy instrument as it includes penalties for not 
complying with the target. It is stated that by 2015 the average emissions for new passenger 
cars in the EU should not exceed 130 g CO2/km. There will be phase-in rules between 2012 
and 2015 limiting the share of a manufacturers cars that shall be taken into account to 65% 
in 2012, 75% in 2013, 80% in 2014 and 100% from 2015 and onwards.  
In 2008, it was decided that aviation should be integrated in the EU emission trading system 
from 2012 (Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council). The 
directive states that all flights arriving to or departing from an EU airport will be concerned. 
The carbon dioxide emissions will be included but not the emissions of the other greenhouse 
gases, nitrogen oxides and water vapour, that aviation emits. At first 85% of emission 
permits for aviation will be allocated free of charge while the remaining 15% will be 
auctioned.  
 
2.2.3 Comparison of national transport policy approaches and objectives 
Here we chart a brief comparison of national transport priorities and policies in the UK, 
Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria and Norway. In general, the 
structure of transport policy objectives is rather similar across the seven countries covered 
and, indeed, is strongly comparable to objectives at the EU-level. There is a functional 
objective connected to achieving mobility or access as well as a handful of objectives 
relating to negative externalities caused by transport. The functional objective is, however, 
expressed in slightly different ways between countries. In the UK it is expressed as ―to 
support national economic competitiveness and growth‖; in Norway that the transport system 
should cover the Norwegian society‘s transport requirements; and in Germany and Sweden 
that transport should be economically efficient. 
In most cases there is not an explicit hierarchy between the objectives, but in practical policy 
decisions it seems that the functional target nearly always takes precedence – i.e., to build 
and improve infrastructure. One indicator of this is the fact that few environmental targets are 
achieved, which is apparent in many of the follow-up transport policy documents, for 
example the EU Mid-term Review. A more specific example is the Swedish target that 
carbon dioxide emissions from the transport sector should be reduced by 10% between 
1990 and 2010. In 2008, when it was obvious that the target would not be met, it was simply 
removed. 
The provision of adequate infrastructure is obviously a key concern for transport policy 
everywhere, although priorities in this field differ. For instance, in the Czech Republic high-
speed rail construction will be speeded up; in Austria, the Brenner base tunnel will be given 
special priority; and in Denmark a great share of the budget will be spent on the fixed link 
across Fehmarn Belt (together with Germany) and the Metro Circle line in Copenhagen. 
High-speed rail investments have also recently been highly prioritised in, e.g. Spain. In 
Sweden the Government made a directive saying that the transport planning authorities 
should make infrastructure plans in which new roads accounted for at least 50% of the 
available budget for investments in transport infrastructure. 
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Sustainability and its ecological, social and economic dimensions are often mentioned in the 
objectives. In Germany it is expressed that ―[m]obility today should not impede mobility of 
future generations‖. That the transport sector must contribute in mitigating climate change is 
a high level policy objective in almost all countries. The social dimension is however given 
considerably less emphasis than the economic and environmental ones. However, ensuring 
the spatial equity of transport system is an objective at the EU-level. While it is mentioned in 
many cases, it is most pronounced in Norway and Sweden. . 
As is the case at the EU-level, the functional targets are rarely quantified in national policies. 
Quantitative targets specific for the transport sector are common for traffic safety. In both 
Norway and Sweden it is stated that transport policy should be based on a vision of zero 
accidents with fatalities within the transport sector. This vision is complemented with more 
practical quantitative intermediate targets. Regarding greenhouse gas emissions they are 
rarer. Germany has a target to reduce transport related CO2-emissions by 50% until the year 
2030 compared to the year 1990. The German federal government has also approved a 
target of reducing passenger transport intensity by 20% and freight transport intensity by 5% 
until the year 2020, compared to the year 1990. Encouraging a shift to more energy efficient 
and environmentally benign transport modes is mentioned more explicitly as high level 
objectives in the Czech Republic, Germany and Denmark, although it is also mentioned in 
almost all countries in one way or another.  
In the UK, the 1998 White Paper A New Deal for Transport: better for everyone had some 
interesting features in that it explicitly recognised the perceived fallacies of following a 
´predict and provide´ approach to transport management. This new perspective, however, 
lost its influence a few years later. If looking at the contemporary national transport policies it 
seems like a traditional ‗predict and provide‘ approach is still rather influential, even if a 
dissonance might be distinguished. If not so much in practice, policy documents sometimes 
highlight the importance of measures designed to decrease the demand for transport. 
Another objective, used in the UK and in Sweden, which may have similar effects, is that 
transport policy should promote transport modes that are beneficial to health. 
 
2.2.4 Development of European transport policy and its successfulness 
There have been no radical changes in EU transport policy from the White paper 2001 to the 
current date. One noteworthy aspect, however, is the shift in emphasis from increased 
mobility to increased accessibility that appeared in A Sustainable Future for Transport 
(2009). This acknowledgment that transport is generally a derived demand opens up 
consideration for other means of improving accessibility, such as urban planning and virtual 
accessibility.  
Another subtle shift is that, while building new infrastructure is still important, the efficient use 
of existing infrastructure has received an increasing attention. Improved technical 
possibilities brought about by the rapid development in the IT-sector as well as successful 
large scale introduction of congestion charging have been key catalysts for this policy 
change.  
As discussed previously, we can think of types of goals for European transport policy. The 
first relate to the primary function of transport, i.e. to provide a high level of mobility (and 
accessibility) for both passengers and goods and the second kind relates to the negative 
(external) effects generated by transport, which should be minimised. The first kind of goal 
(functional) is seldom, if ever, quantified. The transport policy should achieve a ―high‖ level of 
mobility or a ―free‖ flow of goods, but these notions are not specified further. The second 
kind of goal, on the other hand, includes some that are quantitative. It is often difficult to 
measure whether the policies have been successful in achieving the goals. The main reason 
being that most goals are qualitative in nature, and rather vaguely formulated. It is also the 
case that target fulfilment depends on the total policy landscape – including global 
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agreements, EU-policies, national and local policies – as well as contextual elements, like for 
instance oil prices.  
In A Sustainable Future for Transport (CEC, 2009) it is stated that the environment is the 
policy area where further improvements are most needed. Some of the quantitative goals 
are indicative and some are binding. There is an indicative target that 5.75% of transport fuel 
used in the EU should consist of biofuels by 2010. This target is not expected to be met. A 
new target for the share of biofuels was adopted in 2008, which implies that a 10 % share for 
biofuels should be accomplished by 2020. There is a target for average carbon dioxide 
emissions of new cars which should by 2015 not exceed 130 g/km. There is a phase-in 
period between 2012 and 2015. In 2007 the average emissions of new passenger cars sold 
in the EU was 158 g/km. 
The EU has adopted an overall emission reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions of 
20 % between 1990 and 2020. If other developed countries commit themselves to similar 
reductions the EU will move to a 30 % reduction. For the sectors outside the EU Emission 
Trading System (ETS), a reduction of 10 % between 2005 and 2020 is proposed. It is not 
specified how much respective sectors should contribute to reach these targets, but it is 
hardly possible to reach such targets without substantial efforts to limit transport emissions 
compared to the present business-as-usual forecasts. To illustrate the scale of this 
challenge, greenhouse gas emissions from transport in the EU increased by 28 % between 
1990 and 2006. 
In regard to road safety, transport deaths should be halved by 2010 compared to 2000. This 
goal is not projected to be met, although a quite substantial reduction of about 40% is 
projected. 
The decoupling of economic growth from transport volume may be regarded as a semi-
quantitative goal. It is rather easy to measure how much decoupling actually occurs, but the 
goal only says that it should be achieved, not to what extent. A goal of the same type is 
‗[a]chieving a balanced shift towards environmentally friendly transport modes‘. It is far from 
clear what defines a balanced shift and what has been achieved, or not, in this respect. 
A factor hindering efficient goal achievements is that a level playing field with regard to the 
taxes that different means of transport pay, still seems far away. No carbon tax (or tax 
whatsoever) is levied on air and sea fuel. Furthermore, and as important, international air 
fares are still exempt from VAT. In 2012, aviation will be included in the EU emission trading 
system, but according to predictions the price of the emission permits will only amount to a 
fraction of what road transport pays for its emissions. As noted, only carbon dioxide from 
aviation is included, water vapour and nitrogen oxides emitted from aircraft together has 
almost as big climate impact as the carbon dioxide, but they are not included in the ETS 
(Lee et al., 2009). 
The Mid-term Review (CEC, 2006) acknowledges the inherent tension between achieving 
the environmental targets and at the same time facilitating mobility as a means for economic 
growth. If it turns out that, as voiced by some experts, improvements in vehicle energy 
efficiency and increase in use of carbon neutral fuels are not sufficient in order to reach the 
climate targets, this conflict may increase. In some cases relations between goals is 
dependent on what approaches/policies that are used. For instance, reduced speeds as a 
means to improve traffic safety will also, in general, yield lower emissions. On the other 
hand, using heavier cars as a means to improve safety will increase emissions. 
It can be argued that the EU has a clear transport policy, and this policy is not stagnant but 
evolving over time. At the same time, it is clear that because most of the policy objectives 
are defined in a normative way, i.e. the need for sustainable transport, makes it hard, or 
even impossible, to formulate specific policies that will facilitate the delivery of the policy 
objectives. Furthermore, this normative definition of objectives does not allow a transparent 
and unambiguous prioritisation of objectives when, as often is the case, some are conflicting 
Page | 19  
 
each other. Nevertheless, transport policy makers within the EU working at different 
geographical and institutional levels have a reference point which aims to describe what 
transport policy should strive to achieve. 
 
2.3 Inventory of policy measures 
This section documents the project‘s efforts to establish an ‗inventory‘ of policy measures. 
The inventory is reproduced in Appendix 1 to this Deliverable. The purpose of the inventory 
is partly to be a source for illustrations of situations, effects and approaches, and partly to 
serve as a database from which the OPTIC project can access information for forthcoming 
research tasks. 
It is not intended to assemble a complete inventory of every policy measure available within 
the EU, but rather to provide an overview of the different types of measures available for 
policy makers and allow for a closer examination of their nature. However, with respect to a 
specific policy objective, some extensive inventories of measures are available. For 
example, the VIBAT project (Hickman et al., 2009) examined the potential for CO2 emission 
reductions from transport by identifying about 150 individual policy interventions to reduce 
transport CO2 emissions. The Handbook of road safety measures (Elvik et al., 2009), too, 
contains 128 unique measures.  
Building on the previous section, our approach will be ‗objectives-led‘, and we use the 
inventory to highlight policy measures that are designed to meet different policy goals, 
according to some further categorisations. A total of 79 examples of measures from around 
Europe have been gathered and described in order to illustrate the scope and scale that 
such measures can constitute (for full details see Appendix 1). This chapter therefore relies 
on, and briefly summarises, the findings from this exercise. This is carried out through an 
examination of empirical evidence of measures and the introduction of additional measures, 
introduced at different institutional levels, their successfulness and the occurrence of 
obstacles, barriers and unintended effects. 
 
2.3.1 From objectives to measures 
It is widely recognised that there is a need for government intervention in order to attain 
policy objectives related to the transport sector. And there have been considerable attempts, 
within both the academic community and amongst practitioners and institutions at all levels, 
to reach specific targets and to seek and analyse appropriate measures to meet transport 
policy objectives. Here, we will be looking at the ways in which different policy measures can 
be applied in order to meet such objectives. Transport is generally associated with derived 
demand. As such, there are continual interactions between the ―transport system‖ and the 
rest of the economy and society. While different approaches have been adopted in the 
definition of the transport system (see for example Manheim, 1979; Cascetta, 2009), our 
definition embraces all the interacting elements that are organised to produce the stated 
purpose of the transport system, i.e., accessibility and the movement of people and goods. 
Hence the interacting elements include the supply as well as the demand side, along with 
the producers and the institutions directly involved with the functioning of transport.  
The interactions of the transport system with the rest of the economy and society suggest 
that any change in the rest of the economy and society will affect transport and vice versa. 
And external factors such as changes in world market prices will have consequences for 
both the transport system and the rest of the economy and society. Any change in the 
transport system will manifest itself through the changes in its outputs associated with both 
supply and demand and its institutions. We refer to these changes as effects. Examples of 
effects are changes in traffic volumes by mode, changes in infrastructure, changes in land 
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use and logistics, etc. These effects can in turn be translated into environmental, economical 
and social impacts. 
The figure below presents a system perspective of the interactions of the transport systems 
with other sectors of the economy and traces the relation between overall policy objectives 
and transport specific policy objectives, their effects and impacts through the transport 
system. The intention is to provide an overview of the mechanism through which the 
transport-specific policy objectives and measures are formulated and the way the 
implementation of these policy measures can bring about desired results or unintended 
effects.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: A system perspective on the interrelations between overall policy objectives, 
transport policy objectives and measures, direct transport related effects, and final impacts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector specific 
policy objective/ 
policy measures 
Rest of 
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society/ 
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/ Other 
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Transport System/ 
Sector (Supply and 
demand sides as 
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Users 
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…. 
 
Effects: 
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Δ Location 
Δ Car 
ownership 
Δ Capacity 
Δ etc.. 
 
External factors: 
Shocks (changes in world market prices, international policies, etc) 
Long term trends (climate change, globalization, demography, etc) 
Overall Policy Objectives 
Transport Policy Objectives: economy/efficiency, 
safety, environment/ sustainability and 
accessibility/social inclusion  
Transport Policy Measures: financial/economic, 
legal, infrastructure provision, land use and public 
awareness 
Impacts: 
Δ Environment (GHG, 
local pollution, noise, 
land use) 
Δ Economic (efficiency, 
reliability, resilience) 
Δ Social (accessibility, 
employment conditions, 
service quality) 
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2.3.2 Categorisation and characteristics of measures 
Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the basis for the categorisation of dimensions and 
attributes of the selected examples that are given in the inventory of measures. While the full 
inventory of measures is included in appendix 1 to this Deliverable, this section provides a 
summary of the main aspects and findings. 
Primarily, the inventory is structured according to four main dimensions:  
 Policy objective (4 broad categories: accessibility/social inclusion, economy/efficiency, 
environment/sustainability and safety) 
 Policy measure (5 broad categories: legal, financial/economic, infrastructure, land-use 
and public awareness) 
 Geographical scale (3 levels: EU, national, regional/local) 
 Mode (6 broad categories: walk/bicycle, road (private transport), road (public transport), 
rail, maritime, intermodal) 
 
The collection of examples are organised to represent all possible combinations of these 
dimensions. Further, where relevant, the inventory includes the following attributes, which 
are further described in the next section: 
 Barriers (7 broad categories: cultural, institutional, fiscal/financial, legal/regulatory, 
knowledge/information, political or technical, and further 3 broad categories: 
implementation stage, adoption stage and both) 
 Case study location  
 Specific goals 
 Unintended effects (3 broad categories: positive, negative, both positive and negative) 
 Complementary/remedial measures 
 Goal achievement 
 
The inventory of policy measures largely follows and is constructed around the main 
objective categories, and these can be either primary or secondary policy objectives. There 
is, furthermore, a broad selection of policy instruments and measures available for meeting 
one or several of these objectives. In the PROSPECTS project (5th Framework Programme) 
a number of possible measure categorisations were discussed according to their relevance 
for urban transport policies, resulting in seven measure categories. Building on this 
approach, we reduce the number of categories to five broadly defined policy measures as 
stated above.  
The inventory indicates the geographical scale at which these measures have been 
implemented. For our purposes, we define three levels: EU, national and regional/local. It is, 
however, as noted in Section 2.1 not uncommon that whereas policy objectives are 
formulated at one administrative level, the tools to implement or regulate it are available at 
another administrative level. 
The gathering of cases to the inventory is done in order to represent many potential 
combinations of policy objectives and policy measures available to address these objectives. 
Figure 2.2 below illustrates the possible links between these two dimensions and illustrates 
how the data in the inventory can be used. One specific combination of objective and 
measure is also highlighted, and it is shown in the following table how examples of this 
combination can be extracted from the inventory. 
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Figure 2.2: Possible combinations of policy objectives and policy measures (top) and an 
illustration of one combination (bottom). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
POLICY OBJECTIVE POLICY MEASURE
Accessibility/Social inclusion Legal
Economy/efficiency Financial/economic
Environment/sustainability Infrastructure
Safety Land Use 
Other Public Awareness
Other
All combinations 
possible
POLICY OBJECTIVE POLICY MEASURE
Accessibility/Social inclusion Legal
Economy/efficiency Financial/economic
Environment/sustainability Infrastructure
Safety Land Use 
Other Public Awareness
Other
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A combination of environmental/sustainability objectives and financial/economic measures 
can take various forms in practice. The Table 2.1 below lists selected examples from the 
inventory (for the full information provided on each measure see Appendix 1).  
 
Table 2.1: Examples from the inventory of policy measures of combination of environment/ 
sustainability objectives and financial/economic measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure 
(Short name)
SCALE POLICY OBJECTIVE 
(Primary)
POLICY MEASURE MODE 
(Primary)
CASE STUDY 
LOCATION 
(region/city) Country
CASE STUDY CHARACTERISTICS (brief 
description)
Fairway fees National Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Maritime Swedish ports Sweden Fairway fees  differentiated according to 
the emissions of sulphur and nitrogen 
oxides for the ships.
Aviation in the EU 
ETS
EU Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Air EU EU-wide Inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS by 2012
Environmentally 
differentiated 
landing fees
National Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Air Swedish and 
German airports 
Sweden Landing fees differentiated according to 
emissions of Nox and HC
CO2-differentiation 
in motor vehicle 
taxation
National Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Road (private 
transport)
Norway Change in motor vehicle taxation 
structure towards heavier taxation on 
high CO2-emission vehicles
Alternative fuel 
policy
National Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Road (private 
transport)
Norway National policies for promotion of 
alternative fuel
Free public 
transport
Regional/local Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Road (public 
transport)
Templin 
(Brandenburg)
Germany Implementation of free public transport 
(busses) in Templin (Brandenburg)
Promotion of new 
low-emission and 
river-compatible 
inland waterway 
vessels
National Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Maritime Germany Promoting the acquisition of new low-
emission and river-compatible inland 
waterway vessels
Promotion of 
railway sidings
National Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Rail Germany Promoting railway sidings
Promoting the new construction and 
extension as well as the reactivation of 
private railway sidings
Promotion of 
handling 
installations for 
intermodal 
transport
National Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Intermodal Germany Promoting handling installations for 
intermodal transport
Promoting the construction, the 
extension and expansion of publicly 
accessible handling installations
Low Emission Zone Regional/local Environment/sustai
nability
Financial/economic Road (private 
transport)
London United 
Kingdom
Through road pricing, "the Low Emission 
Zone will reduce traffic pollution by 
deterring the
most polluting diesel-engined lorries, 
buses, coaches, minibuses and
large vans from driving within our city."
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2.3.3 Unintended effects  
A considerable number of the examples described in the inventory of measures have 
resulted in unintended effects. Importantly, these can be both positive and negative. In the 
table provided in Appendix 1, these are just briefly mentioned; however, it will be the subject 
of in-depth assessment in later phases of the OPTIC project. Furthermore, where applicable, 
the introduction of complementary/remedial measures is described in a separate column in 
the table. Depending on the circumstances for implementing these measures, they can form 
part of a policy package or represent individual measures triggered by a specific situation.  
Unintended effects are reported in a majority of the examples in the inventory. Table 2.2 
gives some examples of policy measures that have produced negative unintended effects. 
As noted, unintended effects need not necessarily only be negative. The measures chosen 
may also result in positive effects which can benefit other sectors or users, and contribute, 
unintentionally, towards achievements of specific objectives. Table 2.3 illustrates this.  
In certain cases, both negative and positive unintended effects appear as a result of policy 
measures taken. Table 2.4 gives some examples of this.  
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Table 2.2: Examples from the inventory of policy measures with negative unintended effects. 
 
 
Measure 
(Short name)
POLICY 
OBJECTIVE 
(Primary)
POLICY 
MEASURE
GOAL ACHIEVEMENT 
(primary/secondary)
GOAL 
ACHIEVEMENT 
(specific)
Subsidised ferry 
traffic
Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Financial/econ
omic
Negative High emissions of CO2 from 
fast ferries
Yes
Subsidised air 
traffic to sparsely 
populated areas
Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Financial/econ
omic
Negative Increases emissions from 
air traffic
Yes
Mainland 
connection
Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Infrastructure Negative Regional desintegration 
(due to division of 
established  public 
transport and freight 
routes)
Improved accessibility for 
eastbound and 
northbound traffic, while 
southbound traffic still 
dependent on ferry.
CO2-differentiation 
in motor vehicle 
taxation
Environment/s
ustainability
Financial/econ
omic
Negative Shifting from gasoline to 
more diesel cars results in 
more local emissions (Nox 
and PM10)
Average CO2-emission 
from new cars reduced to 
151 g/km in 2009
Change in vehicle 
fleet towards more 
diesel engines
Low-emission zone Environment/s
ustainability
Legal Negative Evasion traffic
Social exclusion (arising 
costs due to the technical 
refitting of vehicles)
Cleaner air in city centres Reduction of fine 
particulates / 
particulate matter (ca. 
10%)
Park & Ride Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Infrastructure Negative Promoting urban sprawl
Deteriorating public 
transport in the urban 
hinterland, by discouraging 
the usage of feeder 
services
Success differs from case 
study to case study
Attracting passengers 
for public transport
Vehicle Scrappage 
Scheme
Economy/effici
ency
Financial/econ
omic
Negative lock-in of predominant 
mobility habits; acts as a 
disincentive for choosing 
alternative modes
Effective: significant 
increase in consumer 
demand, hence sales 
revenue generated
Park & Ride Economy/effici
ency
Infrastructure Negative Total car-km travelled (i.e. 
Including rural trips) 
actually increased as a 
result of the scheme. Also 
Prevention of pedestrians 
and cyclists using similar 
schemes has equity 
implications and may also 
have a negative influence 
on the attractiveness of 
'active' modes
goals achieved only in the 
urban core. Rural areas 
exhbit induced demand 
for private car usage
Traffic volume in 
urban core was 
reduced and valuable 
urban land conserved 
for more productive 
purposes that car 
parking
Fare and schedule 
coordination
Economy/effici
ency
Financial/econ
omic
Negative restricted competition on 
the transport market  
All main goals are being 
progressively achieved; 
the establishment of the 
integrated system is not 
fully accomplished
There is a satisfaction 
with the system both 
on political and user 
level
Road pricing Economy/effici
ency
Financial/econ
omic
Negative Lorries have started to use 
low class roads
Other goals than to gain 
finance are not 
mentioned. 
Environmental impacts 
have not been 
investigated.
Success of the system 
is evaluated by the 
amount of collected 
money, which is 
relatively high
The reward scheme 
for improved public 
transport and 
reduced use of car 
in cities.
Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Financial/econ
omic
Negative Only to a limited extent, 
the cities have applied 
restrictive measures for car 
transport.
In two of the cities, public 
transport has increased 
more than car transport, 
and the reward scheme is 
one among more causes.
N/A
UNINTENDED EFFECTS (impact type 
and description)
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Table 2.3: Examples from the inventory of policy measures with positive unintended effects. 
 
 
 
Measure 
(Short name)
POLICY 
OBJECTIVE 
(Primary)
POLICY 
MEASURE
GOAL ACHIEVEMENT 
(primary/secondary)
GOAL 
ACHIEVEMENT 
(specific)
Car pooling for 
businesses and 
households
Environment/s
ustainability
Other Positive Improved health and 
household economy
N/A N/A
Digital tachograph Safety Legal Positive Preventing unfair 
competition from 
companies
Providing valuable data 
to the haulage company, 
using it as an effective 
fleet management tool
A slight decrease in the 
number of offences
Better enforcement 
and higher 
compliance
Reducing fraud 
possibilities (less 
tampering)
River Information 
Services (RIS)
Economy/effici
ency
Other Positive Development of Public 
Private Partnership (PPP)
Shift of road traffic to 
waterborne transport
Reduction in fuel 
consumption
Considerable increase 
in efficiency, 
reliability and safety 
of inland waterway 
transport
Promotion of new 
low-emission and 
river-compatible 
inland waterway 
vessels
Environment/s
ustainability
Financial/econ
omic
Positive Avoiding possible ban on 
driving due to the 
exceeding of EU air 
quality limits, thereby 
reducing economic risks 
for the operating 
companies
Reduction of 
environmental pollution
Fuel savings
Decrease in pollutant 
emissions
Promotion of 
railway sidings
Environment/s
ustainability
Financial/econ
omic
Positive Modernisation of rail 
freight transport
Significant growth of rail 
freight transport
Attraction of new 
customers
Shifting 1.5 milliard 
tonne-kilometres per 
year from road to rail
Integrative public 
transport tariff
Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Public 
Awareness
Positive Optimal orientation for 
the costumers
Providing and promoting 
mobility
Harmonisation
More standardised and 
easier / easier to 
understand tariff 
regulations
Significant decrease 
in prices for journeys 
across transport 
association 
boundaries
Significant increase in 
numbers of 
passengers
Bicycle 
permeability
Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Infrastructure Positive Success resulted in 
transfer of principles to 
other areas of London
[Brief description] Moderately successful 
- rates of cycling in 
Hackney are amongst 
the highest in London.
Public transport 
management 
system
Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Infrastructure Positive The exact data on public 
transport operation 
allow to declare that 
most of complains on 
nonobservance of public 
transport timetable are 
unsubstantiated ones
Public transport 
management in Brno 
Transport company is an 
unique tool, which 
supports significantly 
primary(secondary goals  
achievement, but no 
data are available
Public transport 
management system 
contributes positively 
to the usage of public 
transport services
Biofuels Environment/s
ustainability
Other Positive less soy-bean feed 
imports are required, 
since high-protein 
animal feed is generated 
as a by-product of 
bioethanol and biodiesel 
production in Austria
in 2007 the 2.95% 
substitution target was 
reached and 
substantially exceeded 
at 4.23%
N/A
UNINTENDED EFFECTS (impact 
type and description)
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Table 2.4: Examples from the inventory of policy measures with both positive and negative 
unintended effects. 
 
 
2.3.4 Additional and complementary measures 
It is a repeating experience that after a policy measure is introduced it turns out to not be 
sufficient for meeting the formulated goal or objective. In certain cases, remedial or 
complementary measures are then added to enhance the policy effectiveness. In about half 
of the cases in the inventory of measures, additional measures have been introduced in 
some form. The table below provides some examples of this. 
 
Measure 
(Short name)
POLICY 
OBJECTIVE 
(Primary)
POLICY 
MEASURE
GOAL ACHIEVEMENT 
(primary/secondary)
GOAL ACHIEVEMENT 
(specific)
Liberalisation of air 
transport
Economy/effici
ency
Legal Both Traffic leakages from regional 
airports to nearby main airports 
due to better frequencies/lower 
airfare, thus undermining the 
rational for subsidising regional 
routes.
Primary: Competition on  
main airports Secondary: 
No competition for tenders 
on regional routesdu to 
few bidders
Lower air fare on main 
airport where 
competition is present
Competitive 
tendering 
Economy/effici
ency
Financial/econ
omic
Both More coordinated network and 
less fragmented policy area, but 
competitive tendering put 
pressure on workers right and 
established labour relations
Initial reduction in costs, 
more coordinated route 
network
Cost reductions of 10% on 
average
Truck toll Economy/effici
ency
Financial/econ
omic
Both Evasion traffic
Due to the higher density of 
controls, increase in traffic 
safety
Generated revenue: 
presumably 4.6 milliard 
Euro (2009)
Modal shift towards rail
Higher capacity utilisation 
of trucks
Decrease in the share of 
the lower EURO emission 
vehicles
Free public 
transport
Environment/s
ustainability
Financial/econ
omic
Both Induced public transport
Improved accessibility / social 
inclusion
Municipal benefits:
Decreasing marketing and 
operating costs of public 
transport
Decreasing external costs 
of transport
Decreasing investment 
needs for infrastructure
A slight decrease in 
private transport
A significant and lasting 
increase in numbers of 
passengers (a six-fold 
increase within the first 
year)
English bus 
concession
Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Financial/econ
omic
Both Bus travel increased amongst 
elderly, but unanticipated 
financial burden on local 
authorities
Relatively successful (brief description if 
applicable)
Truck toll Economy/effici
ency
Financial/econ
omic
Both neg.: spatially limited evasion 
traffic to the low level roads, 
pos.: slightly positive effect on 
modal split (to rail cargo) 
 increasing revenues for 
road operator,
 increasing transport 
efficiency by less unloaded 
vehicles (deadhead) and 
higher payload 
N/A
UNINTENDED EFFECTS (impact type and 
description)
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Table 2.5: Examples from the inventory of policy measures of the introduction of 
additional/complementary measures. 
 
 
Measure 
(Short name)
POLICY 
OBJECTIVE 
(Primary)
POLICY 
MEASURE
COMPLEMENTARY/REMEDI
AL MEASURES (if 
applicable)
GOAL ACHIEVEMENT 
(primary/secondary)
GOAL ACHIEVEMENT 
(specific)
Congestion 
charging
Accessibility/So
cial inclusion
Financial/eco
nomic
Improved bus traffic approx 6 
months before CC was 
introduced
Yes Traffic was reduced by 20-
25% on links into central 
Stockholm
Liberalisation of air 
transport
Economy/effici
ency
Legal defined level of service and 
maximum air fare in the 
concession contracts for 
regional routes 
Primary: Competition on  main 
airports Secondary: No 
competition for tenders on 
regional routesdu to few 
bidders
Lower air fare on main 
airport where competition is 
present
Competitive 
tendering 
Economy/effici
ency
Financial/eco
nomic
Introduction of compulsory 
take over of employees
Initial reduction in costs, more 
coordinated route network
Cost reductions of 10% on 
average
Low-emission zone Environment/s
ustainability
Legal Extension of the low-emission 
zones
Subsidies for the technical 
refitting of vehicles
Cleaner air in city centres Reduction of fine 
particulates / particulate 
matter (ca. 10%)
Free public 
transport
Environment/s
ustainability
Financial/eco
nomic
Adjustment and / or extension 
of the public transport supply 
side
Municipal benefits:
Decreasing marketing and 
operating costs of public 
transport
Decreasing external costs of 
transport
Decreasing investment needs 
for infrastructure
A slight decrease in private 
transport
A significant and lasting 
increase in numbers of 
passengers (a six-fold 
increase within the first 
year)
Traffic circulation 
plan
Environment/s
ustainability
Land Use Strong car parking 
enforcement widespread
primary very successful
Channel Navigation 
Information Service 
(CNIS)
Safety Infrastructure Search and Rescue; close 
cooperation with French 
authorities 
Appears highly successful in 
accident prevention; recent 
evaluation has taken place but 
not in the public domain. 
(brief description if 
applicable)
Increased speed on 
motorways
Economy/effici
ency
Legal 1) A period with increased 
speed enforcement on the 
motorways.
2) Increasing of the penalties 
for speed violations.
3) Considerable amounts of 
campaign activity.
4) Signposting at the 110-
motorways
N/A N/A
River Information 
Systems
Economy/effici
ency
Infrastructure Mandatory transponder 
requirement for vessels since 
July 1st,  2008 for a AIT 
(Automatic Identification 
System)
key tool in modernising 
Danube navigation, boosts 
traffic safety and improves the 
economic viability, reliability 
and planability of transport 
activities on the Danube.
N/A
Biofuels Environment/s
ustainability
Other Fuel standard limits proportion 
of biofuel to be blended to 5% 
by volume. Tax incentives for 
using biofuels
in 2007 the 2.95% substitution 
target was reached and 
substantially exceeded at 
4.23%
N/A
parking space 
management
Economy/effici
ency
Financial/eco
nomic
extending time for parking 
restiction in the evening,
50% increase the price for 
parking, SMS parking service
increasing revenue for Vienna 
municipiality,
(no studies available about 
impact such as economic 
effect, shift to public 
transport, concerning impact 
on GHG emission and noise) 
N/A
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2.3.5 Barriers 
Another aspect of policy measures that the inventory provides insight to is the existence of 
barriers. These can be perceived at both implementation and/or adoption stages. A few of 
the examples are of policy measures that have not been introduced due to barriers, and 
some may have been altered or adjusted in order to overcome these, thus affecting the 
extent to which objective have been met. Barrier categories are defined as following: 
cultural, institutional, fiscal/financial, legal/regulatory, knowledge/information, political or 
technical. 
Barriers are reported to be present in approximately 70 percent of the examples in the 
Inventory. The reported barriers are spread evenly between the three categories: 
implementation stage, adoption stage and at both stages. The real and perceived existence 
of barriers does, however, vary in degree and manifestation and it is likely that what is 
registered in the inventory is to a certain extent a matter of subjective interpretation of 
obstacles met. It is, however, vital to recognise and be aware of potential barriers and, that 
unless certain measures are taken, these can result in the objective(s) not being met. It is 
often such barriers that necessitate the introduction of additional measures. in order to 
overcome their presence. Barriers are the main topic for Work Package 5 in the OPTIC 
project. 
  
2.4 Conclusions 
The EU, its member states as well as European regions and cities normally have defined 
(and documented) transport policy agendas. Such agendas and the objectives they set out 
to achieve seem to be relative similar in broad terms, but usually differ with respect to the 
targets and measures that are considered and selected to fulfil them. The different objectives 
might be in conflict. For example, in the EU, as mentioned both in the Mid-term Review and 
A Sustainable Future for Transport documents, there is a potential conflict between 
environmental objectives and mobility objectives.  
It is clear that policy-makers, at all levels of policy-making have a range of measures at their 
disposal to use as the tools for making transport policy. Examples of these are described in 
Appendix 1. An overview of these measures reveals a few interesting patterns: unintended 
effects occur in the majority of examples, predominantly on the negative side, but there are 
also a few positive effects and examples where both negative and positive unintended 
consequences are reported.  
 Complementary or remedial measures have been introduced in more than half of the 
examples, and would have probably been required in many more, if not all, of the 
examples described. 
 However, in the inventory of measures there were no apparent links between the 
existence of barriers and the introduction of complementary measures. 
 There appears to be no clear relationship between the type of measure introduced and 
the nature of corresponding attributes such as barriers, unintended effects and 
complementary/measures. In other words, it is not possible to conclude that a certain 
type of measures (e.g. legal) results in more or less barriers and/or unintended effects. 
Indeed, the presence of barriers seems to be almost universal across measures. 
 
The complexities involved in meeting a single objective, let alone multiple objectives, even 
within the transport domain, strongly imply that single measures are rarely sufficient. Often, 
several measures may be needed. Furthermore, each individual measure, even if 
implemented in isolation from other measures is likely to face some form of barrier to its 
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implementation and/or its effectiveness and in addition might result in unintended effects, 
which, if negative, may require mitigation.  
The limitations and unintended consequences of isolated transport policy measures have 
been illustrated by the fact that a large number of policies described in chapter 2.2 have 
been associated with limited success in achieving the goals set, and often exhibit adverse 
unintended effects. There is thus a clear need to better understand these effects in order to 
improve the extent to which individual measures contribute towards achieving a certain 
policy target. In developing a typology of non-intentional effects, chapter 3 provides the 
starting point for such a better understanding. 
Barriers are reported to occur in a large majority of the examples in the inventory of policy 
measures. Barriers can take many different forms (political, technical, cultural etc) and to 
various degrees influence the potential goal achievement according to the selected 
measure(s). In cases when significant barriers are not overcome there will evidently be poor 
goal achievement. In other circumstances, the strain to reduce the barrier effect improves 
the understanding and effect of the actual process of selecting or adapting policy measure(s) 
and thereby improves goal achievement. The likeliness of meeting barriers at either adoption 
or implementation stages, or both, is a clear message that potential barriers need to be 
analysed and addressed before policy measures are introduced. A typology of barriers and 
good practices will be elaborated in WP 5 of the OPTIC project. 
As shown in the many examples from the inventory of policy measure, the different policy 
measures have different attributes and their impacts are rarely observed or perceived in 
isolation from other policy measures or policy areas. Selecting adequate policy measure(s) 
implies the need to look at policies in combination, not necessarily because they should be 
introduced at the same time, but since there are interrelations between them. The case for 
policy packaging is also supported in the general literature. Hickman et al. (2009) and 
Hickman and Banister (2007) show how individual measures are unable to contribute 
significantly to CO2 reductions, and how packages of measures are needed. However, they 
do not conclude as to how effects of two ―mutually supporting‖ policies should be added up. 
They assume additivity, although (positive and negative) synergies seem more realistic, but 
difficult to forecast, and recommend more research to better understand such synergies. 
In section 2.2 we identified complex sets of objectives at national and European levels. It is 
no exaggeration to state that many objectives are inherently conflicting, like increasing 
mobility while at the same time reducing transport externalities. This in particular holds for 
the imperative to rather soon make substantial cuts in carbon dioxide emissions. Single 
policy measures cannot address such multifaceted objectives and are doomed to be 
insufficient. In line with this, and even within one policy area, EEA (2009) recognises that 
environmental objectives are a complex matter which cannot be reduced to one single goal 
(e.g. reduce CO2, or reduce noise). The limitation of isolated measures lies in the fact that 
there are more than one problem that need to be addressed, and hence the need for a 
package of policies. They argue strongly that in order ―to achieve ancillary benefits, 
packages of mitigation measures need to be carefully designed‖ (p 9). 
In total, the multifaceted and often conflicting objectives that relate to European transport, 
the complexity of individual policy areas, and indeed the inventory of policy measures 
suggest that packaging of policy measures is the most likely way to successfully address 
and solve the many challenges facing European transport. Packaging of policy measures 
can help locking in benefits, reducing adverse and rebound effects and secure higher levels 
of goal achievement.  
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3 Towards a typology of non-intentional effects  
 
“If ever there was a society in which laws operated as anticipated by their makers, it is 
unknown to history.” (Roots 2004, p 1390) 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 has exemplified a large set of policies and measures in the transport arena. In 
some cases various kinds of unintended effects have been indicated. The review illustrated 
that while unintended effects are, by their nature, often surprising, some of them can 
potentially be mitigated in advance, either by modifying policies, or by integrating them in 
complimentary packages. There is a clear need to develop a more systematic idea, or 
typology, of unintended effects, as a stepping stone towards a methodology for policy 
packaging, where unintended effects can be more systematically considered and potentially 
mitigated. 
The purpose of OPTIC as such is not to establish a universally applicable taxonomy for all 
aspects of intentions and effects of transport policies. It is more to provide useful guidance to 
practice in order to anticipate and prepare for significant unintended effects by building 
packages of policies (see Chapter 4).  
The guidance needs to be based in research. However, the research is equivocal on 
unintended effects of transport policies. It is therefore necessary to review a number of 
contributions and seek to highlight and overcome differences for the most important aspects 
of unintended effects to end up with a substantiated approach. 
The purpose of the present typology is to, 
 Develop clear definitions of ‗unintended‘ (or ‗non-intentional‘ as they will be labelled 
here) effects‘ of ‗policies‘, and related terms,  
 Provide a systematic and useful categorisation of types of such policy effects  
 Enable guidance on how transport policies, transport policy packages and transport 
policy processes can be designed to consider ex ante, and if necessary, mitigate ex-
post, these effects (the latter is dealt with in Work Package 3) 
  
A brief look at related literature illustrates that there is not one single way to operationalise 
non-intentional effects and no one overarching logic that commands a certain approach. 
Therefore the approach and structure of the chapter does not right away establish and 
populate a rigorous typology, but moves towards it through a series of critical examinations 
and examples. Hence this chapter will: 
 Briefly overview the sources of knowledge that inform this typology; specifically, key 
literature where non-intentional effects have been defined and/or analysed  
 
 Outline the main concepts, dimensions and distinctions involved, provide definitions 
and delimitations for them one by one, and along the way include examples to 
illustrate ways to interpret and distinguish between, for example, different types of 
unintended effects 
 
 Review some contributions to explain and point to why non-intentional effects may 
occur, referring to different scientific disciplines and literature 
 
 Move towards an overall concept and structure as a first draft typology, which is to be 
improved and qualified along the OPTIC project 
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3.1.1 Sources of knowledge and research informing the typology 
It can be assumed that most human actions are accompanied by un-intended consequences 
or effects. It is clear that political interventions as well as innovations are leading to 
unintended, adverse or unexpected effects especially in complex socio-technological 
systems such as transport (see Grunwald, 2002; 2008). Decisions relevant for future actions 
have to be taken, but the future is something unknown. Decision making always has to deal 
with a certain degree of uncertainty and risk (Bechmann, 2007). The decisions may not be 
leading to the effects that were intended, or may lead to effects that were not intended. 
Policy effects that differ from directly intended ones have been studied by research in 
different scientific disciplines, as well as in more specific transport research work. ‗Negative‘, 
‗adverse‘, ‗unanticipated‘, ‗unintended‘, and ‗unwanted‘ consequences are commonly 
referred to, as are sometimes also ‗uncomfortable‘ (Hallsworth et al., 1998), ‗deceptive‘ 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2002), ‗perverse‘, (Albalate and Bel, 2008), ‗paradoxical‘ (Knill and Lemkuhl, 
1999), or even ‗self-defeating‘ (Sunstein, 1997) effects.  
Scientific disciplines contributing to uncover such effects include a wide field from natural 
sciences and engineering over to general philosophy of human cognition and rationality, to 
sociology, economics, political sciences and technology assessment, to mention some major 
ones. The former types of research (natural and technical sciences) can inform us about, for 
example, possible undesired environmental effects arising from interactions between 
physical components in the transport system. The social sciences may on the other hand 
help foresee or explain, for example, behavioural responses to policy interventions that may 
be neither obvious to, nor comfortable for, policy and decision makers.  
In the transport area contributions to such knowledge come from research and practice in 
fields such as transport planning, policy analysis, assessment, economics, geography and 
psychology (Goodwin, 1998; Marshall and Banister, 2000; Feitelson, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2009; 
Talvittie, 2006; Laird et al., 2005; Lindqvist, 1998 and many others).  
Generally, research literature can contribute to the present work in two ways. First, it can 
provide concepts, distinctions and examples to help develop a general typology of what will 
generally we will term ‗non-intentional‘ effects. This will be addressed in Sections 3.2 and 
3.3. Second, research can be useful to identify and organise possible causes or explanatory 
mechanisms behind the various unintended effects. This is discussed in Appendix 7.2.  
 
3.2 Main distinctions and definitions of unintended effects 
This section will concentrate on how to define and clarify ‗unwanted‘ or ‗unintended‘ side-
effects of transport policy measures; or what we more precisely will call: significant counter- 
and other non-intentional consequences which may or do arise directly or indirectly through 
political interventions in the transport sector; where ‗counter-‘ refers to an opposite or 
modifying effect to what is intended, while ‗non-‘ more generally means outside, but not 
necessarily ‗counter‘ to the original intentions. These terms will be further discussed and 
defined below.  
Other terms such as ‗unanticipated‘, ‗adverse‘, ‗perverse‘ etc. are ones we consider as 
secondary to this overarching perspective; some of which will be given specific definitions, 
either as subcategories to the ‗intentional/non-intentional‘ dichotomy or as categories in 
other dimensions.  
3.2.1 ‘Policy’ 
The term ‗policy‘ has many meanings and definitions. We adopt a rather straightforward view 
on policy as ‗public policy‘ defined for example as a decision or a set of interrelated 
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decisions taken by political actors concerning goals and means of achieving them in a 
specified situation (see Jenkins 1978). We do not observe a strict distinction between 
‗policies, and notions such as ‗plans‘, ‗programmes‘, ‗projects‘, etc, as this terminology differs 
across countries (DG TREN, 2005). 
Policy might be understood in terms of both ideas and processes. Whereas policy ideas 
relate to the aims and goals of a certain decision, the term policy process implies that also 
the process of formulating and implementing the ideas in practice should be seen as part of 
the policy formation. It makes it clear that policy is, in essence, never static but under 
continuous development over time. It is a dynamic process, where the conditions for 
formation and implementation (in terms of actors involved, problem definitions, power 
relations etc) are changing continuously (Palm 2001, Hill 1997, c.f. Lipsky 1980). 
In the context of OPTIC, this definition means that a policy might refer to a specific 
intervention, or program of interventions, but also formation of the (program of) 
intervention(s) and the process of practical implementation. 
The key focus when we consider the effects of policies is nevertheless on the particular 
interventions that has its genesis as intended action (‗goals and means‘) by political actors. 
These ‗political actors‘ in connection with interventions and their intended effects are 
primarily the ‗authorised decision makers‘; meaning elected officials, and those civil servants 
they delegate policy making responsibilities to.  
A policy objective is a specification of the policy intentions; a policy measure is the directed 
means or authorised action to achieve the objectives. An unintended effect of a policy 
decision can thus be defined broadly as ―a consequence that diverges from an authorised or 
directed policy action.‖ (Lindquist, 1998, p. 112). 
Political actors do not operate in a vacuum, but are constantly engaged in relations with 
other actors, interests and institutions. The idea in this typology is to maintain a focus on the 
consequences of authorised policy intentions and actions, while of course recognising the 
socially embedded nature of these actions within wider governance structures.  
3.2.2 ‘Intentions’ 
To begin with, non- and counter intentional effects are the core notions that need to be 
defined. Especially since the concept of „intentions‟ in science and public policy is sometimes 
controversial and nebulous. What are intentions? Whose intentions count? How are 
intentions observed? We provide the following answers. 
We are taking, as our point of departure first of all core definitions provided by the Oxford 
English Dictionary (1989), whereby something is ‗intended‘ or ‗intentional‘ if it is ―purposed to 
be done or accomplished‖; and ergo something is ‗unintended‘ or ‗unintentional‘ if it is ―not 
done with, [or] not arising from, intention.‖  
Our scope is primarily effects in regard to political decision makers‟ intentions with respect to 
the policies they design and adopt, and this includes various objectives or goals. The main 
type of evidence of the intentions is the explicit aims or goals stated for a policy intervention. 
For example, the European Commission states as Article 1 in their proposed Directive on 
labelling of tyres with respect to fuel efficiency and other essential parameters that ―[t]he aim 
of this Directive is to increase the fuel-efficiency of road transport by promoting fuel-efficient 
tyres.‖ (EC, 2008, p. 13). 
The intervention may also affect more general aims or goals defined for broader policies to 
which effects of the intervention can be associated. For example, the Commission in its 
proposal also states that ―[a] harmonised labelling scheme will reduce the administrative 
burden on Member States and the tyre industry. It will avoid fragmentation of the internal 
market and provide a level playing field for all‖ (ibid., p. 8). We develop the distinction 
between primary and more secondary intentions further below. 
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Intentions and interests of other actors than ‗political decision makers‘ may of course also be 
of interest when policy effects are evaluated, as evaluation literature strongly posits (Kusek 
and Rist, 2004; Chen, 1996). Furthermore, intentions may not always be clearly stated, or 
conceived, and they may even be contradictory. Nevertheless, we believe that the most 
sound basis for a typology to help anticipate unintended policy effects is to assume some 
goals of the policy makers when they set out to adopt a policy.  
For an overview of a range of policy aims and objectives in the transport sector see chapter 
2.  
3.2.3 Consequences and effects – primary and secondary 
We treat ‗consequences‘ and ‗effects‘ as synonymous. Effects are thus generally discussed 
here in terms of causation, whereby a political intervention ‗I‘ has primary intended effect(s) 
but potentially multiple consequences ‗A‘, ‗B‘, ‗C‘ etc., some of which are likely to be 
unintended, and/or unanticipated to some degree. 
The effects that relate to specific, explicit goals (intentions) we call primary effects. In the 
case of, say, enforcement of speed limit measures near schools to protect school children 
from accidents the primary effects of this policy (positive or negative) concern children‘s 
traffic safety in the area.  
Effects may also refer to other objectives, unspecified in this instance, but which 
nevertheless retain a degree of importance to pertinent actors, which we call secondary 
effects. This could be impacts of the traffic safety measures on other target groups, say 
safety of adult road users in the area, or on other goals, say keeping police enforcement 
expenses low, or energy savings in traffic.  
‗Results‘ and ‗impacts‘ are related terms for different subsequent stages of effects of policies 
rather than different goals. According to European Union Policy Assessment guidelines 
‗results‘ are the immediate effects on the recipients of an intervention (EC, 2009). This is 
very close to the notion of a primary effect adopted here. ‗‗Impact‘ can be defined as a 
subsequent change in some endpoint of interest (economy, environment, etc), beyond the 
direct and immediate interaction with the recipients.  
Hence in the example above the ‗results‘ may be considered in terms of changed behaviour 
of the target group (drivers slowing down or not) while the ‗impacts‘ may be depicted as 
fewer child fatalities and injuries, or as even broader measures of human or community 
health, including impacts with regard to secondary effects.  
Considering the systemic character of transport, and its status as a derived demand, in 
many cases secondary effects arise that are either ‗transmodal‟ (i.e. having an operative 
influence on one or more other transport modes than the targeted one) or ‗transsectoral‟ (i.e. 
having an operative influence on one or more other sectors of the economy) This is in 
addition to ‗intra-sectoral and –modal‟ secondary effects within the regulated mode, for 
example vehicle energy efficiency effects of vehicle safety measures.  
The above are of course not mutually exclusive, there can be various both primary and 
secondary effects of a policy. Before looking for actual examples from the literature we will 
consider how to evaluate different kinds of effects, how to distinguish more clearly ‗good‘ 
from ‗bad‘ ones. 
3.2.4 ‘Positive’ and ‘negative’ consequences – the normative aspect 
Some consequences can be perceived as ‗positive‘, ‗beneficial‘; others as ‗negative‘, or 
‗adverse‘ by some or all policy actors. Both sides are in principle relevant not least because 
different policy actors are likely to have different views and opinions.  
As already stated, the intentions and objectives defined in connection with policy adoption is 
our basic reference. This means that judgment or valuation of the effects (‗good/bad‘) will 
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first and foremost be oriented after their influence on fulfilling the intentions, in direct 
(primary) and indirect (secondary) sense as above; hence we can talk in the first instance 
about ‗intentional‘ versus ‗non-intentional‘ and ‗counter-intentional‘ effects, rather than 
necessarily good or adverse ones. The first, ‗intentional‘ ones, are by our definition 
desirable; the second, non-intentional ones, mean they may be desirable or not, the third 
type, counter-intentional, arguably the most interesting one, is inherently problematic, for 
obvious reasons. 
First, we consider non-intentional effects that in some way possess a significant degree of 
operative influence on primary objectives, thereby altering the net expedience, or 
‗usefulness‘, of the intervention. Such unintended effects can be expedient (i.e. 
serendipitous, obtaining a desirable outcome in an accidental way), or inexpedient (i.e. 
‗adverse‘, or rather counter-intentional). While the former are interesting and worthy of 
analysis, they rarely receive the levels of concerted attention devoted to the latter in the 
academic literature. In contrast, ‗adverse‘ consequences have been identified in ex-post 
analyses of myriad transport policies. These are not rare; many decades ago, in 1967, 
Hirschman noted ‗the centrality of side-effects‘ (Talvittie, 2006). This refers to a situation 
where side-effects, rather that original intentions become key for the success or failure of a 
project.  
We need to be careful to label anything as generally ‗adverse‘. The Oxford English 
Dictionary (1989), defines ‗adverse‘ as ―[something] opposing any one's interests (real or 
supposed); hence, unfavourable, hurtful, detrimental, injurious, calamitous, afflictive.‖ In the 
present terminology, we adopt, as already noted, the policy makers‟ view of this, and replace 
adverse generally with the two categories counter- and non-intentional, where ‗counter‘ 
means something that works to the opposite (detriment) of reaching a policy objective, while 
‗non‘ refers to something generally not on the radar of the policy makers, but still of concern. 
Thus, if a particular intervention was designed by policy makers to improve road safety and 
reduce noise levels, any unintended effect resulting from the intervention, in order to be 
classed as counter-intentional (‗adverse‘ in this sense), it would have to, in some meaningful 
sense, be detrimental to those two objectives, for example by surprisingly enhancing the risk 
of different types of accidents than the ones directly addressed by the intervention. If the 
intervention affects other objectives than safety and noise as well, say energy use, or 
enforcement costs, these secondary ones are included in more broad term of ‗non-
intentional‘ effects for further investigation; since the degree of detriment to an objective may 
be less immediately obvious. If it is immediately clear that the secondary effect is counter to 
a prevalent (if not the primary) intention, it can be termed ‗cross counter-intentional‘.  
In some situations negative consequences of policies are also referred to as ‗perverse‘. The 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport provides the following example: ―Another 
distortion, perhaps more common to some European countries, involves tax deductions for 
commuting costs, which subsidises employees who live far from their place of work. These 
examples show how land-use and transport pricing and fiscal policies can have perverse 
effects when they encounter each other‖ (ECMT, 2002, p. 39). 
The notion of ‗perverseness‘ here refers to contradicting effects of two policies, not just 
between a policy and an objective, as for the notion of ‗counter-intentional‘. To avoid again 
the strongly normative connotations we maintain the term ‗counter-intentional‘ (for opposite 
to target) and use ‗contradictory‘ (for opposing measures), respectively.  
Figure 3.1 depicts the general concepts of primary (intentional and counter-intentional) and 
secondary effects. A further category is added, the net effect, as a sum of the effects in 
different directions with regard to the objective. In the examples, the net is positive, which of 
course need not be the case. The secondary effect is not ‗intentional‘ but may consist of 
more or less serendipitous and cross-counter-intentional ones. The ‗net‘ effect‘ of secondary 
effects is considered per impact, but may also be conceived across impacts if methods for 
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aggregate consideration can be applied. Figure 3.2 illustrates the notion of contradictory 
effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Basic types of policy effects – primary and secondary  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Starting point 
 
Main aim 
Other 
objective  
1 
3 
2 
5 
1 
 
Intervention 
6 
P = Primary effects, towards main aim 
 1 = Primary, intentional 
2 = Primary, serendipitious 
3 = Primary, counter intentional 
4 = Primary, net effect 
S = Secondary effects, towards other objective 
5 = Secondary, serendipitious 
 6 = Secondary, cross-counter-intentional 
7= Secondary, net effect 
   
4 
7 
 
Effects 
Page | 37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Contradictory effects M and N from interventions m and n towards aims M and N  
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Page | 38  
 
 
A striking example of a primary counter intentional effect is provided by Robinson (1996) in 
her detailed analysis of the introduction of mandatory bicycle helmet legislation in Australia. 
The legislation was introduced explicitly to reduce the proportion of cyclists suffering head 
injuries and a superficial analysis of the available data appeared to indicate that the 
legislation had achieved its intended effect. In the state of Victoria, for example, the 
percentage of cyclists wearing helmets increased from 31% to 75% in the first year of the 
legislation. Similar trends were evident elsewhere in the country, with the percentage of child 
cyclists in New South Wales wearing helmets increasing from 31% to 76% (reaching 85% for 
adults). Moreover, the proportion of head injuries in hospitalised cyclists fell by 13%. 
However, longitudinal data also revealed that the mandatory legislation had triggered a 
reduction in the number of child cyclists up to 15 times greater than the increase in the 
number of children wearing helmets―suggesting that a major unintended effect of the 
legislation had been to discourage cycling.  
Further evidence from attitudinal surveys lend weight to this criticism; 325 cyclists were 
asked ―would you cycle less if helmets became compulsory?‖ 28% said yes. Given that 
Hillman (1993) estimates the health benefits of cycling to outweigh the health costs of not 
doing so by a factor of 20 to 1, Robinson (1996, p. 463) logically concluded that the 
legislation ―may have generated a net loss of health benefits to the nation.‖ To reiterate, 
Robinson‘s (1996) work can be said to illustrate a primary counter-intentional effect as the 
unintended effect was detrimental to the same objective that the intervention arguably was 
designed to influence: the health of the nation.  
The same form of primary effect has been noted elsewhere in the literature on surface 
transport, particularly with respect to policies designed to curb the extent of private car travel 
in European cities. Goodwin (1998), for example, highlights the complex adaptive problems 
that result from increased supply of available transport infrastructure, particularly road 
building schemes. Using the example of a bypass, he contends that although the intended 
effect of the additional road space is to alleviate traffic and congestion along the original 
route and increase speed on the new route, a counter intentional effect of its construction 
may be an overall increase rise in net travel―the now widely-recognised phenomenon of 
induced demand (Noland, 2001).  
Similarly, in the context of superstore location, Hay (2005) discusses the results from a 
series of simulation modelling of UK policies designed to restrict superstore development on 
the urban outskirts. Insofar as the policies are intended to reduce private car use for 
shopping purposes, Hay (2005) argues, they are admirable. However, the results of the 
modelling exercise indicate that a concentrated distribution of stores in the urban core, as 
per the policy, rather than a dispersed distribution, would significantly increase net trip length 
for shoppers. If increasing trip length is not mitigated by other effects it is thus implied that 
the policy to concentrate stores in the city centre may have negative consequences for 
congestion, pollution, household costs and accidents. As Hay (2005) concludes, the policy 
would have to engender a major modal shift away from the private car in order to offset such 
a major adverse effect. Cairns (1995) has done similar research on the topic of supermarket 
location (see also Goodwin, 1998). Using GIS modelling, surveys of shoppers and interviews 
with retailers, she argues that restrictions on store development on the urban periphery may 
have the unintended effect of leading to calls for greater car parking provision in city centres. 
Cairns (1995) concludes with the observation that a more effective policy would be to 
support the (then nascent) home delivery services offered by supermarket chains, rather 
than the introduction of additional development restrictions.  
As Marshall and Banister (2000) note in the context of the EC DGVII DANTE project, 
however, relatively novel measures such as home delivery services should not be 
considered as panaceas for the problems of car dependency in European cities: all switching 
and substituting measures are liable to exhibit unintended effects of their own. For example, 
in their review of an innovative car parking scheme in Aalborg, Denmark, it was found that 
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while trip length and overall vehicle kilometres travelled had decreased as a result of the 
intervention, the reduction in overall traffic was just 0.3%. This ‗limited‘ effect was further 
jeopardised by the fact that the scheme made it significantly easier for drivers to locate 
parking spaces in the city (an intended effect) and thus, as the authors note, this may 
encourage additional car travel into the city centre (an unintended, adverse effect), thereby 
offsetting the initial benefits of reduced traffic. Another case study, examined in the DANTE 
project, is that of a teleworking scheme in the Netherlands revealed similar unintended 
effects, albeit more limited ones. It was found that commuting trips saved through 
teleworking may have been replaced by additional non-work trips and by additional trips 
taken by other members of the teleworkers‘ households (ibid.). 
As noted previously, in addition to primary unintended, adverse effects, there is evidence in 
the literature of secondary non-intentional effects. To restate, these arise in situations where 
a political intervention has undesirable consequences for an objective, or objectives, beyond 
those which the intervention was explicitly seeking to influence.  
Some of the urban planning literature is particularly illustrative of this phenomenon. Goodwin 
(1998), for example, summarises the work of Hass-Klau (1993) and colleagues on 
pedestrianisation interventions in European cities. The intended effect of the interventions 
was to improve the quality of the urban environment, specifically the nature of what has 
more recently been termed ‗walkability‘ in certain districts (see Southworth, 2005). While this 
intended effect was largely realised, however, the intervention also appeared to have the 
unintended effect of discouraging of retail trade by making it more difficult for individuals to 
access shops by other means, particularly by private car. As it turns out, however, these are 
likely to be short-term effects only and primarily arise due to the disruption of shopping 
patterns as a result of the intervention‘s implementation phase. Indeed, it appeared that the 
pedestrian footfall in newly pedestrianised areas was between 20% and 40% greater prior to 
the schemes‘ introduction, thereby leading to a serendipitous increase in the net volume of 
retail trade (Hass-Klau, 1993).  
As this example indicates, the transsectoral unintended effect―that of short-term decline in 
retail sales―was precipitated by an intermediary transmodal effect: reduced accessibility by 
private car. Yet the literature also contains examples of secondary non-intentional effects 
caused by the same mode of transport that the intervention was designed to influence. On 
first consideration, this appears to be analogous to a primary effect, but the complexity of 
contemporary transport systems are such that individual modes perform a multitude of 
differing roles in different spatial and temporal contexts, which thus subject them to 
interventions aimed at variety of objectives. In other words, an intervention designed to 
influence a particular mode in favour of one objective, can have adverse, unintended effects 
on another objective via the same mode.  
Consider, for instance, Parkhurst‘s (1995; 2000) comprehensive analyses of the 
effectiveness of bus park and ride schemes in UK regional cities. The principal intended 
effect of these interventions was essentially twofold: first, to reduce overall traffic in the 
central urban area by encouraging modal shift from private car travel to bus travel; and 
second, to attract more people into city centres for economic reasons. As with previous 
examples, the Parkhurst‘s (1995; 2000) survey data demonstrated the intended effects were 
realised: between 42% and 81% of the scheme users questioned had previously travelled by 
private car all the way into the central urban area from the urban hinterland, and between 
2% and 12% had previously travelled to other locations altogether. However, between 5% 
and 40% had previously made their entire trip to the centre by public transport; thus a major 
unintended effect was the creation of additional car trips in the hinterland beyond the 
geographical area covered by the park and ride services. Clearly, this had a detrimental 
impact on parallel objectives relating to the reduction in absolute travel by private car, 
regardless of urban/rural location (see also Marshall and Banister, 2000). 
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A more subtle type of non intentional transsectoral effect is reported in Levine et al.‘s (2006) 
analysis of seatbelt law enforcement in the southern United States. The authors examined 
the consequences of the disparity in so-called ‗primary law‘ legislation between the adjoining 
US states of Louisiana and Mississippi. In Louisiana, legislation was passed allowing police 
officers to apprehend any motorist seen not wearing a seatbelt. Here the authors observed a 
significant decrease in the disparity between African Americans and White Americans with 
regard to motor vehicle crash mortality rates. In Mississippi, on the other hand, efforts to 
introduce a similar legislation had been thwarted by concerns raised over potential 
discriminatory racial profiling of motorists by law enforcement agencies. Here a significant 
increase in the racial disparity was observed. The authors conclude that the ―successful 
opposition to primary seat belt laws may have the unintended effect of worsening racial 
disparities in mortality‖ (ibid., p. 143). 
Finally, in the context of secondary non-intentional effects, it is worth noting that 
contemporary transport systems can also be the target of transsectoral effects that originate 
elsewhere (Hallsworth et al., 1998). Clearly, as transport is essentially a derived demand, 
this is no surprise. However, recently the policy implications for transport of policy 
developments in other areas have received more attention, not least in the light of concerns 
over growing transport impacts on climate and the environment (EEA, 2008). For example in 
the area of food production, transport has been highlighted as an important element of the 
logistical chain from 'farm to fork', with the potential to influence transport emissions 
throughout the whole process of producing and consuming food. Many factors of food 
production and consumption, ranging from purchasing power, domestic availability of 
foodstuff, product expiration dates, marketing, and technological developments have been 
identified as influencing transport demand, for instance by sometimes leading to increased 
transport (EEA, 2008, p. 9). As another case, a foresight study by the Interdisciplinary 
Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences found that developments in key 
areas like demographics, attitudes, labour markets, institutional arrangements and science 
and technology all may significantly affect trends in the transport sector (ICCR 2004). For 
example, the overall ageing of the population is expected to affect mobility through higher 
rates of employment amongst people aged 60 and above, which will generate higher levels 
of commuting travel. 
  
3.3 Building a typology of unintended consequences  
3.3.1 ‘Knowledge, attention and anticipation’ 
Effects such as the above may be known or not known, anticipated or not anticipated; 
receiving attention or not; they may be neglected, misunderstood or suppressed. Knowledge 
about effects is critical for informed action. Is there knowledge or not? Who possesses it? If 
not, can it be produced; and the effects modelled? How certain is the evidence? The topic of 
knowledge appears at a first glance as an opportunity to introduce further types of effects 
(e.g. ‗unknown‘ effects versus ‗known‘ ones). However these phenomena refer more to 
whether some possible effects are perceived or not in a given situation. A key interest in 
addressing this question is that it may provide steps towards understanding why counter-
intentional effects may arise, and therefore possibly how to mitigate them.  
We will first make a basic distinction between situations were effects are ‗known‘ (labelled 
‗W‘) versus ‗not known‘ (X).Then we map these onto the previous categories of intentional 
(here labelled ‗A‘) and non- intentional (‗B‘) effects, which are divided into two, nemely, ‗B1‘ 
counter-intentional effects relating to the primary objectives, and ‗B2‘, relete to other 
objectives and hence correspond to the category of Secondary effects This is illustrated in 
Table 3.1.  
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Most important here is that there is no necessary match between intention and knowledge. 
There may be some counter-intentional effects that are known in advance and therefore 
possible to take into account, whereas others are not and therefore impossible to take into 
account directly. Conversely some intentional effects are known, while there may also be 
unknown (e.g. serendipitous) effects with regard to the intention. But knowledge of effects 
with regard to intentions are, ceteris paribus, more likely to be operational if intentions, aims 
and targets are clearly specified, and conceived with operational concerns in mind.  
In Table 3.1 the categories are defined and illustrated with a simple example of a 
hypothetical measure to reduce the fuel consumption of transport by introducing a fuel 
efficiency standard.  
 
 Consequence dimension 
 
A. Intentional 
B. Non intentional 
B1 Counter intentional B2 Secondary 
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 d
im
e
n
s
io
n
 
 
W. ‗Known‘ 
The consequences that 
decision makers 
intended with the 
intervention 
------- 
Average fuel 
consumption of new 
vehicles is reduced; 
less fuel is consumed 
Counter-intentional 
effects that were 
anticipated at the time 
of decision 
------- 
Cars are driven longer 
and consume more fuel 
due to lower fuel 
cost/km (rebound 
effect); models may 
predict the effect  
Secondary effects that 
were anticipated at the 
time of the decision 
------- 
Longer distances 
driven lead to increase 
in congestion; 
 models may predict 
the effect 
 
X. ‗Unknown‘ 
Advantageous effects 
that are not known; 
serendipitous 
------- 
New cars inspire some 
people to „green driving‟ 
lifestyles, saving 
additional energy 
Counter-intentional 
effects not known at 
the time of decision 
------- 
Car manufacturers 
economically 
challenged by the 
standard abandon 
plans to develop even 
more energy efficient 
cars 
Secondary effects not 
known at the time of 
the decision 
------- 
Less public propensity 
to use alternative 
travel modes due to 
cheaper car travel, 
leading to line closures 
 
Table 3.1 Consequences versus Knowledge, with a speculative example of a fuel efficiency 
standard. In the example the „A‟ effects relate to the purpose of fuel saving effects in a 
positive way, either as known (anticipated) AW or not known (unanticipated) AX. B1 are 
negative effects with regard to the fuel saving intentions, again known (B1W) or unknown 
(B1X). B2 effects are ones that influence other objectives than fuel efficiency, such as 
congestion or use of public transport. 
 
 
In the example it is assumed to be known that fuel use of the new vehicles will decrease per 
kilometre, which corresponds to the intention (AW). The counter intentional effect that cars 
are then driven longer (B1W), is also known and may be modelled in advance, possibly with 
associated models for some secondary effects (B2W). The unknown effects include here 
some that people might change behaviour in other ways that are supportive of the intention 
(AX), while some industries are forced to give up unadvertised plans for more radical fuel 
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savings strategies (B1X). Unknown secondary effects could include effects on public 
transport use (B2X). The example is highly stylised, and serves mainly to cross the two main 
dimensions, that will be extended further below. It is clear that the main interest would be to 
learn more about the B1X and B2X types of effects.  
It must be noted that the question of knowledge of policy effects of course cannot be 
adequately dealt with as simply as an ‗either- or‘ situation. First of all we cannot easily delimit 
the relevant knowledge for a policy decision to such knowledge possessed personally by 
decision makers in the same manner as we could for the intentions, where we could claim 
decision makers legitimately ‗own‘ the intentions when making a policy decision within their 
jurisdiction. Decision makers are hugely dependent on knowledge resting elsewhere, 
commissioned to them, being produced during the process, or embedded in assessment 
tools like transport, safety or air quality models. In other cases new knowledge may be called 
upon, commissioned, or measures taken to make it available in the longer run (e.g. strategic 
research programs), and decisions may even be postponed until it is available. Hence 
knowledge availability is generally far more plastic than assumed in Table 3.1. 
One way to depict this plasticity is by examining the relative distance between knowledge 
production and the decision ‗situation room‘; such as in the ―ladder of research utilisation‖ 
notion (Landry et al., 2001) – see Table 3.2. Still, relevant research cannot always be 
assumed to exist or be in the ‗pipeline‘.  
 
Stage 1 Transmission:  
―I transmitted my research results to the practitioners and professionals concerned.‖ 
Stage 2 Cognition:  
―My research reports were read and understood by the practitioners and professionals concerned.‖ 
Stage 3 Reference:  
―My work has been cited as a reference in the reports, studies, and strategies of action elaborated by 
practitioners and professionals.‖ 
Stage 4 Effort:  
―Efforts were made to adopt the results of my research by practitioners and professionals.‖ 
Stage 5 Influence:  
―My research results influenced the choice and decision of practitioners and professionals.‖ 
Stage 6 Application:  
―My research results gave rise to applications and extension by the practitioners and professionals 
concerned.‖ 
Table 3.2 Ladder of research Utilisation (adapted from Landry et al., 2001) 
 
 
In addition to the remoteness of the knowledge there are degrees of quality, certainty, 
suitability and acceptance of existing knowledge as well as knowledge to be gathered or 
produced. The quality can be defined in terms of how valid, reliable, accurate, and credible it 
is and how safe predictions of policy outcomes it allows. In terms of indicators of potential 
policy success, it may also matter to what extent the knowledge is operationally related to 
policy objectives; and pointing towards policy levers (say, average speed of traffic flow, or 
price of a public transport fare card) and whether the knowledge is based on assumptions 
and values that are shared or more controversial (Turnhout et al., 2007; Innes, 1998; Farchi 
et al., 2006). More broadly Cash et al. (2003) summarise three fundamental factors 
associated with the likelihood that knowledge and evidence from scientific assessments are 
used to inform public policy rather than being ignored or discredited, namely its: 
 Salience, which means the perceived relevance of information for a policy actors‘ 
choices 
 Credibility, which refers to information perceived as meeting standards of scientific 
quality and trustworthiness  
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 Legitimacy, which refers to whether the process to provide the knowledge is seen as 
politically unbiased and fair, or potentially influenced by certain interests 
 
These features of knowledge use are not systematically connected to unintended effects, but 
illustrate general barriers that may contribute to blur the dichotomy between ‗known‘ and 
‗unknown‘ effects.  
Further inspiration to conceptualise the critical dimensions of policy knowledge can be found 
in American sociologist Roberts Merton‘s work. In his article, ‗The Unanticipated 
Consequences of Purposive Action‘ Merton (1936), identifies and expands upon five reasons 
for the presence of unanticipated effects arising from purposive action (that is, including 
policy), four of which are considered relevant here (see Table 3.3). Merton emphasises four 
other types of barriers for overcoming knowledge gaps with regard to policy effects, including 
ignorance, error, bias and feedback effects. In a similar vein we draw from the work of the 
economist Frank Knight, cited as the originator of an important distinction between risk and 
uncertainty (Runde, 1998). In popular perception, ‗risk‘ involves effects for which knowledge 
and parameters are available to assess the likelihood of some outcome; ‗uncertainty‘ refers 
to a more genuine lack of systematic understanding of causal relations. Noise effects on 
human productivity may partially be predicted and a risk assessment made. Noise effects on 
human creativity may be impossible to parameterise or even conceive. 
 
 
The major reason, and arguably most intuitive, concerns limitations to the ‗existing state of 
knowledge‘. This again refers to two different conditions. The first feature, concerns the complex 
subject matter of the social sciences, particularly the fact that the relationships central to the process 
and consequences of purposive action tend to be stochastic, or conjectural in nature. The second 
feature refers to the quality of the individual perceptive abilities and the disparity between knowledge 
that can be conceivably obtained and knowledge actually obtained. Under this there may be several 
forms of ignorance on the part of the actors involved. As Merton notes, ignorance becomes salient by 
the fact that people often need to make decisions even with incomplete information. 
The second reason for the presence of unanticipated effects is to do with (actor) error. This can occur 
in all phases of a purposive action: problem appraisal, action formulation, or action implementation. 
One form of error, when actors only partially consider the diverse array of elements (and, ergo, 
potential consequences) that exist in a given situation. This may occur as a result of an unintentional 
omission (i.e. accidental neglect), or as a result of some explicit refusal to consider further elements of 
the problem in a systematic manner.  
The third reason for the presence of unanticipated effects, Merton terms the ‗imperious immediacy of 
interest‘. This is essentially an argument about time preference, which let all elements of a decision 
situation remain acknowledged, while the value accorded to each one may change. As Merton notes, 
this is not necessarily antithetical to undertaking systematic and exhaustive reviews of potential 
consequences, but in practice concern for the former may override the latter and thus give rise to 
secondary unintentional effects as described above.  
The fourth reason Merton offers in explanation of the presence of unanticipated effects is related to 
the presence of feedback in complex adaptive systems. ―Public predictions of future social 
developments are…not sustained precisely because the prediction has become a new element in the 
concrete situation, thus tending to change the initial course of developments‖ (ibid., p. 904). Unique to 
human systems, and particularly relevant to political interventions, these can be extraordinarily 
powerful; as when Marx and Engel‘s dystopian narrative of the power of capital over labour arguably 
influenced the proletariat to take action. 
 
Table 3.3 Merton‟s unanticipated effects  
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3.3.2 Categories of effects and situations- the core typology 
 
We divide here situations with regard to the ‗known‘/‘unknown‘ distinction into four (W, Z, Y 
and X) rather than two (W and X) broad categories, centring on the role of conceptual causal 
models linking interventions to effects; or ‗program theories‘ to speak in the language of 
evaluation research (Johnson et al., 2009).  
 (W) Situations where recognised causal models linking intervention to effects exist 
and are applied to rather correctly predict effects 
 (Z) Situations where recognised conceptual models are applied, but the actual 
application of them do not predict the effects completely 
 (Y) Situations where causal assumptions are made in policy, which however fail to 
take into account significant recognised conceptual models, or evidence 
 (X) Situations where there is no agreement over causal models, or where no models 
to predict cause and effect are available and might not be feasible  
 
The categories are inspired by, but do not correspond fully to Merton‘s categories.  
In the following we will define a range of categories to combine these situations with the 
types of effects introduced earlier, thus detailing the overall categories laid out in Table 3.1. 
This will form the core of the typology. Each category is given a unique algebraic symbol 
referring to the general groups in Table 3.1 as further subdivided above and below, but also 
more popular name labels for more intuitive recognition are proposed. Examples are given to 
illustrate each type; the examples are for clarification purpose only, and should not 
necessarily be taken to suggest actual effects, even if references to literature are sometimes 
given. 
 
 
Correctly anticipated effects 
AW) or ‗Bulls eye’. Correctly anticipated Intended Effect: The anticipated effect occurred 
and tendency and scale of its impact were anticipated correctly. For example, a reasonably 
accurate model of traffic response to signal timings may allow predicting and obtaining a 6% 
savings of fuel consumption from implementing the measure on a city network basis (Turner 
et al., 1999). 
BW) or ‗Timely warning‘. Correctly anticipated unintended effects: The anticipated effect 
occurred and tendency and scale of its impact were anticipated (perhaps mitigated) 
correctly. For example, the ‗rebound effect‘ when introducing a fuel efficiency standard, may 
be calculated to be max 20% (International Transport Forum Leipzig, 2008), and found to be 
verified after the implementation of a program that is calibrated to take this effect into 
account. Another example can be potential damage to roadside trees from increased 
intensity of salting to prevent accidents on icy roads. The tree damage effect may be 
acknowledged and appropriate measures to protect the trees taken already at the road 
planning and management stage (Pedersen et al., 2000). The first example belongs to the 
category ‗B1W‘ in Table 3.1, while the latter one is ‗B2W‘ (referring to secondary effects). 
These categories where effects are correctly anticipated are not of prime concern for OPTIC 
and are not expanded further. 
 
Underestimated intentional effects 
AZ1) or ‗Overdone‘. Policy-makers have a relatively correct causal model of the policy 
situation (i.e. it includes the relevant major variables), but nevertheless their ‗weighting‘ of 
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the various elements is somehow inaccurate, thus the predicted outcome improve notably 
from the actual outcome in terms of magnitude or timing. For example, if a new fuel based 
vehicle tax aiming to reduce fuel demand leads to a series of stronger adjustments in 
purchasing behaviour than anticipated. 
AZ2) or ‘Spill over‘. Policy-makers here also have a relatively correct causal model of the 
policy situation, but they omit a part of the whole causal system from their considerations, for 
example because some effected area does not fall under their jurisdiction. This could include 
traffic calming efforts leading to a reduction in speeds on a road network, near a municipal 
border where some of the speed reduction takes place in the neighbouring municipality, and 
is therefore not considered.  
Again these ‗A‘ types of advantageous effects are less important, but they are indications of 
incomplete assumptions, that could therefore suggest the presence of other – also possibly 
negative – faults and the need for better foundations. We now turn to presumably more 
important situations and effects. 
 
Underestimated Non-intentional effects 
B1Z1) or ‗Off the Mark‘. Also here, policy-makers have a relatively correct causal model of 
the policy situation (i.e. it includes the relevant major variables), but again their weighting of 
the various elements is partially inaccurate, thus the predicted outcome worsens notably 
from the actual outcome in terms of magnitude or when it occurs. In this case a counter 
effect, or ‗drag‘ is underestimated or overlooked. For example, if a vehicle scrappage 
program is introduced, it may increase the average fuel efficiency of new vehicles sold, but 
not as much as anticipated because price elasticities are overestimated. Or a policy 
measure to reduce the use of mobile phones while driving is introduced, but the policy 
underestimates the complications involved in detecting violations, and thus overestimates 
the long term effects of compliance (Caird, 2008; Dragutinovic and Twisk, 2005). In both 
situations, evidence may in principle be collected and applied to readjust the parameters of 
the underlying models. 
B1Z2) or ‘Not-In-My-System (NIMS)’. Policy-makers have a relatively correct causal model 
of the policy situation that includes the relevant major variables, but they omit a part of the 
whole causal system from their considerations. Again it could be because it does not fall 
under their jurisdiction. For example if traffic calming efforts leading to a reduction in speeds 
also lead to some detouring cars using higher speeds through a neighbouring municipality, 
which are not considered. An example on a larger scale may be if measures to promote the 
use of biofuels are introduced in order to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions, without 
fully considering upstream emissions from fossil fuel energy needed to cultivate and harvest 
the crops, as these may occur abroad. In this category the unintended effects (speeds, 
greenhouse gasses) are still of the same type (hence, primary) as the ones addressed by 
the policy intention, but parts of the interactions are left out. We do not consider unintended 
secondary effects (B2) as part of the causal models, but address them further below. 
B1Y1) or ‘Blind spot’. Here policy-makers assume an inaccurate causal model of the policy 
situation (i.e. it ignores relevant major variables or interactions), and thus the predicted 
outcome of the intended effect differ significantly from the actual outcome leading to counter-
intentional effects, to the extent that it may be levelled out or negated entirely. This is 
analogous to John Maynard Keynes‘s (1921) concept of ‗subjective chance‘, a situation that 
differs from ‗objective chance, when failures can be ascribed to fundamental unpredictability 
of the situation (see ‗BX‘ below). In the present category there is some degree of knowledge 
misspecification, be it due to ignorance, ‗optimism bias‘, time pressure, regulatory capture, 
‗hubris‘ or other causes. In each of these cases the possible remedy could differ. Blind spot 
is arguably one of the most critical situations, as it refers to a direct failure with regard to 
intended effects, and one most policy makers would like to avoid. In a worst case it may be 
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‗blind spot with a vengeance‘, if the counter effect is so strong that the effect actually goes 
in the opposite direction to the one intended by the policy. This is expressed by Sunstein 
(1997, p 116) as a ‗regulatory paradox‘, like if the US Clean Air Act‘ actually made the air 
more dirty. 
An example of blind spot could be European policy makers failing to adopt low noise car tyre 
policies as part of a plan to reach road noise objectives because of the trade off between 
positive noise effect and traffic safety of tires. According to Sandberg (2001) the European 
Council and Parliament indeed assumed such a position in 2001, even if recent available 
research had confirmed this conflict to be a myth.  
Another example could be the introduction of a vehicle scrappage scheme with the double 
purpose to help boost a domestic car industry, and to replace older polluting vehicles with 
new greener and more energy efficient ones. According to De Palma and Kilani (2008) both 
objectives may be elusive in as much as current policy models do not take into account the 
potential effects of a scrappage premium to increase the value of used vehicles, which could 
actually delay rather than speed up scrappage. Recent studies of such programs in the US 
and UK ( see e.g. Sivak and Schoettle (2009); SMMT (2010) and Haugh et al. (2010) 
indicate limitations to the causal assumptions behind policies in this area with regard to 
either fuel savings or industry recovery. This ‗blind spot‘ situation is probably very common 
for a wide range of policy effects  
A third example could be again the case of biofuels as a means to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. One of the critical potential consequences of increasing the area for producing 
such fuels are the so-called ‗indirect land use effects‘, leading to additional greenhouse gas 
emissions when farmers across the globe clear land (such as carbon-capturing forest) to 
grow other crops needed to replace food and feedstock that have been diverted to biofuels 
(Devereaux and Lee, 2009). The current EU directive does not take into account this effect 
to calculate greenhouse gas reductions from various biofuels, whereas recent US legislation 
does so. According to Searchinger et al. (2008) ignoring this effect can be an example of 
what is here called ‗blind spot with a vengeance‘, as some biofuels can be calculated to 
actually increase rather than decrease CO2 emission compared to fossil fuels if these effects 
are taken into account. However, it remains debated if the knowledge today is sufficiently 
solid to provide actual default numbers for certification of biofuels as in the US case, or if 
policy is considered safer by not making ‗scientifically‘ based final assumptions in this regard 
as in the EU. Either way there are recognised blind spots in existing regulations, although 
some would classify them rather as B1X further below, at least for the time being. 
B2Y) or ‘Secondary blind spots’ Here the inadequate causal assumptions extend into 
secondary effects, which may in principle be known before, but are in this case not 
discovered or considered in the analysis of the policy makers, again for potentially a variety 
of reasons. The elements ignored in this instance can encompass everything on the 
spectrum of secondary effects, including all kinds of economic, social or environmental 
consequences, and wider impacts. The effects could belong to this category as long as there 
would be potential opportunity to take them into account by sufficiently careful consideration 
of existing or commissionable knowledge, rather than them being of a more principal 
incomprehensibility as for category B2X below. The difference between this category and the 
former one from the policy making point of view of knowledge is that it may be less obvious 
what kind of knowledge to consider as causal models encompassing secondary effects may 
involve a different, cross modal or -sectoral conceptualisation of the intervention, quickly 
leading into a whole range of complications and possible speculations Some of the 
mechanism that may produce ‗blind spots‘ are not related only to lack of knowledge, but may 
also be caused by to phenomena such as assymetric information (Laffont & Tirole 1993) or 
rent seeking behaviour among decisicon makers and administrators, who may have their 
own interest in highlighting some effects rather than others (Hindriks and Mayles 2006). 
Compartmentalised decision making (Brignall and Model, 2000), or un-coordinated policies 
Page | 47  
 
(Peters, 1998) may provide additional partial explanations for the occurrence of secondary 
blind spots. Possible scientific explanations are discussed in Appendix 7.2  
It is instructive to use the case of the vehicle scrappage scheme to illustrate a potentially 
wide range of secondary effects, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. Taking departure from the UK 
scheme managed by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, there are three 
main intentions: 
 To support domestic car industry  
 To improve road safety, and  
 To improve the environment 
 
The UK scheme was introduced in May 2009. Basically, a car owner scrapping a vehicle of 
10 years of age or more receive a £2,000 discount when buying a new one that fulfils certain 
minimum requirements. The scheme is funded half by government and half by industry and 
covers up to 400,000 vehicles. According to the auto industry itself the program is very 
successful in terms of boosting vehicle sales and helping to speed up the introduction of 
more fuel efficient vehicles (SMMT, 2010). However, there is limited evidence about, for 
example, the extent to which the effects are attributable to the scheme and how the program 
influences consumer behaviour in a holistic sense.  
As depicted in Figure 3.3, a number of positive and negative correlations between the 
program, its goals and a various additional possible impact pathways may be envisaged. 
According to the causal mapping, anticipated effects (text in black) point to simple relations 
leading to likely program success (the ‗program theory‘). However, a number of additional 
causal effect links may be at work (text in blue). For example, the program theory may not 
consider (counter intentional) environmental effects connected to shipping and disposing of 
scrapped or production of new vehicles. On the other hand, it may overlook additional 
economic industry benefits from spare parts. A further analysis of possible long term effects 
(not shown) adds considerable further complexity. For example, it is possible that a 
perceived success of the program will lead to lobbying from industry for a continuation of the 
scheme, which again could be associated with a number of reactions and intermediate 
effects among government officials, consumers and industry representatives ranging from 
contributions to sustain a norm of automobility in the sector to the promulgation of a broader 
recycling ethos. 
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Figure 3.3 Speculative causal map concerning a range of intended („positive‟) and non-
intended („negative‟) effects of a UK policy scheme to introduce vehicle scrappage. Short 
term effects. See further discussion of this approach in Chapter 4. 
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B2X) or ‗Holy Smoke!‘ An effect occurred that was not known before, never occurred in that 
policy context or have only existed as speculation. This is analogous to Keynes‘s (1921) 
concept of ‗objective chance‘, as in such a situation policy-makers‘ causal models could not 
possibly incorporate certain variables. In some cases the effects materialise forcefully up 
front, as for example the consequences of ineffective airport safety controls indirectly 
allowing the unprecedented disaster to occur in New York and Washington on 11 September 
2001. One may find that the outcome was beyond comprehension, or rather that it was due 
to a series of blind spots (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004). In other cases cause and 
effects relations may only be uncovered following long periods of extensive research, if ever. 
For example, ballast water carried by ships have been found to disperse a wide range 
aquatic organisms –jellyfish, crabs, clams, fish, snails, etc. over long distances and 
sometimes release them as alien or invasive species in other waters where they may disrupt 
local ecosystems and crowd out indigenous ones (NRC, 1996). To foresee such an effect in 
advance seem at least to require development of an ecosystems based thinking. More 
recently the potential introduction of bacteria and viruses through ballast water has become 
a possible concern, which however remains very little studied (Battelle, 2000). Potentially 
this category is almost endless, especially if one considers all possible secondary effects 
across modes and sectors and questions such as what the bicycle has meant for the alleged 
happiness of Danes, or what full motorisation will do to China and the world.  
 
The above categories are here defined as distinct although they are really only points on 
several continua that can be frozen only by convention. For example, anticipations of effects 
will rarely be 100% correct; ‗inaccurate‘ weighting among causal variables can be on a 
bigger or smaller scale; system boundaries can be set up in ways that are more or less blind 
to spill over effects, and ignorance can be fundamental or passing, for example depending 
on where on the ladder of research utilisation potentially enlightening knowledge presently 
sits (if it has entered it at all). Sometimes ‗self-defeating results‘ of certain policies are 
proclaimed, but to sort out to what extent and in which situations this is actually the case or 
not, may not be possible even after careful scrutiny of evidence or extended academic 
exchange, as in the case of whether widening of urban roads actually leads to a slowing of 
travel speeds (Mogridge, 1997). The categories above are intended to help provide an 
overview of some main types of effects. 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
A review of types of non intentional policy effects has been drawn up by working through a 
number of key dimensions, by equipping each dimension with definitions and distinctions, 
and by combining several them into a tentative typology to be applied in OPTIC and 
developed further. 
The work in such a typology is at one time helped by a rich terminology and many strains of 
research, but at the same time challenged by such a diversity of perspectives, 
categorisations and interpretations; it is hard to imagine a ‗one size fits all‘ typology. Still it 
should be useful to have these kinds of distinctions clearly in mind, as they are likely to 
require different kind of countermeasures in order to be avoided. 
The key dimensions and categories proposed to consider in the preliminary typology include 
the following: 
1) a general outline and vocabulary of policy measures, policy aims and policy effects as 
related to transport in general 
 
2) a choice of perspective from which the ‗effects of interest‘ are to be seen and evaluated 
(namely the position of the policy makers and their stated intentions, that is a ‗classical 
‗policy analysis approach) 
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3) a terminology of effects with regard to a logic centred on the transport policy maker in a 
specific situation, hence  
 
 Intentional, non-intentional, counter intentional, cross-counter intentional 
(contradictory) 
 Primary, Secondary 
 Result; (effect=consequence); impact 
 Intramodal, transmodal; transsectoral,  
 
4) a terminology of the knowledge situation, focusing on the status of causal model or 
‗programme theory‘  
 Situations where established causal models linking intervention to effects exist and 
are applied to rather correctly predict effects 
 Situations where recognised conceptual models are applied, but the actual 
application of them do not predict the effects completely 
 Situations where causal assumptions are made in policy, which however fail to take 
into account significant recognised conceptual models, or evidence 
 Situations where there is no agreement over causal models, or where no models to 
predict cause and effect are not even feasible  
 
5) a core typology with 10 main types of effects/situations, spanning a range of effects 
(intentional, counter-intentional and secondary non-intentional ones) and the range of 
knowledge situations, nicknemaed as follows, with the most importants being the following 
six ones, 
 ‗Bulls eye‘, Correctly anticipated Intended Effects: 
 ‗Timely Warning‘, Correctly anticipated unintended effects 
 ‗Off the Mark‘, misspecification of broadly correct causal assumptions 
 ‗Not-In-My-System‘, misspecification of system boundary of broadly correct causal 
assumptions, leading to spillover negative effects  
 ‘Blind spots‘ (primary, secondary), Counterintentional or other non-intentional effects 
dues to an inaccurate causal model of the policy situation  
 ‗Holy smoke‘ An effect of a policy intervention occurs that was not known before, or 
could not exist other than as speculations 
 
It would be possible to detail the typology further and add more dimensions, for example with 
regard to issues like reversibility/irreversibility; perspectives of different beneficiaries of 
interventions etc, but it is deemed that adding further complications to the typology at this 
point could hamper a useful discussion. 
Appendix 7.2 presents a brief review of explanatory factors behind non-intentional effects, 
within three fields of research (technical/natural science; economics; political science) and 
three categories of effect logics (political acceptance; implementation feasibility; instrumental 
effectiveness) that each of these types of research primarily helps to explain. 
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4 Towards a framework for policy packaging 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we outlined a typology of non-intentional effects, highlighting those 
which we deem to be particularly significant for policy-making. In this chapter, we examine 
the notion of policy packaging and―alongside other concerns―seek to develop a 
framework through which the likelihood and severity of such non-intentional effects may be 
reduced and/or rendered manageable. It is vital to stress at the outset to this chapter that we 
are not seeking to propose a ‗one size fits all‘ approach to policy packaging; indeed, we are 
aware that there are likely to be several approaches to successful packaging, almost all of 
which can be considered viable to a greater or lesser extent. As a result, this chapter is not 
intended to be read in a normative sense. Nevertheless, we do actively seek to converge on 
a set of interrelated principles that logically support the project of policy packaging in its 
broadest guise.  
 
We proceed through two major sections. First, we outline what the key literature in the field 
considers to be the core elements of a policy package: primary measure(s); effectiveness 
measures, acceptability measures and feasibility measures. Second, drawing on theoretical 
advances made in recent literature, we explore potential means by which processes of policy 
packaging may be strengthened so as to ensure, insofar as is possible, that policy packages 
represent effective and efficient political interventions.  
 
While its mechanisms may often be complex, the rationale for policy packaging is 
straightforward. Contemporary transport systems, in facilitating the movement of individuals 
and material goods, naturally confer many benefits to society. Yet, as is increasingly 
recognised, the same systems also generate and/or compound numerous social, 
environmental and economic problems that require various forms of political intervention in 
order to mitigate their harm or facilitate their contribution, and in a fair manner as possible 
(Banister, 2005). Furthermore, the vast majority of these problems are multi-aspect in nature 
(OECD, 2007). In other words, political interventions designed to mitigate their harm are 
rarely able to do so; rather, they must constantly recognise and respond in kind to problems‘ 
spatial and temporal complexity and ensure that they remain sufficiently flexible to address 
future risks and uncertainties. The salience of this complexity has clear implications for the 
design of political interventions; rarely can so-called ‗messy‘ policy problems (Ney, 2009) be 
solved by simple solutions alone. In short, there are no so-called ‗silver bullet‘ measures 
available for dealing with the multifaceted transportation challenges that Europe faces in the 
coming decades; an effective response requires concerted and coordinated action (OECD, 
2008).  
 
Importantly, the validity of this principle is by no means restricted to the logic of integrating 
transport policy with other broad domains such as environmental management or energy 
policy (although this can prove highly advantageous). Rather, it remains highly relevant at 
the level of transport policy per se. That is to say, even for a single issue like urban traffic 
congestion, the ‗optimal‘ policy response would almost certainly encompass a range of 
measures deployed in a coordinated fashion. As Feitelson (2003) observes, however, the 
processes by which policy measures are devised, proposed, implemented and evaluated are 
all too often isolationist in nature. That is to say, a lack of consideration is given to the 
potential synergetic and/or contradictory effects that individual measures may 
impose―directly or indirectly―upon each other. This is argued to be true of instances where 
one or more measures are imposed in tandem, and also where new measures are 
implemented in a political milieu without due consideration of measures already in existence. 
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In contrast to such isolationism, ‗policy packaging‘ arguably represents a more holistic and 
enlightened approach to the formulation of political interventions. Through the calculated 
combination of individual policy measures, made possible following a concerted exploration 
of their interrelationships, policy packaging seeks to maximise both the effectiveness and 
tolerability of political interventions in the transport system. The reason for this is fairly 
logical, as May and Roberts (1995, p. 98) contend: ―there is benefit to be gained from an 
integrated approach, when compared with the piecemeal implementation of individual 
measures... [as this yields] a higher performance against the objectives of the strategy than 
could be achieved by the individual measures on their own.‖ Packaging measures together 
in this manner, argue Banister et al. (2000), is vital for fulfilling policy objectives in politically 
acceptable ways and for ensuring the viability of fundamental shifts in policy direction within 
the foreseeable future. Indeed, as the OECD (2008) note, if done well, policy packaging can 
represent an ideal approach to designing effective and efficient political interventions. 
 
The OECD‘s (2008) caveat ‗if done well‘, however, is a valuable and pertinent observation. 
Given the limited material, evidence available as to their success, policy packages should 
not be construed as a panacea to the complexities and challenges of policy-making in their 
own right. In other words, while the rationale for policy packaging stems largely from the 
‗silver bullet‘ fallacy, there is a danger that packages may themselves be tacitly and 
mistakenly revered in the same regard. As will become evident through the course of this 
chapter, policy packaging is a complex and multifaceted process and, as such, plenty of 
opportunities exist for the occurrence of practices and decisions leading to non-optimal 
outcomes. It is for precisely this reason, therefore, that the OPTIC project is concerned with 
examining and improving the means by which packages come to be developed.  
 
In Appendix 7.3 we review the presence of policy packaging in the context of nine EU-
funded transport research projects from the 4th, 5th and 6th Framework Programmes. It can 
be seen from the conclusions drawn within the different EU projects that policy packaging is 
considered to be a promising approach to deal with conflict of interests which may arise 
during the policy making process. In some projects recommendations are given on how to 
approach the process of policy making and, to a lesser extent, policy packaging. However, 
due to the complexity of the policy making process and the context related challenges, no 
single solution to policy making and even less policy packaging can be forthcoming. 
Nevertheless, certain prerequisites that were identified can increase the likelihood of 
success, and these generally pertain to: the involvement of all actors in a broad decision 
making process; the use of appropriate models but not as a substitute for a decision making 
process; consideration of all relevant areas which are affected by transport policy; allowing 
for adjustments during the implementation phase; having a clear definition of expected policy 
outcomes; consideration of possible interactions between different measures; examination of 
measure acceptability for different groups involved; consideration of possible barriers for the 
implementation of policies. None of the projects reviewed, however, have engaged 
adequately with the issues of non-intentional effects raised in Chapter 3. 
In this chapter, we build on and include the many elements of policy packaging indentified in 
past EU projects. We aim to propose a more coherent and structured framework for policy 
packaging which may help address current problems and challenges in the transport system.  
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4.2 Policy packaging: core elements 
This section introduces some of the main conceptual themes and high-level approaches 
underpinning the notion of policy packaging. This comes in advance of Section 4.3 which 
extends our analysis to the procedural level. Here we outline what are generally considered 
to represent the core elements of a policy package: primary measures; effectiveness 
measures, acceptability measures and feasibility measures (as shown in Figure 4.1). All 
these should be considered―but not necessarily included―in a package.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 The main building blocks of a policy package 
 
 
It is important at this early stage to first consider what can be said to genuinely constitute a 
package. The verb, to ‗package‘, in the sense in which it is used in this context, has been 
defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) as: ―to put together as a single unit.‖ 
Naturally, this implies that a noteworthy degree of rationality is present, insofar as a 
‗packager‘ would use their faculties of reason, manifest through various methods of analysis 
or planning, to assemble individual policy measures in a calculated and deliberate manner 
(ibid.). For the purposes of the OPTIC project, we define a policy package as follows: 
 
A 'policy package' is a combination of individual policy measures, aimed at addressing one 
or more policy goals. The package is created in order to improve the impacts of the 
individual policy measures, minimise possible negative side effects, and/or facilitate 
measures‟ implementation and acceptability. 
 
Here we thus distinguish our approach from assemblages of individual policy measures that 
exhibit coincidental spatial and temporal co-presence as the result of other political or 
societal processes. Indeed, the OECD (2008) note that, to date, the majority of what may 
appear to be ‗policy packages‘ are actually the product of myriad ad hoc decisions taken in 
relative isolation of one another, and often resulting from fluctuating and pressing short-term 
political imperatives. Thus, while several measures may be implemented in the same spatial 
and temporal context, it would be wrong to consider these to be bona fide policy packages in 
the sense used in the OPTIC definition as they have not been developed in a ―fully 
articulated and coherent manner‖ (ibid., p. 435).  
 
Also, it is important to make some observations with regard to the use of the term 
‗integration‘ in the existing literature. This term is, of course, widely used within the 
international transport policy community. As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that it is 
regularly used to refer to a number of related, but nevertheless conceptually distinct, 
processes. Here, we do not attempt to undertake a wide-ranging review of such usage, nor 
do we advocate our own taxonomy. Rather, we seek to acknowledge this heterogeneity of 
meaning, and to clarify its place in the discussion of policy packaging. May and Roberts 
(1995, p. 97), for example, recognise the similarities in the strategic usage of the terms 
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‗integrated‘, ‗balanced‘ and ‗package‘ in the ‗transport‘ field during the early 1990s, viewing 
each as implying: ―the combination, or integration, of measures into a package which is 
balanced in its treatment of modes, areas or groups of users‖ (ibid.). Significantly, though, 
this is qualitatively different from ‗integration‘ in the sense of physical intermodal integration 
or integrated (transport) policy (e.g. Givoni and Banister, 2010). Although the former is likely 
to appear as a goal in most policy packaging and the latter is probably necessary for many 
policies to be effective.  
 
This is also relevant to the discussion of what constitutes a package as discussed above. 
For May and Roberts (1995) ‗integration‘ in the context of policy packaging pertains to the 
strategic interaction of different policy measures. Hypothetically, for example, such strategic 
integration would refer to the genuine integration of a bus and rail service, or the co-
implementation of traffic calming and traffic management measures. In contrast, the 
inclusion of a pedestrian crossing in a traffic calming scheme does not represent strategic 
integration in this sense. Four ‗types‘ of integration that materialised in this strategic context 
can be highlighted:  
 
 First, integration can refer to integration between different government authorities 
and jurisdictional scales;1  
 Second, integration can refer to measures involving different transport modes;  
 Third, integration can refer to the coordinated implementation of infrastructure, 
management and pricing measures;  
 Finally, it can refer to integration between transport and other policy domains, such 
as healthcare or education (ibid.). Typically, this final form is discussed in the context 
of spatial planning; however, it is increasingly evident that healthcare, energy and 
education policy can exhibit significant interrelationships with transport policy (see, 
for example, Woodcock et al., 2007). 
 
4.2.1  ‘Primary measure(s)’ 
Based on their work on the EU FP4 POSSUM project (see appendix 7.3), Banister et al. 
(2000) note that the process of designing a policy package is necessarily iterative and 
creative; policy-making clearly does not take place in a socio-cultural vacuum, and hence 
one cannot hope to create a viable package on the basis of formal procedure alone. 
Nevertheless, it is invariably acknowledged that the likelihood of developing a coherent, 
internally consistent and implementable policy package without recourse to some form of 
strategic process or framework is slim (ibid.; Feitelson, 2003).  
 
A common point of departure in the construction of policy packages is thus the identification 
of a primary policy measure―or measures―that respond in an effective and direct manner 
to some given externality or policy objective(s). As will be discussed, it is to such primary 
measure(s) that further policy measures are added, in order to fulfil the various criteria by 
which a policy package may be considered viable. In the interest of conceptual clarity, this 
chapter uses the term ‗primary measure(s)‘ in preference to ‗starter package‘ (Banister et al., 
2000), or ‗base package‘ (Feitelson, 2003), as this aids the intelligibility of forthcoming 
sections.  
 
Naturally, decisions taken as to which primary measure(s) to adopt in order to combat a 
particular transport problem will be highly contingent upon the precise social, economic and 
political contexts in which the intervention is being both designed and implemented 
(Feitelson, 2003). This said, generic guidance remains useful for ensuring due consideration 
                                               
1
 However, as Ney (2009) points out, this sphere should be broadened to encompass the heterogeneity of NGOs 
that comprise contemporary ‗polity‘ networks. 
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is given to prominent concerns which are broadly applicable regardless of local specificities. 
In light of this, Banister et al. (2000) identify four key principles for policy-makers to bear in 
mind when deciding which policy measures should represent the core of any package: 
 
 First, the primary measure(s) should be, as far as is feasibly possible, 
uncontroversial, as this automatically serves to reduce the need for acceptability 
amendments later in the process. However, in practice, there may well be an inverse 
correlation between the extent to which a measure is effective and the extent to 
which it is likely to be acceptable.  
 
 Second, it is argued that those measures which are likely to make vital contributions 
to an intervention‘s overall effectiveness, but which require a long lead time before 
results appear (such as land use measures), should be implemented early on in the 
process.  
 
 Similarly, the third principle advocates immediate implementation for measures that 
are likely to act as trigger mechanisms for ‗dynamic processes‘, which can be 
considered as those measures that initiate desirable positive feedback in the 
transport system; for example, encouraging telecommuting from the suburbs may 
reduce travel and encourages a significant proportion of the relevant population to 
engage to a greater extent with the local suburban economy. In turn, a vibrant 
suburban economy may attract those on the cusp of telecommuting to do so, thus 
reducing the demand for travel. Thus, the second and third principles relate to the 
timing of implementation and their effects (see also Section 4.3.2 on increasing 
package feasibility).  
 
 Fourth, it is argued that the primary measure(s) chosen should include those that 
afford a degree of adaptability over time, in contrast to measures which are likely to 
lead to ‗lock-in‘ solutions. This is an important consideration; as the future is 
uncertain, retaining a degree of flexibility in policy formulation is vital in order to enact 
remedial action and/or to manipulate the package in light of changed circumstances. 
This issue will be explored further in Section 4.3 in relation to the potential mitigation 
of unintended effects. 
 
As Banister et al. (2000) stress, however, while it may be desirable for an individual measure 
to fulfil all of these four principles, this is unlikely to occur in practice. Notwithstanding the 
compatibility issues explored in Section 4.3, they thus advocate inclusion in the first instance 
providing that a primary measure fulfils the first principle and one or more of the remaining 
three. Moreover, while this initial phase may seem relatively straightforward, other authors 
have noted that rigorous appraisal of existing policy measures can be severely hampered by 
a lack of available data concerning their effectiveness (Feitelson, 2003; May et al., 2005a, 
2005b).  
 
 
4.2.2  ‘Additional measure(s)’ 
Once the primary measure(s) have been identified and their likely impact has been 
evaluated, there may be a need for policy-makers to incorporate additional measures so as 
to enhance both the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed intervention―thus creating 
a bona fide ‗package‘. The existing literature highlights the fact that understanding and 
marshalling these additional measures constitutes the central opportunities and challenges 
of policy packaging design. Given the wealth of potential measures available, it is likely that 
a high number of potentially synergetic and contradictory relationships will be present, with 
each demanding careful consideration and appraisal. Indeed, as Holvad (2005) notes, policy 
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packages designed to mitigate certain transport-related externalities ought not to be solely 
comprised of transport-specific measures alone; related policy measures in domains such as 
healthcare, education, land use and environment are likely to warrant inclusion to varying 
degrees. Furthermore, those transport measures which are present will pertain to a variety of 
transport modes, requiring the application of integrated approaches in the sense of genuine 
inter-modal accessibility (ibid.; Givoni and Banister, 2010). However, in practice policy 
packaging in transport rarely relates to other sectors and integration is usually not achieved 
(ibid.). 
 
Most of the major contributions to the academic literature on policy packaging assert that 
such additional measures can be usefully categorised according to the role they are 
expected to perform within a policy package (e.g. Feitelson, 2003). While terminologies 
naturally differ, it is possible to trace three such roles which appear particularly 
significant―relating to the enhancement of packages‘ effectiveness, acceptability and 
feasibility. Importantly, the latter two roles also strongly relate to the overall efficiency of a 
package, insofar as additional measures may alleviate (or potentially exacerbate) the costs 
of overcoming barriers associated with socio-political acceptability and/or economic 
feasibility.2 This issue will be explored in greater detail in Section 4.3. 
 
 
Increasing Package Effectiveness 
 
The ‗effect‘ that an intervention has on a policy target can be defined in terms of the former‘s 
―operative influence‖ on the latter; and hence ‗effectiveness‘ can be defined in terms of the 
magnitude of this operative influence.3 In the context of the OPTIC project, an ‗effective‘ 
policy package would thus be one that exhibits a degree of influence on a policy target to 
such an extent that it is capable of manipulating it in an expedient manner. It is vital to keep 
in mind that here we conceive of effectiveness as a continuum, whereby packages are 
comparable according to the degree of their operative influence. 
 
In their report Instrument Mixes for Environmental Policy, the OECD (2007) offer valuable 
insights into the high-level approaches that can be used to increase the effectiveness of 
policy packages. Of particular interest here is the emphasis they place on ensuring that 
policy-makers have a sound understanding of the nature of the particular problem/externality 
that they are attempting to ameliorate or mitigate. At first glance, this seems like an obvious 
point to make. However, as will be discussed in Section 4.3, attaining sufficient knowledge of 
the numerous causal mechanisms present in a policy scenario can be extraordinarily 
complex.  
 
For the OECD (2007), a key part of this understanding is to determine whether the problem 
is most appropriately characterised as ‗multi-‗ or ‗single-‗ aspect.4 Single-aspect problems 
are rare; an example given is the total emission of a harmful pollutant into the atmosphere. 
In this case, the problem is ‗single-aspect‘ because it possesses only one element of 
significance (i.e. it is only the total amount of CFCs in the atmosphere that is of concern, 
regardless of where and/or when the CFCs are emitted). Multi-aspect problems are those 
where these additional dimensions are of concern and are more common. A transport 
example is offered here, specifically that of aircraft noise. In this example, it is not simply 
                                               
2
 This chosen structure of analysis follows Feitelson (2003), insofar as it maintains a broad perspective with 
respect to the net value of a policy package. Specifically, this value is argued to simply be a product of 
effectiveness (benefit maximisation) and efficiency (benefit/cost ratio). Issues concerning the ‗acceptability‘ and 
‗feasibility‘ costs of a package thus pertain to both categories.  
3
 This is consistent with the definitional guidance contained in the Oxford English Dictionary (1989). 
4
 This is qualitatively different from Feitelson‘s (2003) ‗single- and ‗multiple-target‘ terminology discussed in later 
sections, as it relates specifically to the problem at hand, and only indirectly to the design of a policy package. 
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enough to address the total amount of noise generated by aircraft, but rather the concern is 
further directed to understanding and appreciating where, when, and how the noise impacts 
are most acute.  
 
Following Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), the OECD (2007) thus argue that in the case of 
multi-aspect problems, additional effectiveness measures should be deployed for each 
failure present in the market. Importantly, this relates to both the broad meta-failures which 
instigate the main policy objectives, but also the sub-failures which somehow further 
undermine the mitigation capability of the primary measures. Thus in the context of 
environmental policy, one measure would be needed to address the meta-failure per se (e.g. 
a carbon tax) and further measures would need to be deployed in order to support the 
effectiveness of the carbon tax; for example, labelling regulations designed to address the 
lack of information available to consumers as to the carbon emissions of motor vehicles.  
 
Much of the literature on package effectiveness has approached this issue in terms of 
‗synergy‘, which can be defined as the ―increased effectiveness...produced as a result of 
combined action or co-operation‖ (OED, 1989). Synergetic relationships are considered to 
exist in a policy package where individual measures mutually underpin one another. As 
demonstrated in the above example, this can be particularly important where failures exist in 
the markets in which the primary measure is operating, thus an additional measure can help 
to overcome these failures (e.g. a lack of information) and thus make the primary measure 
more effective than it otherwise would have been (OECD, 2007). As will become evident 
from this chapter, however, packaging must proceed in a cautious and analytical manner, 
with a considered evaluation of additional measures‘ marginal costs and benefits.  
 
While the effectiveness of a primary measure may thus be increased through the provision 
of additional measures per se, the nature of such additional measures is similarly worthy of 
attention. Specifically, the OECD (2007) argues that policy packages should address a given 
set of problems/externalities in as broad a manner as possible. Often, this means regulatory 
measures should be applied in addition to market-based measures as they are better able to 
address the manner in which externalities are caused rather than simply targeting the total 
magnitude of the externality. In terms of emissions from transport, the OECD thus 
recognises the limitations of market-based measures and highlights the need for targeted 
regulation. However, it is also stressed that regulation is often better directed at emissions 
themselves rather than those which effectively promote fuel-efficient technologies. For 
example, subsidies directed at hybrid vehicle technology may inadvertently result in larger 
hybrid vehicle engines rather than any absolute reduction in emissions, a clear non-
intentional effect. Importantly, packages must be designed in such a way that they remain 
flexible enough to allow those impacted to meet targets in a variety of ways, thereby 
enabling positive innovation. It is argued that there is a need for policy packages to give 
consistent short-term and long-term signals in order to support private investment decisions 
(ibid.). 
 
 
Increasing Package Acceptability 
 
Naturally, the profession of policy-making rests upon the valid assumption that policy 
measures and packages, to various degrees, are able to influence firms‘ and the public‘s 
behaviour. The most successful political interventions can also be formative, in the sense 
that they not only succeed in influencing behaviour, but manage to influence attitudes with 
regard to a particular issue (e.g. UK drink-driving or anti-smoking laws). It is generally 
acknowledged, however, that the exact characteristics of a potential political intervention are 
highly contingent upon the degree to which it is considered acceptable by a range of actors, 
often with competing interests. 
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For this reason, therefore, additional measures may help to make a primary measure(s) 
more socially and/or politically acceptable―providing they are implemented in full 
awareness of the political and institutional context into which the proposed package is to be 
deployed (Feitelson, 2003). Indeed, a well-formulated additional measure that somehow 
serves to placate strong opposition to an otherwise effective measure has the potential to 
significantly reduce the transaction costs associated with the overall intervention (ibid.).5 
 
More recent work by the OECD (2008) furthers this line of reasoning to suggest that such 
additional measures may serve to increase the acceptability of a policy package through 
effectively penalising a known ‗bad‘ rather than effectively subsidising an assumed ‗good‘. 
That is to say, ‗bads‘ are generally known (i.e. there is a demonstrable causal relationship 
between fossil fuel combustion and CO2 emission), whereas today‘s ‗goods‘ (e.g. electric 
vehicles) may be later shown to be inefficient or ineffective by some other criteria. 
Furthermore, and as noted in the previous section, the OECD (2007) argue that in order to 
maximise the potential for synergetic relationships between measures it is important to 
select measures for the policy package that afford a high degree of flexibility to those 
stakeholders that will be affected. Thus, it is thought to be more advantageous―and more 
politically/socially acceptable―to initiate measures which allow for a degree of freedom and 
innovative response from affected actors. The OECD (2007) imply that this is more likely to 
be the case for market-based measures, but stress that this can also be achieved using 
certain forms of regulatory measures.  
 
 
Increasing Package Feasibility 
 
If policy packages are to be effective in meeting their targets, they must have an inbuilt 
sensitivity to complexity, and the ability to address policy targets with a battery of spatially- 
and temporally-differentiated measures. The previous section touched on issues of 
implementation as they relate to social and political acceptability. However, the challenges 
facing policy-makers with regard to implementation extend far beyond attitudinal obstacles.  
 
The element of temporality here is particularly significant. As noted previously, Banister et al. 
(2000) highlight this in their appraisal of available policy measures, classifying each 
according to whether its effectual timescale is short-, medium-, or long-term. Essentially, this 
represents the time taken for the relevant actors (e.g. motorists) to react to the measure 
(Feitelson, 2003). Depending on the nature of the measure, this period may be almost 
instantaneous (e.g. the response to new parking restrictions) or it may be more gradual. An 
excellent example of the latter is provided by Duffy (2008), where he sets out a vision for 
urban sustainability founded upon a series of long-term measures designed to alter the 
characteristics of urban workspace provision. Duffy‘s work further illustrates the importance 
of including non-transport measures in transport-orientated policy packages.  
 
In addition to this ‗effectual‘ timescale, however, Feitelson (2003) suggests that attention 
should also be directed to two further timescales: measures‘ ‗enacting‘ time, and their 
‗implementation‘ time. Enacting time is argued to be a function of the prior processes upon 
which the implementation of a particular measure is conditional. This can also be considered 
a proxy for transaction costs mentioned previously. Such processes may be administrative, 
technical or, as in the case of regulatory measures, they may be legislative (see also OECD, 
2007). Legislative processes are liable to extend the enacting time considerably, and have 
                                               
5
 Formally, transaction costs can be defined as ‗the costs of deciding, planning, arranging and negotiating the 
action to be taken and the terms of exchange when two or more parties do business; the costs of changing plans, 
renegotiating terms, and resolving disputes as changing circumstances require; and the costs of ensuring that 
parties perform as agreed‘ (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, p. 60). 
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strong parallels with the issues raised previously with regard to social and political 
acceptability. Implementation time, in turn, refers to the time between a decision to deploy a 
measure and its eventual execution. If the measure requires the construction of 
infrastructure and/or acquisition of capital goods this can be considerable. Once again, 
however, the impetus for execution will depend on the political context (e.g. the pressure for 
infrastructural development in view of the London 2012 Olympic Games). Thus, it might be 
necessary to include measures in the package which serve to meet similar targets that have 
a different, shorter, enacting time and/or implementation time in order to compensate for the 
long enacting and/or implementation time of the measures already included in the package.  
 
Broadly, there are two spatial issues that require consideration in policy package design. 
The first relates to the scale of the policy target in question. Specifically, it is important to 
ensure that this is compatible with the spatial scale of the policy measures deployed. Thus if 
a policy target is confined to geographically bounded area (e.g. congestion in central 
London), a policy measure with wider national consequences (e.g. fuel tax duty) should not 
be included. The second issue of significance here, as touched upon earlier, relates to 
jurisdictional issues. The breadth of a policy target, and ergo, its attendant policy package, 
may well entail that a multiplicity of actors, operating at a range of spatial scales, from the 
supranational to the local, are to be involved (Feitelson, 2003). Such agencies may be of two 
types: those with direct responsibilities for the management of the transport system (e.g. a 
UK county council/ Department for Transport); and those without direct responsibilities, 
which, nevertheless, can impact significantly on the transport system indirectly via their 
operation (e.g. national treasuries) (ibid.). May and Roberts (1995) also note the significance 
of the fact that the vast majority of potential measures in a policy package can be deployed 
at different spatial scales and at a wide range of intensities. In the case of road pricing, for 
example, policy-makers can opt to implement the measure in a small, targeted zone or 
across a whole city. Measures outside the jurisdiction of those putting together the policy 
package are not only likely to have long enacting time, they might not be possible to 
implement at all and therefore should be excluded from the package on these grounds.  
 
 
4.3 The process of policy packaging 
In this section, we build on the ‗core elements‘ discussed above, but broaden our focus to 
encompass the important procedural elements of policy packaging. We thus examine some 
of the key considerations and decisions involved in the development of effective and efficient 
interventions. While such processes are vital to the success of policy packaging, our 
intention here is not to prescribe a singular ‗finalised‘ method for policy packaging. Rather, 
we aim to develop a framework for policy packaging that forms a sound conceptual basis for 
later OPTIC work packages and more generally for the purposes of formulating transport 
policies. Specifically, this initial framework is intended to support the following five concerns: 
 
 The effectiveness of political interventions in the transport system (with respect to 
meeting the targets and objectives set); 
 The efficiency of political interventions in the transport system (with respect to inter-
measure interactions); 
 The efficiency of political interventions in the transport system (with respect to social and 
political acceptability); 
 The efficiency of political interventions in the transport system (with respect to technical 
and economic feasibility); 
 The ex-ante prevention and ex-post mitigation of non-intentional effects. 
 
The framework itself is comprised the following four phases (Figure 4.2):  
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PHASE 1 – ‗Determination of values, objectives and targets‘ 
PHASE 2 – ‗Inventory of measures, provisional measures and causal assumptions‘ 
PHASE 3A – ‗Evaluation: effectiveness and efficiency‘ 
PHASE 3B – ‗Evaluation: prevention and mitigation of non-intentional effects‘ 
PHASE 4 – ‗Additional measures and inter-measure interaction‘ 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 General phases in the policy packaging process  
 
 
For ease of intelligibility, these will be discussed in the order shown above. However, 
emphasis is placed throughout on the framework‘s iterative nature, so it should not be 
viewed as necessarily chronological. It is important to stress here that many of the caveats 
mentioned in Chapter 3‘s discussion of non-intentional effects are also relevant in this 
section. In particular, it should be noted that the framework is highly stylised. Nevertheless, 
the framework has been developed in such a manner as to communicate the main 
procedural elements of policy packaging, rather than seeking to be ontologically correct. 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Objectives, measures and causality (Phases 1 and 2) 
The first phase of the framework―termed ‗determination of values, objectives and 
targets‘―initially involves the designation of particular phenomena as ‗undesirable‘ in the 
light of various ethical, moral or utilitarian value systems and world-views. Subsequently, 
political objectives are democratically agreed upon in relation to these phenomena, and 
specific (often numerous) targets are identified in order to realise the objective(s) (See Table 
4.1).6 As Feitelson (2009) reminds us, this will invariably involve the presence of competing 
values and world-views as well as markedly divergent perceptions of ‗reality‘―characteristic 
of so-called ‗wicked‘ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) or ‗messy‘ (Ney, 2009) policy problems.  
 
                                               
6 
Such objectives may be considered akin to those outlined in the UK Department for Transport‘s New 
Approach to Appraisal framework, for example: ‗reducing the direct and indirect impacts of transport 
facilities on the environment‘ or ‗improving the economic efficiency of transport‘ (DETR, 1998).  
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Table 4.1 Example of a „value statement‟, „objective‟ and targets in transport policy making 
Value statement „the current transport system should not compromise the well-being 
of future generations‟  
Democratically-agreed 
objective 
„we intend to significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions from 
passenger transport in the EU‟ 
Identified target(s) ‘we will improve the fuel efficiency of the motor vehicle fleet’ 
’we will make it easier for people to walk and to cycle’ 
’we will reduce the cost of public transport’ 
 
 
Clearly, the democratic nature of this phase necessitates the participation of a broad range 
of actors and stakeholders, including politicians, citizens, policy-makers, NGOs and 
commercial interests. The role for policy analysts is thus less clearly defined here than in 
later phases. Nevertheless, expert knowledge is a valuable resource, especially when one 
considers that the quality of early decision-making can have significant implications further 
along the policy-development process. Importantly, analysts have a lead role to play in 
ensuring that early decisions are sensitive to the objectives and targets of overlapping policy 
domains (e.g. healthcare). As will be explored in Section 4.3.3, this has the potential to 
reduce the likelihood of certain non-intentional effects. 
 
The second phase of the framework―termed ‗inventory of measures, provisional measures 
and causal assumptions‘―is comprised of three stages. First, an inventory of potential 
primary measures is created. This is intended to be an open and liberal process, with 
potential measures rarely being rejected outright at this point. The inventory could be 
comprised of a diverse array of measures, including novel or innovative ideas as well as so-
called ‗best practices‘ derived from other spatial/temporal contexts. Although by no means 
exhaustive, the sample transport policy measures discussed in Chapter 2 is illustrative of 
such inventory. May and Roberts (1995), too, offer a similar catalogue grouped according to 
infrastructure measures, management measures, pricing measures and land use measures. 
 
For Banister et al. (2000), four ‗policy orientations‘ are pertinent to the development of an 
inventory of primary measures:7  
 
 ‗Lifestyle-oriented‘ policies, whereby the intention is to assist in engendering a societal 
shift towards ‗post-material‘ lifestyles. 
 
 ‗Market-orientated‘ policies, such as fiscal reforms. However, as the authors stress, 
these measures tend to function best in socio-economic contexts where the principle of 
allocating goods and services through pricing mechanisms is broadly accepted (e.g. fuel 
taxation). 
 
 ‗Regulation-orientated‘ policies, which apply technical standards in the management of 
particular phenomena (e.g. specified speed limits or minimal zoning densities). Typically 
these are decreed by national and/or supra-national authorities rather than those with 
local or federal jurisdictions.  
 
                                               
7 
Similar considerations are put forward by Feitelson et al. (2001) as: technological measures, traffic 
management, demand management, infrastructural measures, land use measures, regulatory 
measures and economic measures. Both sets of authors, however, recognise that in practice these 
categories are by no means mutually exclusive. 
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 ‗Public infrastructure/ services‘ policies, corresponding to the provision of infrastructural 
and/or public transport services. In practice, these are often likely to be contracted out 
under competitive tendering to private sector operators (e.g. the Parisian Vélib cycle hire 
scheme).  
 
Second, this inventory is subjected to expert review and one or two primary measure(s) are 
selected on the basis of key criteria outlined by Banister et al. (2000) and discussed in 
Section 4.2.1. Are there, for example, measures available that are relatively uncontroversial, 
yet remain adaptable or have the potential to act as trigger mechanisms? Have some 
measures been proven to work in the recent past or in similar geographical contexts? Is 
there a measure which is likely to have the backing of particularly influential actors?  
 
Third, the causal assumptions underpinning this selection are codified using a ‗causal map‘. 
This final stage is intended to illustrate the direct and indirect processes by which the actors 
believe the chosen primary measure(s) will influence the various policy target(s). As Figure 
4.3 demonstrates, such ‗causal mapping‘ (Huff, 1990) is generally designed to support the 
codification and dissemination of tacitly-held causal knowledge and assumptions. In other 
words, it is essentially a diagrammatic representation of knowledge, or ―a form of visual aid 
to enhance our understanding of the thoughts of an individual, group or organisation‖ (Pinch 
et al., 2010, p. 377). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 The principle causal assumptions underpinning the UK Vehicle Scrappage 
Scheme  
 
 
4.3.2 Evaluation of effectiveness and efficiency (Phase 3a)  
Phase 3a of the framework―termed ‗evaluation: effectiveness and efficiency‘―is comprised 
of two stages, with each drawing heavily on the causal map produced in Phase 2. First, the 
likely distributional effects of the primary measure(s) are considered and evaluated. The 
intention here is to determine―insofar as is possible―the likely effectiveness and 
acceptability of the intervention in its original guise.  
 
There is a clearly a need here to discuss the place of modelling and quantitative analysis in 
the framework. Modelling, in its broadest sense, refers to the simplified representation of 
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complex phenomena and it offers numerous advantages in decision-making processes. A 
major component of the proposed policy packaging framework outlined in this deliverable 
has been a form of qualitative modelling―causal mapping. This technique has been chosen 
to play a key role in the framework because it has the capacity to collate, structure and 
present intuitive information in a manner which supports effective and transparent decision-
making. For all its merits, however, it is clear that such causal mapping needs to be 
complemented with input from robust quantitative modelling tools if decision-makers are to 
be able to make important decisions with a sufficient degree of confidence. Computerised 
modelling tools can ably indicate the strength of cause-effect relationships, assist in the 
identification of critical paths within a proposed intervention and offer structural support to 
complex problems beyond the capabilities of the human mind (see Hensher and Button, 
2000).  
 
A key aspect of Work Package 3 in the OPTIC project is a critical review of existing 
modelling tools currently available to analysts in the transport sector. In particular, this 
forthcoming work will focus upon the extent to which these tools are capable of addressing 
phenomena central to interests of OPTIC, such as the presence of synergetic relationships 
between policy measures. Given the nature of the policy packaging framework discussed 
here, however, it is possible at this early stage to highlight a number of important criteria 
which quantitative models used in Phase 3a of the process should ideally possess. First, and 
most obviously, it is necessary for models to support accurate prediction of agents‘ 
behavioural responses to a proposed intervention. Second, and very much related to this, 
they should be able to clearly indicate the likely impact of a proposed intervention on a range 
of societal groups. Finally, any modelling tools used must be compatible with the demands of 
mainstream evaluation methodologies such as cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and multi-criteria 
analysis (MCA). Both CBA and MCA are routinely used in the ex-ante evaluation of transport 
policies in order to maximise societal, environmental and economic welfare through 
transport, subject to the collective desire to allocate scarce resources to other policy 
objectives. Yet, while CBA and MCA are useful for decision-making in the context of specific 
schemes, they also potentially represent valuable tools for the appraisal of policy packages 
in a broader sense (Berechman, 2009).  
 
While the integration of quantitative modelling in this phase of the policy packaging process 
is vital to ensure high-quality decision-making, it is important to bear in mind that such 
models only constitute one of many important elements in the proposed framework. Indeed, 
the principle rationale for the OPTIC project is founded upon the fact that existing 
approaches to transport policy-making suffer an inability to adequately address those 
phenomena―such as non-intentional effects and political acceptability―which tend to fall 
‗outside‘ of mainstream modelling approaches.8 The role of modelling should, therefore, be 
that of a guidance tool in the framework. It can be incredibly valuable, but its inherent 
limitations mean that it should not solely determine the outcome of decision-making 
processes. 
 
It is particularly necessary in this phase to consider which actors will be affected, how they 
will be affected, when they will be affected, and how much political capital these actors 
possess (Feitelson, 2009; Rietveld and Verhoef, 1998; OECD, 2007).9 In a hypothetical 
policy intervention labelled ‗liveable cities‘, for example, Banister et al. (2000, p. 182) identify 
                                               
8
 Although it should be noted that some models can recognise those non-intentional effects, such as 
induced demand, which relate to pre-specified model variables. 
9 In addition to concerns of ‗who‘, ‗how‘ and ‗when‘ in terms of distributional effects, one may be 
tempted to suggest further analysis of the variables ‗why‘, ‗what‘ and ‗where‘. However, these are 
essentially either deducible from the nature of the causal model (i.e. ‗why‘ and ‗what‘) or/and are 
subsumed under ‗who‘ (i.e. where). 
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a series of stakeholder impacts likely to result from the various policy measures deployed. 
The primary beneficiaries of the measures were thought to be families with young children 
and the elderly, brought about principally by reduced car use in urban areas and a return to 
decentralised concentration land use planning. Those expected to be adversely affected, in 
contrast, were car drivers choosing to make rural-urban trips.  
 
For Feitelson (2009), a systematic approach to the analysis of interventions‘ distributional 
effects involves a procedure termed ‗actor assessment‘. The value of such an approach is 
that it supports decision-makers and analysts in developing tailored strategies for coping 
with the varying interests, beliefs, positions and power held by affected stakeholders and so-
called ‗formal authorities‘. The matrix below illustrates the basic approach, using the 
hypothetical example of a toll on road-freight (Table 4.2). 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 A framework for „actor assessment‟ (from Feitelson, 2009) 
Actor Interests Beliefs Position Political 
resources 
Hauliers Profit ―Road hauliers 
are already in a 
difficult situation, 
this would 
damage our 
industry‖ 
Anti Medium 
Consumers Low prices  ―Transport costs 
will be passed 
on to us‖ 
Anti Low (alternatively 
high as indirect 
effect of consumer 
behaviour) 
 
Manufacturers Profit ―Increased 
transport costs 
will further 
weaken our 
position vis a vis 
low cost regions 
(like Asia)‖ 
Anti High 
 
 
Next, the knowledge of the intervention‘s likely effectiveness and acceptability―derived from 
the causal assumptions and distributional effects―can be appraised against estimates of the 
intervention‘s financial viability in order to determine―insofar as is possible―whether the 
current intervention is likely to represent good value for money. The financial viability of an 
intervention is essentially the sum of its associated direct, indirect and transaction costs 
(Feitelson, 2003). Direct costs can be classed as those which are outlaid for the measure to 
be sufficiently implemented. For example, the costs incurred as a result of providing the 
necessary infrastructure for a park and ride scheme. Importantly, these can often be 
mitigated or even offset altogether by revenue generated by the measure‘s own operation 
(i.e. park and ride fares) or by other measures co-deployed in an eventual policy package 
(e.g. congestion charging). Indirect costs may be considered as externalities incurred by 
society. Transaction costs may be considered as the cost of overcoming political and 
institutional barriers, as defined earlier. 
  
At this point, it should be possible to come to an initial judgement as to whether the 
intervention is considered to be sufficient for purpose. 
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4.3.3 Prevention and mitigation of non-intentional effects (Phase 3b) 
Phase 3b of the framework is termed ‗prevention and mitigation of non-intentional effects‘, 
and can also be considered to represent an evaluative stage of the process. Traditionally, 
once a proposed intervention is considered to be an effective and efficient means of 
achieving a pre-specified policy objective, the policy development processes ends and 
implementation processes begin. This is understandable; however, the analyst‘s role does 
not cease at the moment a theoretically optimal intervention has been developed. It is also 
the responsibility of the analyst to conceptualise the problem in its fullest sense and to take 
into account the potential risks created by the presence of non-intentional effects. 
 
First, we focus on the ex-ante prevention of non-intentional effects. Essentially, this involves 
minimising the likelihood of the intervention producing non-intentional effects and may 
necessitate a degree of package redesign in order to achieve this. In Chapter 3, we 
developed a typology of non-intentional effects founded upon two core dimensions: 
‗consequence and ‗knowledge‘. The typology is illustrated again below (Figure 4.3): 
 
Table 4.3 Basic typology of non-intentional effects (adapted from Chapter 3) 
 
 
Consequence dimension 
 
A. Expedient (~ 
intentional) 
B. In-expedient 
B1 Counter 
intentional 
B2 Secondary 
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 d
im
e
n
s
io
n
 
 
W. known 
The consequences 
that decision 
makers intended 
with the intervention 
------- 
Average fuel 
consumption of new 
vehicles is reduced; 
less fuel is 
consumed 
Counter-intentional 
effects that were 
anticipated at the 
time of decision  
------- 
Cars are driven 
longer distances 
due to lower fuel 
cost/km (rebound); 
models may 
predict the effect  
Non-intentional 
effects that were 
anticipated at the 
time of the 
decision 
------- 
Longer distances 
driven lead to 
increase in 
congestion, 
models may 
predict the effect 
 
X. unknown 
Advantageous 
effects not 
anticipated; 
serendipitous 
------- 
New cars inspire 
some people to 
„green driving‟ 
lifestyles saving 
additional energy 
Counter-intentional 
effects not 
anticipated at the 
time of decision 
------- 
More people scrap 
old small cars 
leading to 
increased energy 
use for vehicle 
production and 
disposal 
Non-intentional 
effects not 
anticipated at the 
time of the 
decision 
------- 
Less public 
propensity to use 
alternative travel 
modes, leading to 
line closures 
 
 
From the typology, we can identify one category of intended effect (cell WA) – known and 
expedient (in primary policy domain, i.e. transport). This represents the desired and 
purposed effect(s) of the intervention. Providing that Phases 1 – 3a have been adequately 
performed, these should be clear at the outset of Phase 3b. We can also, however, identify 
five categories of non-intentional effect, corresponding to the following cells in Table 4.3:  
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WB1 – known and inexpedient (in primary policy domain [i.e. transport]) 
WB2 – known and inexpedient (in secondary policy domain [e.g. public health]) 
XA – unknown and expedient (in primary policy domain [i.e. transport]) 
XB1 – unknown and inexpedient (in primary policy domain [i.e. transport]) 
XB2 – unknown and inexpedient (in secondary policy domain [e.g. public health]) 
 
In order to ensure that the overall intervention is valuable and effective, it is vital to prevent 
any significant, adverse consequences that might result from the presence of such non-
intentional effects. In light of this, our framework seeks to transform as many ‗X effects‘ into 
‗W effects‘ as possible, and to ‗design out‘ as many ‗B effects‘ as possible. In other words, 
we wish to undertake two processes: improve analysts‘ knowledge of the proposed 
intervention; and improve the effectiveness of the proposed intervention. Evidently, both of 
these processes lie at the core of the packaging framework; however, in Phase 3b, they 
should take place on a much ‗broader‘ scale so as to also encompass the likely impacts of 
the proposed intervention in overlapping policy domains.  
 
Insofar as improving key actors‘ knowledge of the proposed intervention is concerned, we 
are aiming to ensure that the shared ‗causal map‘ underpinning the policy package is as 
comprehensive as possible. That is to say, it should demonstrate detailed understanding of 
the intervention‘s core mechanisms and their relations with the context in which it is to be 
applied. While the causal map can never be wholly ‗complete‘, we are thus basically 
attempting―in the first instance―to change XAs into WAs, XB1s into WB1s, and XB2s into 
WB2s, respectively. This is no straightforward task. Theoretically, however, achieving it 
involves improving both the ‗quality‘ of available knowledge (through improved research), 
and minimising the ‗distance‘ of this knowledge from the analysts‘ cognitive field.10 Given 
that changing XB2s into WB2s involves overlapping policy domains, and thus as this 
‗distance‘ is likely to be greater, this process of knowledge-enhancement will be 
comparatively more difficult and resource intensive than for changing XB1s into WB1s. 
Practically, this knowledge-enhancement would involve detailed examination of the causal 
map in Phase 2, with analysts considering how each variable may directly or indirectly have 
an adverse effect on the policy target(s) and objective(s) in both the primary policy domain 
and secondary, overlapping, domains. 
 
At this stage, once analysts‘ knowledge of the proposed intervention has been developed as 
far as possible, the (original and new) WB1s and WB2s may be considered to represent 
‗timely warnings‘. That is to say, analysts are aware of their likely occurrence, but 
nevertheless such occurrences would remain undesirable. Using the improved knowledge of 
the situation, however, in conjunction with the packaging techniques to be outlined in Phase 
4, it may be possible to reduce the likelihood of such occurrences through the removal of 
existing measures and/or the inclusion of additional measures. Theoretically, therefore, we 
can envisage a situation whereby current WB1s and WB2s are removed so as to enhance 
the contribution of WA1s and WA2s, respectively.11  
 
In addition to ex-ante mitigation, Phase 3b also addresses the ex-post mitigation of non-
intentional effects. Regardless of the resources and effort directed at their prevention, the 
presence of non-intentional effects can never be ‗designed out‘ of an intervention. Indeed, 
the contemporary economic, societal and cultural process in which policy interventions are 
necessarily embedded, bear many of the hallmarks of so-called ‗complex systems‘ (e.g. non-
linear relationships, tipping points and path-dependencies). Thus, it is vital to 
                                               
10
 See discussion of Landry et al.‘s (2002) ‗ladder of research utilisation‘ in Chapter 3. 
11
 The current typology automatically defines WA in terms of WA1, and does not currently include a WA2 
category. For the purposes of our argument, however, let us assume that such a category is present. 
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ensure―insofar as is feasibly possible―that if adverse, non-intentional effects do occur as 
the result of an intervention, the underlying policy packages are flexible enough to be 
changed in the light of such circumstances. This has important implications on the measure 
selection stage in Phase 2, and thus highlights the iterative nature of the framework. 
Measures requiring significant infrastructural developments, for example, can be difficult to 
modify, whereas pricing schemes afford greater adaptability to changing circumstances and 
flexible planning processes.  
 
4.3.4 Additional measures and inter-measure interaction (Phase 4) 
As accounted for in Figure 4.2 above, it is theoretically possible that the one or two primary 
measures selected in Phase 2―having been thoroughly evaluated in Phases 3a and 
3b―could be considered as a sufficient intervention in their own right. That is to say, in such 
a situation there would be no need for analysts to engage in ‗packaging‘ activities, per se. 
However, as noted in Chapter 2, the complexity of contemporary transportation problems is 
such that measures deployed in isolation will rarely suffice. In Phase 4, then, we are 
concerned with the manner in which analysts may modify the proposed intervention so as to 
improve its effectiveness, efficiency and/or limit its propensity to bring about non-intentional 
effects. Following Feitelson (2003), this may occur through the adoption of three strategies: 
 
1) Measure removal 
 
It may be advisable to reconsider the inclusion of certain primary measures that have proved 
particularly contentious with one or more stakeholder groups. In this situation, removing the 
measure and replacing it with another may improve the overall acceptability (and hence 
reduce the transaction costs) of the package dramatically. However, this is not an ideal 
situation, as, by virtue of its original inclusion, such a measure will inherently be beneficial in 
some way to either the effectiveness or technical/economic feasibility of the package (May et 
al. 2005a). Hence, the opportunity cost of its removal may be considerable with respect to 
the overall viability of the package. 
 
2) Context manipulation 
 
The second option for improving the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the primary measures 
lies not with the package per se, but the socio-political context in which it is being proposed. 
Specifically, it may be possible to modify this context―be it public opinion or 
otherwise―thereby facilitating the measure‘s inclusion. In practice, such an undertaking is 
likely to substantially increase the transaction costs and by definition imply the inclusion of 
additional measures to facilitate the modification of the unfavourable (for policy 
implementation and acceptability) socio-political context (see below).  
 
3) Incorporation of additional measures 
 
Finally, in the light of the causal map, distributional effects, financial viability of the primary 
measures and/or the likely presence of non-intentional effects, it may become evident that 
effectiveness and/or efficiency of the intervention might be improved through the 
incorporation of additional measures (i.e. the creation of a policy package). Perhaps barriers 
to acceptability are evident, for example, and additional measures may help to placate this 
opposition; or perhaps information failures are likely to exist and additional measures may 
help to increase the effectiveness of those primary measures that rely on a threshold degree 
of public knowledge. It may also be the case that non-intentional effects can already be 
foreseen and need to be addressed. Indeed, there can be many reasons which call for 
expansion of the package. 
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Essentially, this third strategy follows very much the logic of ‗critical pragmatism‘ (Banister, 
2003), whereby a balance is struck between the various interests held by relevant 
stakeholders implicated in the intervention. This strategy is thus framed in contrast to 
positivistic, instrumental approaches which conceptualise decision-making to exist in a social 
vacuum, with little or no consideration of public or stakeholder involvement, and ‗consensus-
seeking‘ approaches such as collaborative planning, which can undermine effective yet 
contentious policies.  
 
As Banister et al. (2000) note, the process of selecting additional measures is liable to be 
both deductive and inductive; deductive, as it may draw on a preconceived vision of the 
future―as in the case of ‗backcasting‘―and inductive because it may allow for the 
development of policy packages based on the novel combination of potential measures 
hitherto deployed only in isolation. Moreover, the identification of such potential additional 
measures―which may have grown beyond those in the original inventory discussed in 
Phase 2―should, at this stage, be based on intuition, clear delineation of causal 
assumptions built on the earlier causal model, and professional expertise and experience, as 
more detailed evaluation of additional measures‘ impacts will take place later in the phase.  
 
Indeed, May and Roberts (1995) offer a convincing rationale for not dismissing potential 
measures out of hand, as they may possess valuable attributes not immediately apparent. 
Like Feitelson (2003) and the OECD (2007), they highlight a number of core ‗rejection 
criteria‘ that analysts may be tempted to employ during this phase: 
 
 First, potential measures may be seen as technically unfeasible, as existing legislation 
may not be adequate to support them. Writing in the early 1990s, they interestingly use 
road pricing as an illustrative example of this.  
 
 Second, a measure may fall under a different jurisdictional scope to that of the 
implementing body. Thus a fuel taxation measure could be seen as an inappropriate 
measure to include in a municipal authority‘s policy package as this falls under the 
prerogative of central government. This principle holds sway at all scales of governance, 
insofar as measures may fall ‗above‘ or ‗below‘ one‘s jurisdiction. 
 
 Third, measures may be rejected on the grounds that dispersal of responsibilities has 
made it difficult to plan integrated strategies (e.g. integrated bus and rail ticketing 
following the privatisation). 
 
 Fourth, some measures, for example, light rail, may be viewed as prohibitively expensive 
and thus rejected on grounds of resource constraint. 
 
 Fifth, some measures may be viewed as publically unacceptable (e.g. traffic restraint). 
 
 Finally, sixth, some measures demand new and unproven technologies and are thus 
rejected on the grounds of risk and uncertainty.  
 
Given these multiple reasons for not incorporating measures into a package, May and 
Roberts (1995) argue, it would seem straightforward enough to create a package based on 
the handful of measures that are not, in some significant way, affected by one or more of 
these ‗rejection criteria‘. To do so, however, is to miss two important points. First, as policy 
packages are generally intended to be implemented over a medium to long 
timeframe―often two decades or more―one cannot be certain that the same constraints on 
implementation present at the outset will also be present in the medium to long-term future. 
Indeed, in the fifteen years since May and Roberts‘s (1995) paper was published, we have 
seen a number of prominent road pricing schemes adopted in capital cities across the world, 
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including Singapore, London and Stockholm (Santos, 2004).12 Second, a central component 
of the rationale for policy packaging is the identification of those constraints which, upon 
reflection, appear far from ideal and should be removed. For example, if the nature of rail 
privatisation has reduced policy-makers‘ ability to enact comprehensive change, via the 
dispersal of responsibilities highlighted above, then this may, in part, constitute a valid 
reason for reviewing and potentially modifying the nature of the service provision. In 
essence, it is these ‗rejection criteria‘ that act as the main rationale for expanding the 
package with additional measures in order to allow the inclusion of measures which 
otherwise will have to be rejected. Whether to expand or shrink the package is mainly a 
question of the marginal transaction costs and benefits. These additional measures, which 
might allow the inclusion of measures that otherwise will be rejected, might not be directly, or 
at all, related to any of the policy targets. 
 
A central component of Phase 4 is the systematic analysis of what we have termed ‗inter-
measure interaction‘. This process is concerned with establishing detailed knowledge of 
potential additional measures‘ likely relationships and, hence, examining the extent to which 
such measures may or may not, directly or indirectly, improve the quality of the proposed 
intervention. This is likely to be a highly complex process, as it requires detailed and 
considered appraisal of the nature and magnitude of the relationships between both the 
measures themselves, between the measures and the policy target(s)/objectives and 
between the measures and existing policies already in place. Indeed, it will be a challenge 
simply to achieve such an understanding of likely interactions in a conceptual sense; 
extending the analysis so as to provide definitive estimates of the magnitude and 
probabilities associated with each relationship will be harder still, but nevertheless desirable 
if possible at relatively low financial and time costs. Success in this phase will thus be 
strongly dependent upon the capabilities and accuracies of modelling―which later OPTIC 
work packages explicitly address.  
 
How, then, to decide upon which policy measures to add to the starter package and which to 
omit in order to increase its overall effectiveness? The essential criteria by which a potential 
additional measure would warrant inclusion in the policy package relates to whether it is 
likely that the total marginal benefits (TMBs) resulting from its inclusion will outweigh the total 
marginal cost (TMCs) of its inclusion. Here, TMBs refer to the net positive effect of an 
additional measure on the effectiveness of the intervention, whereas TMCs represent the 
sum of the additional measure‘s associated financial and transactional costs. This distinction 
between individual marginal benefit and total marginal benefit is, of course, a vital 
one―precisely due to the presence of synergetic and/or contradictory effects. Essentially, 
the total marginal benefit represents the net effect an additional measure would have on the 
policy target. For example, if a road pricing scheme constituted the primary measure in an 
intervention designed to reduce congestion, the total marginal benefit resulting from the 
addition of a Park and Ride service would be the difference in congestion levels pre and post 
its addition. Establishing the marginal benefit of implementing the measure in isolation is 
thus of limited value, as such marginal benefit may well be either offset or augmented by the 
presence of other measures. 
 
Following Taeihagh et al. (2009a, 2009b), it appears probable that two particular varieties of 
additional measures are likely to lead to net marginal benefits: 
 
                                               
12
 Recent attempts to introduce road pricing in regional cities have, however, met with more hostility; 
for example, the UK cities of Manchester and Edinburgh.  
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1) Pre-conditional measures  
 
These can be defined as measures, without the inclusion of which, one or more other 
measures will not function. In essence, such relationships represent critical paths in the 
causal map of the intervention. As such, measures to which other measures are act as a 
pre-condition to them are likely to have a high transaction costs and thus also financial costs, 
since they require the inclusion of the pre-condition measure.  
 
2) Synergetic/facilitatory measures13  
 
These can be defined as measures which support the functional ability of one or more other 
measures, although these other measures can still be implemented independently. The 
OECD (2007) suggest that there are at least five different purposes for synergetic 
relationships within any given policy package, those that: ‗provide information‘, ‗stimulate 
innovation‘, ‗address split incentives‘, ‗limit monitoring and enforcement costs‘, and ‗reduce 
compliance cost uncertainty‘. Earlier work by May and Roberts (1995), too, identifies three 
fundamental ways in which measures can be considered ‗synergetic‘. First, they can be 
complementary in terms of their joint impact on users. For example, in addition to road 
pricing, the London Congestion Charging scheme simultaneously allocated significant 
resources to improvements in the public transport network. The net effect of implementing 
two or more of these complementary measures in conjunction with one another, it is argued, 
is larger than that would otherwise be obtained if one merely combined the effects of each 
measure hypothetically deployed in isolation. Second, two or more measures can be 
complementary in the sense that one may make the other(s) more financially feasible. For 
example, fees generated by parking measures might in turn provide the financial capital 
necessary to fund the construction of new infrastructure. In extreme situations, these may 
constitute pre-conditional relationships. Third, measures may be complementary in the 
sense that one might make another more socially or politically acceptable. To return to a 
previous example, the fact that a substantial part of the revenue generated by the London 
congestion charge was earmarked for public transport improvements made the former more 
palatable to those affected (see also Jones, 1991).  
 
Correspondingly, two particular varieties of additional measures are likely to lead to a net 
marginal cost: 
 
2) Redundant measures 
 
These can be defined as measures which make no effectual contribution to the policy 
package beyond that already provided by existing (primary or additional) measures. Simply 
put, this occurs where inclusion of an additional measure in a package will have little or no 
additional impact on the net benefit of the package beyond that which existed prior to its 
inclusion. Such redundancy clearly leads to unnecessary administrative costs and further 
entails that packages run the risk of becoming overly large and complex, at the expense of 
effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility (OECD, 2007). It is also advisable to refrain from 
incorporating additional objectives beyond those directly concerned with the problem/ 
externality in question. Thus in the case of a transport policy package, it may make more 
sense to address the bulk of non-transport objectives (e.g. social security), by other means 
(ibid.). 
 
                                               
13
 Taeihagh et al. (2009) make a conceptual distinction between these two types. However, for our purposes we shall 
consider them to be synonymous. 
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2) Contradictory measures 
 
These can be defined as measures that produce conflicting outcomes or incentives, which 
mean that they are ‗at odds‘ with the purpose of other (primary or additional) measures. As 
Feitelson (2003) and the OECD (2008) both note, such contradictory relationships can 
particularly arise in situations where a policy package seeks to address more than one 
objective.14 If, therefore, as may occur, the inclusion of an otherwise valuable additional 
measure serves to detract from one or more other measures and ergo on one or more other 
policy targets, then a broader decision-making approach must be pursued. Specifically, such 
a situation necessitates that one must establish both the extent of the measure‘s influence 
on the range of policy targets and the relative weight of importance attached to each of the 
policy targets (Feitelson, 2003). This latter consideration will again entail an assessment of 
the targets‘ distributional effects, and may be derived in conjunction with stakeholders via a 
form of Multi-Actor Multi-Criteria Analysis (MAMCA) (see, for example, Macharis et al., 
2010). 
 
Crucially, the new knowledge produced in Phase 4 must remain grounded in all of the 
concerns addressed in Phases 2, 3a and 3b. Hence, the framework is iterative in nature; 
provisional additional measures that are deemed to be potentially useful in Phase 4 must be 
incorporated into the intervention‘s overall causal map and, subsequently, the analysis 
undertaken in Phases 3a and 3b must be repeated in light of the new package structure. The 
policy packaging process ends when the package is deemed to be sufficient when appraised 
against both the criteria in Phase 3a (i.e. it is an effective and efficient means of meeting a 
policy objective) and Phase 3b (i.e. it affords the prevention and mitigation of non-intentional 
effects).  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
As noted in the introduction, policy packages offer a far greater potential for effectiveness 
than single policy measures deployed in isolation. To maximise this potential, however, 
substantial thought must be given to their design. OPTIC will require a framework that is able 
to specify: relevant package targets, package orientation, transport sub-sector(s) affected, 
and spatial/ temporal scales of action. Essentially the existing literature on the topic initially 
advocates building a package around one or more primary policy measures. To this starter 
package, supplementary measures may be added in order to improve the package‘s 
effectiveness, acceptability, and feasibility.  
 
It is important to reiterate that policy packaging is not an exotic dalliance or some kind of 
luxury technique only to be applied in times of bountiful resources; rather we need to stress 
that, in the current political landscape, it should represent the de facto approach to policy-
making. Even when resources are constrained to the extent that designing and implementing 
a large package of heterogeneous measures is prohibitively expensive, the value of policy 
packaging theory still remains highly relevant for evaluating the likely nature of the 
interactions between any new measures proposed and those existing ‗in the field‘.  
 
                                               
14
 The OECD (2008) give the example of measures designed to support agricultural provision and 
those designed to tax nitrogen-loading fertilizers. 
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5 Summary and future work 
This deliverable represents the conceptual foundation of the OPTIC project. In particular, it 
has sought to provide the theoretical resources necessary to develop our understanding of 
the complex causal processes involved in contemporary policy-making at the European 
level. Essentially, this concluding chapter has two complementary purposes; it is intended to 
provide a concise summary of the preceding chapters and, importantly, it is intended to 
situate the contributions that these chapters have made in the wider context of the OPTIC 
project and forthcoming work packages. 
In Chapter 2, we firstly examined the nature of transport policies and processes of policy 
analysis in the European Union at both the supra-national and national scales. Attention was 
directed at a number of areas, including the principal institutional actors involved in agenda-
setting and decision-making, together with an overview of some of the key instrumental 
mechanisms upon which political interventions in the transport system typically depend. Of 
particular significance was the range of overarching EU policy documents, collectively 
stating the main problems related to transport in the Union, the goals for the EU transport 
policy and favoured approaches to achieving these goals. We secondly complemented this 
with a broad overview of policy measures that have been implemented across a range of EU 
member states in recent years. This exercise demonstrated that non-intentional effects and 
barriers to successful implementation are frequent occurrences in such interventions, 
regardless of measures‘ specific objectives, types and geographical scales. 
Recognising the complex and heterogeneous nature of the non-intentional effects 
highlighted in Chapter 2, and those documented elsewhere in the published literature, 
Chapter 3 sought to develop a systematic typology of such effects. As noted, the purpose of 
this exercise was not to establish a universally applicable taxonomy for all aspects of 
intentions and effects of transport policies, but rather to create a schema tailored to the 
specific needs of policy-makers and associated actors. As a result, the typology was 
concerned with establishing conceptual clarity, providing a useful categorisation of types of 
non-intentional policy effects and supporting the design of policy packages later discussed in 
Chapter 4. The final typology is extremely detailed and undertakes to analyse the nature of 
policy effects with respect to numerous variables. Nevertheless, the fundamental 
contribution of Chapter 3 is evident; it demonstrates the importance of actors‘ situational 
knowledge, the accuracy and breadth of their causal assumptions and the real and 
perceived range of their jurisdictional influence. Furthermore, and equally as important, it 
brings the issue of non-intentional effects to the fore; by acknowledging their existence, and 
by starting to define their characteristics, this analysis affords accounting for them in the 
early stages of policy design, thus reducing the need to take remedial action at a later date.  
In Chapter 4, we sought to develop a framework for policy packaging with an in-built 
predisposition to the prevention and mitigation of non-intentional effects. Moreover, this 
prerogative was coupled with input from wider debate in the literature concerning the need 
for interventions in the transport system to be both effective and efficient. We stressed at the 
outset of the chapter that the proposed framework was not to be viewed as a prescription; 
nevertheless, in supporting the efforts of later work packages, we actively sought to 
converge on a set of interrelated principles that logically support the project of policy 
packaging in its broadest guise. Following a review of policy packaging developments in 
previous EU-funded transport research, four ‗core elements‘ of a policy package were 
outlined in accordance with key academic and policy literature: primary measure(s); 
effectiveness measures, acceptability measures and feasibility measures. Attention was then 
directed to the procedural aspects of policy packaging, reiterating and building on the salient 
issues raised in the previous two chapters. Appendix 7.4 reports on the team‘s efforts to test 
the policy packaging framework in a workshop scenario.  
Overall, the deliverable concludes that policy packages offer a far greater potential for 
achieving policy targets and objectives than single policy measures deployed in isolation. 
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Indeed, the nature of the objectives present in current EU policy requires such an approach. 
Yet, a careful and relatively well designed process (as described in Chapter 4) must be 
undertaken for these packages to be effective. Furthermore, we argue that policy-packaging 
as an approach to policy making should be adopted, certainly by the EU and also by other 
bodies involved in policy making at various spatial and institutional levels, as the de facto 
approach to (transport) policy-making. This approach probably provides the best way to 
reduce the extent of policies‘ ex-post non-intentional effects.  
 
With the body of relevant knowledge gathered and built upon in Work Package 2, and 
described in this deliverable, Work Package 3 can now proceed to examine to what extent 
current state-of-the-art modelling and forecasting techniques can facilitate the identification, 
ex-ante, of non-intentional effects and thus contribute to their prevention and mitigation. 
Similarly, with the typology of non-intentional effects in mind, Work Package 3 will also 
examine ways in which unavoidable non-intentional effects can be identified as early as 
possible in the various phases of the policy package. Later in Work Package 3, alternative 
remedial actions in response to the non-intentional effects will be examined.  
Simultaneously, efforts in Work Package 4 are being directed at examining various EU 
transport policy packages (defined according to the definition provided in Chapter 4) with the 
aim of identifying real-world ‗best practice‘ examples of policy packaging techniques. As the 
research proceeds, the typology of non-intentional effects in combination with the framework 
for policy packaging will be revisited and modified in light of such experience, mainly by 
moving from a theoretical dimension to the empirical and applied dimension of policy 
making. 
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Inventory of policy measures 
 
[Please see final pages in landscape format] 
 
7.2 Disciplinary perspectives on non-intentional effects 
 
In Chapter 3 policy effects have been introduced and categories with a special focus on non- 
intentional effects were proposed. The typology is intended to be general and not bound to 
by any particular scientific paradigm or theory. The potential advantage of this is that it may 
be applied without making particular assumptions inherited only from one research 
discipline. This is particularly appropriate a transport context, since transport policy is a 
highly interdisciplinary research topic. 
Different research disciplines and theories can however be helpful to identify a range of 
potential explanations of why the unintended effects occur in the first place, what has 
presumably caused them, and thereby also how they could be potentially dissolved or 
mitigated. For example, an unintended effect of a vehicle fuel efficiency standard may be the 
rebound effect that makes driving cheaper and potentially induces other traffic at already 
congested roads. Economic analysis may allow to identify and predict this effect, based in 
models for elasticities of consumer response to price changes, and hence to consider 
possible compensatory measures in advance, if need be. This is a good example of the 
scientific reasoning: the theory points to a mechanism, that may trigger various non-
intentional effects, rather than describing a specific type of effect itself as  done in chapter 3. 
Again the combination of input for various disciplines can be relevant, taking into account the 
complexity of transport systems and their interactions with surrounding systems and policies. 
In this appendix we provide a brief overview and some examples of theoretical concepts that 
can contribute to the understanding of why some unintended effects may occur. The 
concepts are mostly from economics and political science.  
To set the scene Figure 1 very roughly illustrates elements in a potentially successful policy 
intervention with regard to how different research may contribute to identify different types of 
mechanisms that can cause non-intentional effects in connection with the intervention. 
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Figure 7.1 Steps in a transformation of a policy intention (formed in the policy‟s genesis) to 
its impacts on society, nature or other endpoints (intentional as well as non-intentional). 
Feed backs are assumed, but the illustration is deliberately simplified to illustrate the main 
points of this appendix. 
 
We start in the right hand side where the emphasis is on what can be called the Instrumental 
policy effectiveness, or the effectiveness of the policy instruments themselves with regard to 
influencing the object of regulation (e.g. a behaviour, or a system) leading to the desired 
outcome of interest. This is similar to what Feitelson (2003) calls ‗goal-oriented‘ measures‘. 
Instrumental effectiveness of such measures has arguably been the main focus of policy 
making research in general (Bressers and Klok, 1988), not less so in transport research.  
A wide variety of research contribute here. Natural sciences  and engineering can for 
example help to assess policy effects based on theories, models and  observations of how 
energy input is transformed to physical movement of vehicles or vessels, and how the 
transport flows interact in networks leading to effects on everything from capacity, to wear of 
surfaces, accident risks, human health and global environmental impact far from the source. 
Without such knowledge it would often be difficult to calibrate transport system interventions 
in way that would not produce numerous non-intentional effects (Leutzbach,1987; Litman, 
2007; Health Service Scotland 2007,. Hakkert et al., 2007). Obviously human behaviour is 
also crucial for policy outcomes. Psychology, economics and other human and social 
sciences are therefore applied to predict for example elastic, or perhaps defective 
behavioural reactions among different groups of people targeted by an intervention. 
Thomson et al (2008) in an example of a wide interdisciplinary review of studies of 
unintended health effects of traffic, including ex post assessment of noise effects of a 
bypass, air quality related health impact of a ban on high sulphur fuels, health benefits of 
cycling, crime prevention effects of traffic surveillance, and stress effects of commuting by 
road or train. 
However, according to Healy (1986), the instrumental research normally assumes ―...that 
policy goals can be best attained by the manipulation of causal variables in the social 
environment (social engineering) and that the most efficient means of attaining these goals 
can be (scientifically) determined by an ends-means analysis (instrumental rationality) ― 
(Healy 1986, p 383  ). Earlier stages in the transformation of policy intent to desirable 
outcomes have frequently been ignored or neglected as if they were more or less 
‗automatic‘, something that has increasingly been criticised (Bressers and Klok 1988; Topp 
1995). 
Implementation 
 feasibility 
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effectiveness 
Political  
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Hence research has moved backwards in the chain,  realising that policy intentions do not 
transform to adequate interventions by themselves. Factors such as policy implementation 
feasibility (Winter 2003;  Pressman & Wildavsky 1984) and before that political acceptability 
(Guiliano 1992) have come to the fore as factors that may produce disturbances to the 
successful realisation of policy intentions in additions to those associated with the 
instrumental effectiveness. A diverse range of social science disciplines and theories within 
them have been applied, including areas like institutional and behavioural economics and 
political.  
Below some of the key relevant concepts of economic theory are reviewed followed by a 
brief account of some contributions from political science.   
 
7.2.1 Economics  
Economics provides a wider range of approaches to identify and understand possible 
unintended effects along several parts of Figure 7.1, ranging from the instrumental aspects 
to the implementation and acceptability related ones.  
From an economic point of view, special concern is needed to effects in the impact end that 
are externalities, meaning that the consumption or production choices of one person or firm 
enters the utility or production function of another entity without that entity‘s permission or 
compensation (Kolstad, 2000). This can be both positive and negative, depending upon the 
nature of the transaction. A negative externality could be congestion caused by a driver 
choosing to travel during peak hour traffic, creating further congestion and thereby disutility 
for other drivers. Externalities, can indeed be interpreted as an economic perspective on 
non-intentional effects. According to theory, a well functioning market is the optimal 
mechanism to ensure efficient achievement of society‘s goals; an externality is thus an 
anomaly, which may detract from the optimal solution. The ‗positive‘ externality could be 
equivalent to the ‗overdone‘ measure, or the serendipitous effects discussed in chapter 3. 
 
Increasing returns 
Increasing returns can lead to externalities, positive or negative. Mohring (1972) provides a 
classical example based on data from urban bus transport in the Twin Cities metropolitan 
area in the United States. Here he finds first best arguments for subsidising the bus service. 
The argument rests upon the value of waiting time, and the headways between the busses. 
If, say the headway between the busses is reduced by half, the welfare effect is increased 
with more than a half as the service level is increased and the cost of waiting is reduced.  
With economies of scale it is impossible to predict ex-ante the effect of the different market 
forces. There are possibilities of multiple equilibriums and is difficult to predict the outcome. 
Increasing returns can also cause the economy gradually to lock itself in to an outcome not 
necessarily superior to alternatives, not easily altered, and not entirely predictable in 
advance (Arthur, 1988).  
The most important causes of increasing returns in the transport market are: 
1. Network externality  
2. Supply externalities  
3. Learning-by-doing  
4. Economies of scale  
5. Increasing returns to information  
6. Technological linkages  
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Transport systems, behaviour and complexity 
Transport economics has extensively studied target group behaviour in terms of likely 
response to policy interventions such as changes in supply of transport, prices of transport 
or other market interventions (Small & Verhoef 2007; Burgess & Tavazzy 2004). However (in 
accordance with Richardson 2005, p 29), ―each transportation system is complex, and this 
complexity derives from the pluralism of its hardware (infrastructure and vehicles) and of the 
people and organisations involved. The complexity is multiplied by the existence and roles of 
different modes, regulatory and legislative bodies, service providers, builders, financing 
systems, technologies, land-use patterns and most importantly human behaviour‖.  
Form an economic perspective this has serious consequences. Most economic thinking uses 
simplifications and models to understand the world. These models will capture the essence 
of the process and help us understand it, but in doing so things are left out. This does not 
need to be a serious issue, but it can be. The alternative to this simplification is a set of very 
complex dynamic models with many variables and different lags. This in turn might easily 
become a black box limiting, rather than helping our understanding of the processes 
involved. In other words, transport systems are difficult to model precisely. This is not only 
linked to the internal complexity of the system, but also to external factors, such as risk and 
spill over effects from other markets, feedback effects with different lags etc.  
 
Transport policy implementation and acceptability 
As already noted economic research also extends into implementation problems and 
acceptability in transport, the ‗earlier stages of the chain in Figure 7.1 (Niskanen 2003; 
Ramjerdi and Brundell-Freij, forthcoming). Some examples of key concepts are discussed 
below. 
Asymmetric information 
A specific issue of relevance for policy effectiveness and implementation is asymmetric 
information which is studied in behavioural and institutional economics. Asymmetric 
information includes a series of important problems for policy implementation. Typically the 
policy maker has an informational handicap when meeting with the involved parties. Other 
asymmetries relate to for example assessment of the quality of a product. This can be 
related to the selection of companies involved in the production of services in the transport 
sector. One example could be that a low quality, low price producers take over the market 
after a deregulation of say taxi service in a particular city. The consumers are unable to 
distinguish between high and low quality service (before buying the product). High quality 
service providers cannot credibly state that they are not low quality and thus the low quality 
service will drive the high quality service out of the market..  
This can possibly be exemplified with the deregulation of taxi services in the Dublin area, as 
described by Longva and Bekken (2003). Here entry was deregulated in 2000 resulting in a 
massive increase in supply of taxies. As the price was kept regulated, and did not respond to 
an increase in operating costs, the average income per hour fell and the number of working 
hours needed to maintain a living increased from about 40 per week to an average of 60 
hours per week. This again affected the quality of service provided. According to (Longva 
and Bekken, (2003), this has not been the general result from taxi deregulation in Europe.  
 
Principal – Agent relations 
Principal-agent relations also involve asymmetric information. This theory is very well 
described in Laffont and Tirole (1993). In a transport system setting the agent will typically 
be a company and the principal a public institution. The outline is a situation where the agent 
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has more information than the principal. The principal acknowledges this and is therefore 
confronted with the problem of accepting the proposal given from the agent at face value or 
to dismiss it. The agent will choose to give information according to what is most beneficial 
for the agent. So if it is beneficial for the agent to exaggerate its cost, he/she will do so. The 
solution of this problem can be to let the agent to choose from a menu of contracts that allow 
the principal to observe the cost-type of the agent. In other words the menu of contracts 
must allow the agent to earn some profit from its private information in order for the principal 
to get to know the cost structure of the agent. It is necessary for the principal to know the 
type of agent, in order to minimise his own principal‘s expenditure. In this way the non 
intentional effects are eliminated  
An example of the principal-agent relationship is the relation between the authorities and the 
operating companies, under a tendering regime. Under such a regime various incentives and 
risk sharing arrangements can be made by the authorities in order to make the operating 
companies‘ best option to act in accordance with the authorities objectives.  
 
Rent-seeking 
Rent-seeking can be defined creating an income from seizing an income flow rather than 
creating one. In the private sector rent is often related to monopolistic behaviour. In rent-
seeking terms the government can be seen as a creator of rents, and that those involved in 
government can seek rents wherever possible. Many problems that can be labelled rent-
seeking are related to unintended policy effects. The term can be applied to many aspects, 
including policy making, policy implementation, and the behaviour of private actors in 
response to the policy.  
Rent-seeking related to policy making can be both from the side of the politician and the 
bureaucrat, each seeking to extract rent from their position. This rent can take forms ranging 
from campaign funding, gifts, future career opportunities and bribes in exchange for ‗special 
treatment‘ in other words rent creation (typically in the form of laws or regulations written in 
order to target a specific interest group (duly or unduly).  Rent-seeking related to policy 
implementation, can involve searching for positions where there are possibilities to earn 
rents (in various forms) that are more attractive than the nominal position suggests. This can 
be bureaucratic positions which include the auctioning of subsidies or monopolies.  
There are several ways to control rent-seeking, Hindriks and Mayles (2006) point at two. (1) 
A limit on the effort that can be put into rent-seeking. This can for example be a set of rules 
to improve transparency.  (2) To restrict the process of rent creation. The most important 
principle here is the principle of equal treatment of economic actors, thus limiting the amount 
of rent that can be earned. A problem with both of these approaches is that there are several 
instances where differential treatment between actors, or some limits on transparency are 
due. 
 
 
7.2.2 Political science 
Political science and research is the last area we will consider. This field of research has 
originally its point of departure in the very opposite end to the instrumental types of research, 
namely in the phases preceding the policy measures and instruments; in the political system 
and its structures and actions. In fact political science did not traditionally pay too much 
attention to policy effects but was more concerned with the constitution and enactment of 
political power itself. Hence the first category of ‗political acceptability‘ could be a topic on 
which this field had something to contribute.  
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However the last decades have seen a flourishing of research in policy making and 
implementation processes, and especially why policies do not always pass smoothly and 
unchanged from its genesis and design at the political level into the intended signals to the 
target groups of the policy (Winter 2003; 1990; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). 
Implementation reach has become almost a sub-discipline of its own. Associated sub-
disciplines such as policy analysis have further contributed to connect political studies with 
the field of practical policy assessment and hence even also to instrumental types of issues, 
in addition to traditional critical ones.  
Implementation represents a significant critical phase in the policy process, and not as 
earlier believed a simple transmission tube. Hence the actors involved there are potential 
sources or generators of non and even counter intentional effects in comparison with what 
decision makers may have intended, and it is also a phase that may exert influence on what 
can be considered intentional versus non intentional in the first place  
According to Winter (2003) Implementation process effects can be related to uncoordinated 
intra- or interorganisational behaviour; behaviour by street level bureaucrats (= front line staff 
with their own agenda or conditions ); and by unexpected target group behaviour, for 
example efforts to evade or even counter the policy intervention (e.g. ‗fuel tax protests‘).This 
reflects the position  of the ‗target group‘ as not only a passive, if crucial component to be 
captured in causal instrumental policy models but also potentially strategic factor in the 
production of unintended effects; connected to the fourth category ‗feedback‘ in Merton's set 
(see chapter 3 Table 3.3).  Inter- and intra-organisational behaviour refers to public 
agencies, but can also include private organisations in cases where such organisations have 
responsibility for the implementation process. Implementation processes may also involve 
unforeseen costs.  
Related to the problem that the policy is aiming to solve, policy outcome effects designate 
the effects of changes in the behaviour of the target group brought about by the outputs. The 
target group of a given policy is not necessarily equal to the beneficiaries of the policy. 
Instead, they might be the ones that the policy sees as responsible for causing the problem 
at stake, e.g. measures to reduce traffic in a street to the benefit of the dwellers (e.g. noise) 
or children (e.g. traffic safety). Hence, it might be the target group‘s behaviour that needs to 
be changed in order for the group suffering from a given problem to benefit. The target 
group‘s reactions to output may be as expected, take on an unintended form, or indeed not 
take place at all (Sager 2007: 274). Among outcome effects of transport policy we find 
citizens acceptance and behaviour, as well as effectiveness of the policy. 
Recent work by Flyvbjerg (2009), illustrates how non intentional effects can occur at a much 
earlier―but arguably no less important―phase: that of project planning and appraisal. 
In lieu of the widespread adoption of New Public Management (NPM) philosophy during the 
1980s and 1990s (Overman and Boyd, 1994), public contracts for transport infrastructure 
projects are commonly allocated to private actors on the basis of competitive tendering 
practices. The rationale behind this approach is well-known and a fundamental tenet of free-
market economics; a competitive market is considered to lead to the most efficient use of 
scarce resources. The intended effect of the competitive tendering for public infrastructure 
projects is thus that the commissioning bodies commissioning the work receive greater value 
for money than they would otherwise enjoy if they undertook the work ‗in-house‘. The 
problem with this approach, as Flyvbjerg (2009, p. 352) observes in The Survival of the 
'Unfittest', is that ―strong interests and strong incentives exist at the project approval stage to 
present projects as favourably as possible—that is, with benefits emphasised and costs and 
risks de-emphasised‖, moreover, ―local authorities, local developers and land owners, local 
labour unions, local politicians, local officials, local MPs, and consultants all stand to benefit 
from a project that looks favourable on paper and they have little incentive actively to avoid 
bias in estimates of benefits, costs, and risks.‖ As interviews with promoters and forecasters 
revealed, for these actors, underestimating costs and overestimating benefits is, of course, a 
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rational approach to securing funding in a competitive market. Thus for Flyvbjerg (2009), the 
unintended adverse effect of current tendering and appraisal regimes is that, ceteris paribus, 
it is not the objectively ‗best‘ proposals that are successful in bidding for public funds, but 
rather those that lead to the greatest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in practice. Once 
again, this might be considered a primary counter intentional effect because it is detrimental 
to the very same objective that the policy of competitive tendering is designed to positively 
influence: efficient allocation of scare public resources. 
Some of the observations of the political science perspectives may also be anaysed with 
economic concepts and vice versa. 
 
 
Summary 
In summary, various scientific disciplines offer different accounts and types of explanations 
of what may cause non-intentional effects of policies, from the instrumental effect models of 
natural and technical sciences revealing potentially invisible and distant impacts, over the 
complexity-dependent systemic and behavioural models of economics and other 
social/human sciences to the studies of implementation failures and asymmetric information 
of actors involved in the policy making process. Undertaken in political science and 
economics 
The different disciplines cover different areas or similar areas with different lenses. All of 
them may be relevant for non-intentional effects of transport policy making. 
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7.3 Policy packaging in EU projects 
 
In recent decades, a number of EU projects have directly and indirectly addressed issues of 
policy packaging. This section reviews nine projects that were undertaken during the 4th, 5th 
and 6th Framework Programmes―OPTIMA, POSSUM, TENASSESS, FATIMA, SAMI, 
SPECTRUM, TRANSPLUS, SUMMA, and TRANSFORUM―and provides a short synopsis 
for each, based upon their conclusions and recommendations. Reflecting the development 
of policy packaging processes over time, the projects are presented in chronological order.  
 
OPTIMA -  Optimisation of Policies for Transport Integration in Metropolitan Areas 
Date: 1995 – 1997; FP: 4 
 
The OPTIMA project attempted to identify optimal urban transport and land use strategies for 
a range of urban areas within the EU. Policy instruments at various levels and including 
management, land use, infrastructure and pricing measures were examined in this context. 
Based on case studies carried out on different European cities, general guidelines for urban 
transport policies within the EU were developed. Their conclusions for creating effective 
policies relating to urban transport were that strategies should be based on combinations of 
measures, and should draw fully on the synergy between successful measures. These 
measures relate to infrastructure measures, management measures, pricing measures and 
land use measures. They also conclude that when implementing policies and optimising 
procedures, careful thought must be given to the policy implications of each stage of the 
process. In addition, public acceptability will be a significant barrier with those measures 
which reduce service levels or increase costs which implies the need for effective public 
relations campaigns, and carefully designed implementation programmes. 
 
POSSUM - Policy Scenarios for Sustainable Mobility 
Date: 1996 – 1998; FP: 4 
 
The goal of the POSSUM project was to construct scenarios for achieving the objectives of 
sustainable mobility and to assist the Commission in future decisions about the Common 
Transport Policy and the development of the Trans-European Networks. One special focus 
was on policy packages and how they can be created to increase their effectiveness and 
maximise synergies. Two approaches were chosen to create these packages: first, a more 
deductive, systematic approach based on the policy goals as a guideline to define the outline 
of the packages; and second, a more intuitive, inductive approach starting from the list of 
policy measures which allowed a creative process of inventing new combinations of policies. 
It was further acknowledged that some policies may have to evolve step by step and 
continuously be adapted to external factors that are more or less impossible to predict and 
manage. On the basis of the POSSUM project, Banister et al. (2000) published the book 
European Transport Policy and Sustainable Mobility. We draw heavily on this work in later 
sections. 
 
TENASSESS -  Policy Assessment of Trans-European Networks & Common Transport 
Policy 
Date: 1996 – 1999; FP: 4 
 
In TENASSESS a study of policy processes was carried out in order to support the 
assessment of policy and to collect empirical material for the development of two decision 
support tools: the TENASSESS Policy Assessment Tool and the TENASSESS Barrier 
Model. In the project, four ‗ideal type‘ transport policy frameworks were distinguished: first, 
traditional transport planning with a regional focus and on infrastructure investments; 
second, as the traditional framework but with greater private sector involvement; third, a 
liberal approach with regulation through pricing mechanisms and taxation; fourth, an 
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ecological approach. While no policy framework belongs to only one of these types, they 
show the main cleavages between different national and EU transport policies. Three 
general conflict areas were identified for the implementation of the Common Transport Policy 
(CTP): first, conflicts about competencies on local, regional, national and European levels; 
second, thematic conflict relating to environmental vs. economic development; third, conflicts 
related to the re-structuring of the transport market. 
 
FATIMA - Financial Assistance for Transport Integration in Metropolitan Areas  
Date: 1997 – 1998 
FP: 4 
 
In the FATIMA project, while looking mainly at strategies for using private finance to support 
urban transport provision, a number of more general recommendations were given for policy 
makers for the design of optimal transport strategies. One was that strategies should be 
based on combinations of measures, and should draw fully on the synergy between 
successful measures. For formulating strategy/policy the following steps were 
recommended:  
 
1. Clearly identify the policy objective(s);  
2. Where a set of policy objectives is identified, indicate what the appropriate trade-off is 
between them (assuming, usually correctly, that they are to some extent in conflict);  
3. Identify the set of policy measures which are to be considered, and which can be 
expected to have a strategic impact (in particular, list those which meet the latter 
requirement);  
4. Specify the range(s) within which the measures in (3) can be applied, and the factors 
which limit that range (financial, political, legislative etc.);  
5. Specify any other overall constraints (e.g. financial) on the specification of optimal 
strategies;  
6. Employ a transport model which enables the full range of measures in (3) to be 
assessed against all the objectives (1), taking into account of all the user responses 
(mode, time of day, destination, frequency, route) of strategic relevance, and all the 
supply interactions (congestion, overcrowding, queuing) of strategic relevance;  
7. Follow an optimisation procedure to identify the optimum, taking into account 
constraints where appropriate;  
8. Check that this optimum is feasible and acceptable and modify if necessary;  
9. Decide whether it is appropriate to use private finance or private sector operation, or 
both. If so, decide how best to employ them within the context of a socio-
economically optimum strategy.  
 
Of these steps, the most problematic in terms of practical transport policy-making were 
considered to be Steps 1 and 2, and it was argued that these should be given special 
attention by policy-makers. 
 
The steps listed above implicitly assume that all policy impacts can be measured 
quantitatively and that transport models are available for predicting the levels of such 
impacts. If policy impacts that cannot be measured quantitatively are taken into account, a 
different approach, in which the optimisation process incorporates both fuzzy data and 
qualitative judgements, would be needed.  
 
SAMI - Strategic Assessment Methodology for the Interaction of CTP Instruments  
Date: 1997 – 2000; FP: 4 
 
The objectives of the SAMI project were to develop an approach for setting targets for 
transport policy and provide a methodology and supporting software for selecting and 
evaluating packages of policy measures to reach those targets. In SAMI, the nature of 
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interaction between policy targets was determined according to three characteristics: 
direction, intensity and precedence. The ‗direction‘ refers to whether the interaction is 
synergetic or contradictory, the ‗intensity‘ describes the power of the interaction―if there is 
no intensity then there is no interaction between the targets―and ‗precedence‘ refers to 
which of the targets generates a reaction in the other. This latter characteristic considered 
necessary because in many cases interactions between targets are not symmetrical, even 
though also symmetrical cases exist so that either target can generate a reaction on the 
other.  
 
In addition such interactions can be characterised by ‗structural‘, ‗circumstantial‘ and 
‗instrumental‘ dimensions. A structural interaction is considered permanent, independent of 
the current positions and point of view, as well as of the orientations adopted for action in 
pursuit of those targets. One of the major factors contributing for a structural interaction is a 
strong commonality of stakeholders engaged (positively or negatively) in the two targets 
being considered. A ‗circumstantial‘ interaction refers to a situation where a change in one of 
the targets would lead to changes in the direction and intensity of its interaction with the 
other. Finally, an ‗instrumental‘ interaction means that the interaction between targets is 
likely to depend on the instruments or policy orientations adopted for their pursuit. 
 
In the SAMI project, a quantitative planning approach was developed which aimed to 
determine the optimal level of instrument implementation in order to maximise specified 
social objectives. This is similar in nature to the methods reviewed in the OPTIMA project. 
Suitable policies were first selected from an inventory of policy options which contribute to 
one or more policy targets. Synergies between policies and feedback mechanisms between 
policies were then identified using expert groups. Subsequently, suitable policies were 
ranked in order to indicate their likely impact on each of the policy targets. From the highest-
ranking policies, a ‗trigger policy‘ was then selected – a policy which contributes significantly 
to the policy targets but which presents few major obstacles to implement. The trigger policy 
forms the basis for the construction of the policy package. Having identified the trigger 
policy, the process follows a series of similar stages where complementary policies are 
identified. In the first stage, one or more policies that are most complementary to the trigger 
policy are identified. In turn, for each of the complementary policies identified, one or more 
policies that are most complementary to them are identified. 
 
SPECTRUM - Study of Policies Regarding Economic Instruments, Complementing 
Transport Regulation and the Undertaking of Physical Measures 
Date: 1998 – 2002; FP: 5 
 
In the SPECTRUM project, a more market-orientated approach to managing the transport 
network was explored. Case studies were carried out at both urban and interurban levels to 
provide quantified evidence on the performance of a range of economic and other 
instruments, whether implemented alone or in packages. Instrument performance when 
implemented in packages were categorised according to the following outcomes: 
complementarity, which exists when the use of two instruments gives greater total benefits 
than the use of either alone; additivity, which exists when the welfare gain from the use of 
two or more instruments in a policy package is equal to the sum of the welfare gain of using 
each in isolation; synergy, which occurs when the simultaneous use of two or more 
instruments gives a greater benefit than the sum of the benefits of using either one of them 
alone; decreasing returns, which occur when the welfare gain of the simultaneous use of A 
and B is smaller than the sum of the benefits of using either one of them alone; and 
incompatibility, which refers to a combination of instruments that does not lead to any 
welfare benefits and is not suitable for a combinatorial application. These definitions indicate 
the broad direction of interaction effects that may be seen to occur in practice through the 
implementation. 
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Instrument performance was also compared with respect to two other aspects: efficiency 
gains and feasibility issues. Efficiency was assessed by looking at economic efficiency in a 
strict sense (i.e. excluding external environmental, health, safety and security concerns) and 
equity (specifically, intergenerational equity). Feasibility considered five factors: 
political/cultural acceptability; legal/institutional acceptability; financial requirements; 
practical/technical requirements; and potential unintended effects. In addition, instruments or 
packages may involve a number of costs not reflected in the analysis, such as costs of 
monitoring and enforcement or public information costs. Considering efficiency and feasibility 
together the following conclusions were made:  
 
1. In an urban context, economic instruments performed best overall when implemented 
in packages with other instruments, particularly those that involved improvements to 
public transport. Urban instruments performing less well overall included economic 
instruments implemented in isolation. In the interurban case, marginal cost pricing 
measures were performing best.  
2. Overall it should be considered that policy instruments that provide efficiency gains 
without costs to a particular stakeholder or group are rare and possibly non-existent. 
For example changes in public transport fares would be at the cost of the operator, 
which may be unacceptable for privately operated public transport systems.  
3. The key to a successful move towards a greater use of economic instruments would 
seem to lie in a package of measures where the costs are spread in such a way that 
the barriers on feasibility are low across the board and there is not a strong adverse 
impact on any single indicator.  
4. Another issue is the maturity of the transport system. A system that is already mature 
(in the sense of levels of saturation, current instruments in use, levels of future 
demand and other factors) may have much to gain from a step change in 
management approach and be less resistant in terms of barriers.  
5. There are situations when certain instruments that would optimise policy packages 
cannot be used due to restrictions, for example, inflexible legislation or public 
acceptability issues. A number of approaches can be used to reduce this problem: to 
combine restricted instruments in a policy package with publicly acceptable 
measures; to alter the rules in the framework to account for certain rules not being 
met due to restrictions in the use of instruments; and to substitute an alternative 
instrument for the restricted instrument. 
 
TRANSPLUS -  Achieving Sustainable Transport and Land Use with Integrated Policies 
Date: 2000 – 2003; FP: 5 
 
TRANSPLUS aimed at identifying best practice in the organisation of land use and transport 
policies in European cities and regions. It was recognised that the implementation of a land 
use and transport strategy usually implies the combination of several policy measures. It is 
assumed that the objectives can be achieved more effectively by using packages of policies, 
whereby the combination of complementary and mutually supportive measures facilitates 
their implementation and/or intensifies the respective impacts. Mutual interactions may be: 
benefit enhancing, insofar as a measure reinforces the benefits of another; acceptance 
enhancing, insofar as a measure makes another more acceptable for citizens and/or 
stakeholders (e.g. specific provisions to compensate losers); resource providing, insofar as a 
measure provides more financial or technical resources for the implementation of another 
measure; or simply logistical, insofar as they may represent a prerequisites for other 
measures. 
  
The TRANSPLUS project further noted that to implement a land use and transport strategy 
does not simply require identifying a suitable list of policy measures. Rather, it involves the 
integration of several processes and actions into a coherent, and comprehensive framework 
that includes: deliberation, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, identification of 
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complementary policies, coordination between authorities at different levels of government 
and the participation of citizens and stakeholders. 
 
Full policy integration requires activating this policy cycle and strengthening the links 
between different institutions with open and dynamic forms of co-operation. However, the 
real challenge is to maintain the coherence of the policy cycle over a long time period, 
involving different decision makers at neighbourhood, city, regional and national level, as 
well as ensuring the participation of relevant stakeholders and civil society. A number of 
activities which increase the likelihood of transferability and success were identified:  
 
1. Collaboration: in some instances pairs or groups of cities will work together formally 
to develop similar systems and the transfer of innovation will take place through the 
structure of a specific project. These may include skills exchanges and staff 
secondments.  
2. Networking: many cities participate in networks, facilitated by NGOs, where they 
gather to share experiences and transfer expertise through conferences, workshops 
and other media. 
3. Dissemination: cities who have successfully implemented a new solution will 
disseminate their results to other cities through conferences and journals.  
4. Osmosis: eventually an innovative solution becomes mainstream practice. At this 
point the process of transfer becomes hard to monitor, and further transfer takes 
place through a process of osmosis until the solution becomes standard practice.  
 
The main purposes of such participatory approaches relate to: improving the quality of 
resulting plans and their effective implementation; developing common guidelines for action 
programs; avoiding and/or solving conflicts; raising awareness and encouraging changes in 
behaviour; and initiating the learning processes and social empowerment of the participants.  
 
SUMMA -  Sustainable Mobility, Policy Measures and Assessment  
Date: 2003 – 2005; FP: 5 
 
SUMMA was designed to support policymakers by providing them with a consistent 
framework for making trade-offs, where appropriate, among the economic, environmental 
and social components of sustainability. Although special focus of this project was on 
sustainability and all the challenges related to it in the context of mobility, many conclusions 
are relevant for policy measures in general as most problems are multidimensional. It was 
concluded in SUMMA that policy makers should try to develop policy packages to address 
the different dimensions of sustainability. Thus, policy measures should be dealt with in an 
integrated manner, as it is unlikely that any single policy measure can by itself help attain a 
sustainable transport system. Due to the complexity of some problems―e.g. CO2 
reduction―policy packages must often include a wider range of policy measures, for 
example, management of land use and technological development. In SUMMA a strong 
recommendation is given towards policies based on charges as opposed to policies based 
on subsidies, at the same time realising that the context of the policy must be considered as 
well.  
 
SUMMA further noted that transport has both large positive and negative impacts. Thus, 
policymakers are faced with the conundrum of simultaneously stimulating the positive effects 
and mitigating the negative effects. The following factors are were deemed to be particularly 
significant: 
 
1. The externalities, both the negative and positive environmental and social impacts, of 
transport are usually not included in the monetary calculations of transport costs. 
Thus, decision-makers lack information about the total effects of their decisions on 
the transport system and on society. Similarly, users do not have to pay for the 
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environmental and social damage resulting from their use of the transport system 
and their transport choices. Since information about, and awareness of the impacts 
costs is not complete, responsibility for the negative effects is not assigned to 
anyone, in short the costs of the negative impacts are ignored. 
2. Transport and mobility are an integral part of society. Thus, it is extremely difficult to 
bring about changes in the transport choices made by people and in the functioning 
of the transport system and move towards a more sustainable transport system as 
long as changes are not made in the non-transport choices of people and in other 
sectors of the economy. 
3. Existing structures are resistant to change. Innovations are only slowly adopted in the 
transport market and the capacity of the political system to reflect the increasing 
need for political measures is limited. Established structures also hold back 
behavioural patterns of transport choices from changing. 
4. Finally, due to the fact that there are large and many positive and negative impacts of 
transport, there are also a number of conflicting interests: the interests of 
environment are in conflict with those of the economy and interests of individuals 
conflict with the interests of society as a whole. These differing interests disperse the 
willingness and capacity of the society to tackle the problems of the transport sector. 
 
TRANSFORUM - Scientific Forum on Transport Forecast Validation and Policy Assessment  
Date: 2005 – 2007; FP: 6 
 
The TRANSFORUM project provided an overview and a forum for critical discussion about 
assessment methods and model development which part of projects in the Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Framework Programs. By screening EU policy instruments assessing FP projects, 
policy themes and issues were identified. From these, policy questions and, in turn, policy 
indicators were derived. These indicators were analysed as to their 'fitness for  purpose' 
based on five criteria: whether the indicator was clearly derived from policy, whether it could 
be measured, whether data were available, whether it was suitable for forecasting, and 
whether they could be considered key indicators. Based on the analysis it was found that 
different indicators for policy objectives are used in almost all European projects, optimal 
indicators are used for project purposes and generally no clear description had been given 
as to how indicators were derived from policy objectives as formulated in policy documents.  
 
A common set of indicators was presented for assessing EU policy. Even though they may 
not be suitable for assessing every possible policy, they may be used to assess common 
aspects in a consistent and comparable way. Four groups of indicators were defined for this 
purpose: core indicators for policy objectives, other indicators for policy objectives, indicators 
for policy measures and indicators for other 'contextual' factors. TRANSFORUM 
recommended that DG-TREN promote the use of a common set of indicators that can be 
regarded as fit for purpose for monitoring the current situation of social developments 
relevant to transport, the assessment of new transport policy packages, the monitoring of 
policy implementation and ex-post evaluation.  
 
TRANSFORUM further noted that it is increasingly recognised that individual policy 
instruments should be combined into comprehensive policy packages. Two main reasons 
were believed to be responsible for this development: first, natural synergies may exist 
between individual instruments; and second, for reasons of public acceptability, packaging 
may be required in order to balance a potentially unpopular instrument (such as road pricing) 
with a popular instrument (such as improved public transport). When designing and selecting 
policy packages, it was argued that consideration needs to be paid to: the extent of the 
inventory of potential measures (i.e. has the widest possible range of instruments for 
packages been screened?); the basis for ranking and selecting policy packages (i.e. 
intuition/heuristics or a formalised selection framework); the potential interaction between 
policy instruments (i.e. synergetic and contradictory relationships); the method used for 
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developing policy packages (i.e. participative or otherwise); and the acceptability of 
instruments/ policy packages amongst various stakeholders. Finally, many barriers may 
prevent certain policy packages from being actually exploited, or implemented. Policy 
packages may appear too radical, and/or may simply raise extreme opposition amongst 
particular stakeholders.  
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7.4 OPTIC Workshop: feedback and response 
 
7.4.1 Introduction 
 
In order to receive valuable external perspectives on the content of this deliverable, an 
expert workshop was organised to test the proposed framework for policy packaging. The 
workshop took place in Brussels on 21 April 2010 and comprised an array of participants 
with backgrounds in academia, policy-making and the wider transport industry. After briefly 
describing the nature of the workshop activities, including a brief overview of the group 
exercise upon which many of the participants based their feedback, this appendix discusses 
a number of issues which arose from the workshop that we consider to be particularly 
significant. It is important to note, however, that the results of the workshop remain 
contingent on the setting, group composition and other constraints. Thus, the exercises 
undertaken cannot be viewed as analogous to the use of the proposed framework in the ‗real 
world‘.  
 
7.4.2 Workshop overview 
 
The workshop began with introductory presentations from the OPTIC team and a 
representative of the EC Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport. Following this, the 
proposed framework for policy packaging was presented, based primarily upon the content 
of Chapters 3 and 4 of this deliverable. At this stage, the workshop participants were 
encouraged to ask ‗high-level‘ questions of the proposed framework, in order to ensure that 
the conceptual aspects of the approach had been adequately communicated.  
Subsequently, the workshop participants were divided into three groups and asked to test an 
abridged version of the policy packaging framework in the context of a given policy problem. 
Given that the time available for the exercise was only 90 minutes, Phase 1 of the 
framework―determination of values, objectives and targets―was pre-specified for the 
participants (see Table 5.1). Also pre-specified were inventories of primary measures 
tailored to the nature of each group‘s transport domain and policy objective.  
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
Transport domain Urban transport 
Long-distance 
passenger transport 
Long-distance freight 
transport 
Given policy objective 
The reduction of traffic 
congestion 
The revitalisation of rail 
transport 
Optimising exisiting 
networks using 
intelligent transport 
systems 
 
Table 7.1 Group characteristics in workshop exercise 
 
For the participants, the principle goal of the exercise was to design an effective and efficient 
policy response to the problem using the proposed OPTIC framework. In essence, they were 
thus attempting to select a variety of policy measures which, taken together, would positively 
influence their given objective, whilst ensuring value for money and reducing the likelihood 
and extent of non-intentional effects. The process followed by the participants was strongly 
moderated by members of the OPTIC team to ensure that the proposed framework was 
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closely followed. This ensured that the feedback received remained relevant within the 
context of this deliverable.  
In accordance with the packaging framework set out in Chapter 4, the workshop participants 
were first required to first select a primary measure from the inventory provided. 
Subsequently, and following the techniques discussed previously in Section 4.3.1, the causal 
reasoning underpinning the selection of their primary measure was explicated using a causal 
mapping approach. This mapping approach served two principle purposes: first, it provided a 
clear and comprehensible focal point around which the participants were able to debate and 
articulate their collective strategies for reaching the intended objective; second, it supported 
the participants‘ ability to predict the likely distributional effects of their strategies and the 
implications of their chosen measures with respect to non-intentional outcomes (Figure 7.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 The causal mapping approach in use (long-distance passenger transport group) 
 
Using the maps in this manner thus facilitated the next two stages of the exercise: first, 
evaluating the chosen measure with respect to its likely effectiveness, costs and key 
uncertainties; and second, evaluating the measure with respect to the likely presence of 
unintended effects. This analysis was also supported with the use of actor assessment 
tables, as described in Section 4.3.2 (Figure 7.3). In light of the evaluation, and in 
accordance with the OPTIC framework, the participants in all three groups opted to 
complement their primary measures with additional measures.  
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Figure 7.3 The actor assessment tables in use (urban and passenger transport groups) 
 
Obviously, time constraints prevented a truly comprehensive appraisal of the framework. 
Nevertheless, the exercise involving the abridged version proved to be a valuable means of 
stimulating discussion as to the merits and limitations of the approach to policy packaging 
outlined in this deliverable. Following the exercise, the participants were given time to reflect 
upon their experiences. In particular, we asked to answer two key questions:  
 
1) To what extent is our policy packaging framework likely to be useful 'in the field'?  
 
And 
 
2) Are the elements and stages present in the process sufficient, or are some useful aspects 
missing?  
 
A representative from each of the three groups acted as a rapporteur and discussed the 
collective responses to these questions in a final afternoon panel discussion chaired by 
OPTIC. This panel discussion also enabled the OPTIC team to receive feedback on the draft 
version of Deliverable 1 from selected participants who had been sent advance copies. 
 
7.4.3 Significant themes 
 
As with all such participatory events, many comments, questions and recommendations 
were made throughout the workshop, during both the group exercises and the final panel 
discussion. Some of these related to issues with which the OPTIC team were already 
familiar and this served to strengthen our resolve to ensure that the proposed policy 
packaging framework can be clearly communicated to a range of audiences. However, given 
the range of viewpoints afforded by the workshop participants‘ diverse professional roles, 
some of the comments received highlighted issues which the OPTIC team had yet to 
sufficiently acknowledge. Specifically, the workshop served to illustrate those issues which 
were deemed particularly significant by key stakeholders, which the remainder of this section 
shall discuss. 
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System boundaries and critical paths 
Despite the fact that it only lasted for a short while, the group exercises convincingly 
demonstrated the complexity of contemporary policy-making. The causal maps generated by 
the participants developed rapidly from a relatively simple cause and effect relationship 
between the primary measure and the policy objective, to an intricate web of relationships 
connecting an extraordinarily wide variety of economic, social and environment variables.  
Given OPTIC‘s focus on the interrelationships between policy measures and efforts to 
mitigate the adverse implications of unintended effects, it is clearly encouraging that the 
issue of complexity in policy-making came to the fore in the workshop. However, while it may 
be admirable to acknowledge the presence of complexity in contemporary transport policy-
making, recognition per se is clearly insufficient as a means of supporting high-quality 
political decision-making. In other words, whilst it is helpful to understand policy domains as 
complex phenomena, policy-makers must also be able to manage change in complex policy 
domains.  
There is thus a need to strike a balance between recognising and interrogating the 
complexity of transport problems, and limiting this complexity to a level which decision-
making can realistically proceed. On the one hand, too much complexity may lead to data 
overload and paralysis of decision-making. On the other, an overly-simple model of a policy 
domain is likely to narrow the scope of relevant knowledge to such a degree that the 
effectiveness and efficiency of a policy package will be severely undermined. Moreover, as 
demonstrated in Section 4.3.3, reducing the breadth of actors‘ understanding would both 
increase the likelihood of non-intentional effects as well as limiting policy-makers‘ capacity to 
effectively mitigate such effects when they occur. In essence, there currently appears to be 
an inverse relationship between the degree of complexity recognised in the analysis of a 
transport policy problem, and the resultant capacity of policy-makers to adequately respond 
with an effective and efficient intervention. This is naturally exacerbated by OPTIC‘s inter-
modal and inter-jurisdictional scope.  
So what can be done to move beyond this problem? How can analysts recognise complexity 
and at the same time make effective interventions? The answer, broadly, relates to appraisal 
of the causal relationships and, specifically, to the identification of critical paths. 
Fundamentally, the numerous variables in the causal map of a potential intervention will 
differ in terms of their relative importance; some variables will be highly significant in the 
context of the intervention, while others may be relatively peripheral to the key issues of 
concern.15 Bearing in mind the need for decision-makers in one jurisdictional domain to pay 
heed to the implications of their decisions elsewhere, there is thus a need to focus analysts‘ 
efforts on those variables which are both particularly significant and which fall under their 
jurisdictional sphere of influence. Weighting the variables in this manner is likely to be a 
resource-intensive process, although it could be facilitated through the use of decision-
support systems.  
 
Integration of modelling and quantitative assessment 
As the variables in the analysis vary in significance, so the relationships that link them also 
vary in terms of magnitude. Ensuring that the characteristics of these relationships are 
accurately known is clearly vital if policy-makers are able to make informed decisions about 
the best way to reach a given objective (i.e. through the ranking of alternative options). It is 
important to stress, therefore, that the causal mapping is subsequently to be supported by 
quantitative analysis. This will be crucial in order to limit the uncertainty in the causal maps 
                                               
15
 However, it must be remembered that the degree of ‗importance‘ will be relative to actors‘ 
positionality. This has implications for jurisdictional issues. Health etc... 
Page | 100  
 
and thus to support the identification and analysis of critical paths amongst the complex 
array of variables present.  
Key to this process will be the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods. We very 
much agree with feedback from the workshop that this may be best facilitated through a 
series of iterative steps, whereby quantitative techniques are used to clarify and assess 
initial qualitative assumptions, with the quantitative output of such assessment forming the 
basis for further qualitative reflection and discussion. As we see it, this would have two 
principle benefits: first, it would help to identify the most significant variables in the complex 
causal models, helping to identify critical paths; second, it would give greater confidence with 
respect to the relationships between these variables. Together, this knowledge would 
enhance the overall quality of the packaging process, giving confidence to results and 
facilitating the comparative assessment of different policy packages. 
Following feedback from the workshop, we have updated the content of Section 4.3.2 to 
ensure that it explicitly highlights the role of modelling in the policy packaging framework. In 
addition, Work Package 3 in the OPTIC project will critically evaluate the capabilities of 
existing models to support the packaging process as outlined in this deliverable.  
 
Defining objectives 
As stressed in Section 4.3.1, the workshop highlighted the importance of setting clear policy 
objectives, complemented by measurable policy targets at the outset of the policy packaging 
process. This was argued to be crucial if subsequent policy packaging efforts are to be 
meaningfully evaluated. Furthermore, participants noted the importance of ensuring that the 
inventory of measures created in Phase 2 of the framework is as comprehensive as 
possible. In particular, it was recommended that each measure in the inventory be assessed 
against a range of relevant criteria such as its likely effectiveness, its propensity to cause 
non-intentional effects and its major distributional effects. In line with the iterative nature of 
the framework, this could initially be based upon proxy indicators and subsequently updated 
following quantitative analyses described above. 
 
Guidance and structure 
The nature of the group exercises undertaken in the workshop illustrated that the guidance 
provided by OPTIC was only partially able to ensure that the proposed framework could be 
followed by policy-makers independent of OPTIC moderation. In part, this resulted from the 
nature of the group dynamics and reluctance on the part of some participants to fully engage 
with the format of the process, as denoted in the guidance material provided. However, it is 
clear that this guidance could be improved. In particular, it was felt that a greater degree of 
prescription would be of benefit, as would a more formal approach.   
It is, of course, always difficult to represent and communicate the nature of a dynamic 
process in the form of guidance material. This is particularly evident in the case of the policy 
packaging framework where there is a definite tension between the iterative, theoretical 
approach outlined and the inevitable changes that this approach will undergo in order to be 
practically applied. For example, Phases 3a and 3b in the framework are to be considered 
as parallel processes, yet unless significant resources are available, in practice these would 
proceed sequentially. The famous ‗chicken and egg‘ analogy is useful here: we want to 
create both effective and acceptable policy packages. If one starts the process with a 
concern only for measures that are effective, it is almost certain that some will subsequently 
prove to be unacceptable, and one could argue that this is a waste of resources. However, if 
one starts the process with a concern only for measures which are acceptable, there is a 
genuine risk that many will prove to be ineffective and one may also dismiss measures 
which are likely to be highly effective yet unacceptable. There is no straightforward solution 
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to this issue of translation and communication. The OPTIC team can only strive to develop 
clear, prescriptive guidance which is sensitive to the practicalities of policy-making.  
In addition, the workshop also highlighted the need to acknowledge the salience of 
organisational dynamics and the positionality of decision-makers in the overall policy 
process. Although ostensibly similar to issues of jurisdiction and responsibility mentioned 
throughout this deliverable, this pertains directly to the capacity of policy-making bodies, 
such as the European Commission, to facilitate the processes of policy packaging that we 
have outlined within the organisation. These are not completely new issues for the OPTIC 
project to take into account, but rather they demonstrate the need to acknowledge issues of 
implementability at a broader range of scales than has previously been recognised. The 
business strategy methodology Six Sigma was recommended as a potentially useful 
instrument with which to clarify the optimal organisational environment for high-quality policy 
packaging processes. Initial consultation of the academic literature on Six Sigma certainly 
appears to indicate that it can provide valuable insight into the nature of organisational 
dynamics (see, for example, Schroeder et al., 2008; Anthony and Banuelas, 2002).  
While the proposed framework aims to address most of the elements and stages involved in 
the process of policy packaging, it does not address the 'space' nor the 'actors' directly 
involved in conducting the process. This is crucial, as it is not only the outside 'political' world 
which shapes eventual policy, but very much also the internal dynamics and actors within 
the organisation, indeed the unit within it, responsible for designing the package. In this 
respect, it is useful to draw from the experience of commercial companies who are faced 
with similar challenges and the way this is handled within the organisation. The literature on 
‗total quality management‘, and more recently Six Sigma, is certainly useful here although 
such instruments must remain sensitive to the everyday realities of policy making. 
 
 
Stakeholder engagement 
Finally, the role of non-policy stakeholders in the policy packaging process was also raised 
by a number of participants. The discussion essentially hinged upon one question: to what 
extent should external stakeholders (e.g. industry bodies, haulage companies, airlines) play 
a role in developing policy packages? Official approaches to policy-making often play down 
the involvement of such actors in the formative stages of policy design. The rationale for this 
is highly understandable, both for reasons of pragmatism and democratic ethics. However, it 
is no secret that many regulatory measures stem from industry demands (e.g. rent seeking 
behaviour; demand for fair competition/ access to markets; or consumers demanding 
protection/rights). The case for greater stakeholder engagement in the policy packaging 
process was made in the workshop. Not least, it was argued that stakeholders have 
unparalleled insight into the nature of the transport systems as they are manifested in 
everyday personal and business practices. Hence, their knowledge of the subtleties and 
nuances of the transport system may well create a much richer and more detailed causal 
map of the policy intervention in question. This was thought to be particularly valuable with 
regard to the ex-ante identification of non-intentional effects. Clearly, however, although 
external stakeholders offer valuable knowledge and experience to the process, it would be 
naive to imagine that their contribution to policy-making would not be guided in some way by 
their private agendas. Hence, their involvement must be managed in a specific and strategic 
manner. One potential approach could involved setting up ‗closed fora‘, where stakeholders 
are able to speak frankly about their experience without overly influencing the decision-
making process. 
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7.4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The policy packaging workshop was a valuable and insightful event which highlighted many 
of the strengths and limitations of the framework outlined in this deliverable. The participants‘ 
comments and recommendations have been acknowledged and will doubtless offer valuable 
guidance to the OPTIC team as the project progresses. Finally, it should be noted that the 
typology of non-intentional effects outlined in Chapter 3, although presented at the 
workshop, generated little in the way of critical feedback―either positive or negative. As this 
typology is central to the project‘s development, we envisage that future discussions with 
external stakeholders may focus on this issue in greater depth.  
 
